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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
1.         Pakistan’s trade indicators reflect low outward orientation, concentration on low value added 
activities and an undiversified product mix which out of line with the fastest growing areas of world 
demand.  The export share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has remained low and falling—from 
13 to 11 percent in 2010, while 45 products account for around 83 percent of exports, with 10— 
mostly from the textiles and garment sector—representing more than half. As a result, textiles and 
garments  share  of  exports  has  been  consistently  exceeded  60  percent  while  food  and  leather 
accounted for an additional 17 percent and engineering, barely 2 percent. On the other hand, the 
engineering share of world trade has grown to 60 percent from rising export powers in East Asia and 
Latin America, while the world’s textile shares have remained at stagnant 6 percent, but even here, 
strengthening competitors is South Asia, new competitors in South East Asia are competing for a 
stagnant 6 percent of world trade, making competition even more fierce in the commodities in which 
Pakistan’s traditionally specializes. 
 
2.         There have been many good signs in Pakistan’s trade performance in recent years which 
provides a strong basis to build upon, as the policy mix considers the role of trade in Pakistan’s 
growth agenda. While, there have been periods of low growth, usually in response to recession in 
developed  countries,  when  the  world  grows  and  Pakistan’s  policies  are  conducive  to  trade 
orientation, a strong supply response is witnessed.  Greater diversification occurred during the 2000s 
with the share of exports going to textiles falling from 68 percent in 2003-04 to 55 percent in 2007- 
08 to 52 percent in 2010-2011.  The rising share of note during this period was food (from 10 to 14 
percent) and other manufactures (from 16 to 20 percent), but there was considerable attempts at 
export diversification – both new products and new markets—at low levels, often unsustainable 
levels of activity. 
 
3.         Pakistan currently faces a difficult challenge of stabilizing, reforming and growing, all under 
difficult conditions of commodity price volatility, tight finance and dampened world demand. The 
persistent deterioration in the global economy has certainly created difficult external conditions for 
developing countries to transform, strengthen and diversify their own economies through export led 
strategies.  For  countries  like  Pakistan  which  export  to  the  markets  experiencing  the  largest 
contraction, renewed demand for their exports will require additional time to enable excess labor and 
unbalanced fiscal positions to be accommodated, possibly forestalling high demand conditions for 
some years to come. 
 
4.         Still, both in spite of, as well as because of the most difficult world and home market 
conditions in recent memory, Pakistan faces little choice but to reduce exporting biases and position 
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its business sector to look outward for prosperity, once markets revive. The ability to expand, 
diversify and upgrade production requires imported capital goods and intermediates as part of the 
global supply chain process. Increased exports are needed to offset the shrinking invisible account 
surplus as well, thereby providing scare balance of payments financing.  Most importantly however, 
export growth remains an outcome of productive, innovative and sophisticated firms.  As such, 
attention to success in exporting—along with its many behind-the-border, at-the-border and other- 
side-of-border success factors—has been, and continues to be, a central theme and policy goal in 
economic management in recent months and for years to come. 
 
Pakistan’s Starting Conditions 
 
5.         Crises have indeed also been important features of Pakistan’s history. Several of these have 
had profound consequences for the shape of the economy, the structure of its political system, and 
the way the country’s citizens look at the world outside. In dealing with them, the policymakers of 
the day adopted approaches that left their mark on the development of the country. Crises were 
caused by different sets of circumstances, and have numbered into the double digits, depending on 
how one characterizes crises. Four crises are highlighted due to their very strong impact on the 
economic structure today. 
 
 Dividing Society: Before Pakistan emerged as an independent Muslim state, colonial rulers in 
British India became concerned that the economic system was putting the Muslims under 
considerable economic pressures, particularly in Muslim dominated areas. While the laws 
that were put on the books to protect the Muslim peasantry achieved the objective, there were 
unintended consequences of exacerbating the Muslim-non-Muslim divide and contributed to 
the mass movement of people in the months around the time of the carving out of a new 
Muslim state. Resettling refugees and social divide has become an enduring challenge for 
realizing the benefits of economic integration—nationally, regionally and internationally. 
 
 A Difficult Neighborhood: In the years immediately following the partition of India and the 
creation of Pakistan, the creation of a predominantly Muslim Pakistan and a predominately 
non-Muslim India led to potential conflict that surfaced the moment Pakistan was born. There 
was the perception among the first generations of Pakistani leaders that first administration in 
India was attempting to undo partition and fold back the newly created Muslim state into 
India. This perception was to become the basis of public policymaking in Pakistan for 
decades and led to a series of crises related to the emerging conflict with India—deeply affect 
the structure, direction and performance Pakistan’s economy ever since. 
 
 State Dominance of the Economy: The ideological underpinnings of the administration in 
power was more important as the source of crises in India than was the case for Pakistan as 
for almost four decades, the Indian state was put on the commanding heights of the economy. 
However, in Pakistan two administrations devised and implemented economic policies based 
on ideology: socialism in the case of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) and Islam 
in the case of President Ziaul Haq (1977-88). While the changes were less substantive in the 
latter case, in the former case, the policies adopted had lasting adverse consequences. 
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  Impact of Poor Governance: Two periods in Pakistan’s history are relevant: the first in the 
  decade following the birth of the country when there was enormous jockeying for power, no 
  institutions to intermediate between contending political forces and the resulting political 
  chaos and economic confusion. Pakistan was placed under military rule and a new economic 
model due to the differences among the newly empowered political forces.1 Neither he nor 
  his  program  survived  and  he  was  forced  to  resign.  Poor  governance  of  a  similar  type 
  reappeared in 2008-12, causing an already bad economy to turn to crisis. 
 
6. 
 
 
Despite and because of these crises, Pakistan’s position in world trade has changed little over 
the past three decades.  As Pakistan’s market share in the world has been declining during the last 
several years, those of Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand have doubled, and China’s has tripled. 
Pakistan’s average trade-to-GDP ratio in the late 2000s was roughly the same as a decade earlier and 
has been declining in recent years. Along with this declining export share, two markets - the United 
States (US) and the European Union (EU) - absorb two thirds of Pakistan’s total exports while the 
export  bundle’s  reliance  on  a  few  commodities  making  it  highly  susceptible  to  global  market 
volatility of type which has become commonplace. 
 
7.         Meanwhile, aided by large reductions in trade barriers and technological advancements, 
export oriented countries led by China and India and other emerging markets have become major 
drivers of global trade in goods and services, respectively. Moreover, world trade has undergone a 
dramatic transformation toward the global fragmentation of production, resulting in greater trade 
flows, particularly within supply chains, and an increased the variety in the types of traded goods and 
services—a trend that has largely eluded Pakistan.2 
 
8.         This evolving trade landscape is likely to exact more pressure on firms in other developing 
economies to improve productivity through better industrial organization, in order to enhance its 
“trade competitiveness” and benefit from the growing opportunities for new entrants on the 
international market. However, growth and competitiveness requires more than abstract formulation 
carried out in isolation. Increasingly, competitive countries are taking aggressive steps to enhance 
domestic competitiveness in order to measures up to competitors who are doing the same. 
 
9.         Pakistan’s current and potential competitors, even those with similar endowments of skill and 
technological capacities at present have become relatively more open and more integrated in world 
trade, and as a result recorded large gains in the amount or exporting firms were successfully 
recording. Successful performers are not restricted to China and East Asia’s “new Tigers” like 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam but also include Turkey, Costa Rica, 
Chile, and Mauritius. 
 
10.      In most countries a significant reduction in anti-export bias was achieved as result of 
maintaining  relatively  low  tariffs  and  a  competitive  exchange  rate,  supplemented  by  effective 
regulatory  regimes.  The  result  has  been  to  reduce  forced  idleness  of  resources,  eliminating  or 
 
 
1 
Muhammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography, London, Oxford University Press, 1967. 
2 
World Bank, 2010. 
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reducing allocative and ‘X-inefficiency enabling gains in total factor productivity (TFP) which are 
key in enhancing trade competitiveness. 3 
 
11.       The need for trade for reform, and the scope and pace of reform, need to be considered from 
both a wider competitiveness dimension than just a physical distance to competitors and peers. The 
investment climate, trade policy, infrastructure and knowledge as well as the incentive structure and 
the institutions to facilitate are important elements of a trade and competitiveness strategy. Export 
diversification will follow a flexible, dynamic and open set of factor and product markets – with 
product markets by all means encompassing both the domestic market and international markets – 
particularly since Pakistan’s competitors, are paying the price to remain at its door to exert pressure 
on its firms, and are more competitive in Pakistan’s export markets. The complexity of the new trade 
landscape calls for a more integrated approach to achieving Pakistan’s declared goals for trade and 
industrial   development   in   order   to   create   an   incentive   environment   conducing   to   trade 
competitiveness and export diversification. 
 
A Conceptual Framework for Trade Competitiveness 
 
12.       Studies on competitiveness have made it clear that the determinants of competitiveness are 
many and complex. There is now little doubt that, in the long run, economies more open to trade 
show stronger economic growth and overall development performance, including export growth. 4 
The arguments for investment in physical capital and infrastructure, coupled with appropriate macro, 
micro and governance fundamentals so that resources naturally flow into the right sectors, and within 
those sectors, to the right firms.   Further human and social capital, soft infrastructure, support for 
technology related innovation, business friendly environments, sound markets, property rights 
regimes, were all complementary areas for the public sector contribute, in order to maintain the 
productivity and operational efficiency achieved from inter-firm and inter-industry linkages. 
 
13.       A good practice export competitiveness initiative underscores several of the above issues and 
draws on the myriad of policy tools and approaches employed around the world on trade, 
macroeconomic policy, customs and logistics, and direct enterprise support.  It emphasizes the 
importance of global integration in achieving competitiveness – be it through new technologies, 
market-integrating economic policies.    The policy agenda that typically emerges from a 
competitiveness  analysis  relates  to  three  or  four  core  areas  with  Education  and  health  often 
considered a fourth distinct core area. 
 
 Macro fundamentals (e.g., removal of economic biases having to do with tariff and non-tariff 
barriers, real exchange rate misalignment, distortive tax regime, overall fiscal health of the 
 
 
3  
Amiti  and  Kronin, 2007, Jayanthakumaran 2004.In particular, see  Jayanthakumaran (2004)  for  a  survey of 
literature discussing trade liberalization and trade growth linking to TFP growth. 
4 
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2004). “Trade, Growth, and Poverty”, Economic Journal (2004); Dollar, D. and A. Kraay 
(2002). “Growth is Good for the Poor”, Journal of Economic Growth; Michaely, M., D. Papageorgiou, and A. 
Choksi (1991). Liberalizing Foreign Trade: Lessons of Experience in the Developing World (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell); Winters, L. Alan, N. McCulloch, and A. McKay (2004). “Trade Liberalization and Poverty: The 
Evidence So Far”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol, XLII (March). 
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economy,  product  and  factor  market  conditions,  property  right  protection,  effective 
regulation, case of firm entry and exit). 
 
 Services  and  costs  (e.g.,  infrastructure,  customs  and  trade  logistics,  the  costs  of  doing 
business including compliance cost of regulation). 
 
 Proactive  measures  that  try  to  correct  market  failures  and  develop  public  goods  (e.g., 
technology creation and adaptation, product standards and certifications, export promotion, 
environmental and social standards, social safety nets). 
 
 Education and health (e.g., primary and higher education, vocational and on-the-job training, 
basic health care). 
 
Pro Forma Analytical Framework for Trade Competitiveness 
 
 
 
Public Sector Private Sector Civil Society & 
Academia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy 
Fundementals 
-  Macroeconomic Stability 
-  Product & Factor Markets 
-  Property Right Protection 
-  Effective Regulation 
-  Ease of Entry& Exit 
Services & 
Costs 
-  Infrastructure 
-  Trade Logistics 
-  Compliance Cost of 
Regulation 
Market Failure & 
Public Goods 
-  Environmental & Social 
Standards 
-  Technology Creation & 
Adaptation 
-  Social Safety Nets 
Education & 
Health 
-  Primary & Higher 
Education 
-  Vocational & OTJ 
Training 
-  Basic Health Care 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economy Wide Sector Specific Firm Level 
 
 
 
 
14.       The focus of the report is to reinforcing the arguments embodied in this analytical framework 
for trade competitiveness, focusing on the principal areas facing Pakistan’s policy makers, first by 
analyzing Pakistan’s historical underpinning of its initial conditions, trade outcomes, and policy 
issues and analytical needs related to improving trade competitiveness. 
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Competitiveness through Trade Outcomes 
 
15.       Export Competitiveness is defined as the ability of the economy to adjust to changes and 
continue selling its products.  From a country’s perspective this would involve expansion at the 
extensive and intensive margins, but the two mean the same in terms of export receipts.  However, in 
terms of specifics, where are the jobs, the foreign exchange inflow, the income, etc. 
 
16.      The analysis of trade outcomes show mixed results, from both the short and longer term 
perspective.  At the heart of the long term issue is that Pakistan’s trade orientation is very low and its 
traded products are at the unsophisticated end of the technology spectrum.  Both facts have been 
dominant characteristics of Pakistan’s trade outcomes for some time. In terms of more immediate 
challenges of growth what Pakistan exports, there have been large growth spurts in the past, but these 
have tempered dramatically in recent years, and the over all trend is a declining one. 
 
17.       On the positive side, the level of diversification is higher than implied by the top sectors or 
product s share of exports, indicating, low level product exports.  There are also positive signs at the 
firm level which indicting entry and exit dynamics that are promising in terms of future 
competitiveness, once these firms achieve success and are able to scale up. There is significant 
churning at the country margin and some healthy creative destruction at the firm margin. The 
product/sector margin has been less dynamic. 
 
18.       Three outcomes speak the how well the economy is showing the appropriate dynamics, 
resource allocation and creative destruction needed to maintain competitiveness. 
 
 The first dimension is about static outcomes, reflecting the initial conditions described in 
Chapter Three outcomes are examined: (i) Trade orientation  and export growth, (ii) product 
and market diversification and (iii) process upgrading 
 
 The second dimensions is about breaking down changes in trade flows into separate and 
analyzable  components,  including  extensive  margins(how  well  is  performance  in  new 
products and markets) and intensive margins(how well is performance in existing products 
and markets). 
 
 The third dimensions is to examine what is happening at the firm level, in terms of firm entry 
and  exit,  introduction  of  new  products/  sector,  and  penetration  into  new  markets,  to 
understand how the dynamics seen at the product level is being reflected in firm level 
performance. 
 
19.       Recent trade patterns in Pakistan are viewed from two perspectives:  trade flows by products 
(irrespective of the firms which originate them), and export activity by firms (according to the 
products they produce).  The perspective is to examine, to the extent possible,  dynamic forces at 
work behind the trade flows to so how, the country’s systems for allocating resources is leading to 
positive trade outcomes. 
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20.       Trade orientation in goods is low and decreasing, goods are low tech, and trading partners are 
dominated by a few developed economies.  Specifically, 
 
 The trade orientation here is described in terms of outward looking of the economy – trade to 
GDP, which as 32 percent is half of what it should be.  Other countries have reached that 
China and India but Pakistan has stayed constant and even fell a decade ago. 
 
 From a sector   point of view, Pakistan’s exports are dominated by labor-intensive light 
manufacturing -- like textiles, clothing, footwear, leather and agri-foods. This group’s share 
in exports in 2007-09 was 65 percent. The second most important export sector was the 
agrifood sector with slightly more than 11 percent of total exports. 
 
 The technological content of exports in Pakistan is low. High-tech exports constituted less 
than 2 percent in 2008, a share broadly unchanged in the past 25 years.5 
 
 The   low   level   of   export   sophistication   in   Pakistan.   Pakistan’s   increase   in   export 
sophistication is modest. In 1986, the sophistication of its export basket was higher than that 
of Vietnam. In past 20 years, Pakistan export basket has not undergone an improvement as its 
Asian peers. 
 
 The US and European markets6 absorb 31 percent and 23 percent of Pakistan’s total exports, 
respectively with China represents the third most important destination, with a 11.5 percent. 
Gulf (UAE, Afghanistan, Oman) destinations are important re-export destinations. 
 
21.      Trade in Services has been a potential bright spot as a nice set of products spurred by 
considerable technology transfer from foreign direct investment in telecoms and banking.  Both types 
of FDI have since ebbed due to security considerations, but the service exports from the past FDI is 
currently showing some pay off. Specifically, 
 
 Trade in services, although only partially seen in official statistics, has acquired momentum, 
possibly because it can override tangible, physical constraints faced by the goods sector. 
 
 Increasingly, services trade became an important source of export diversification in Pakistan 
but less so that its peer countries: Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Malaysia, and Turkey. 
Outside Bangladesh, Pakistan has the lowest share of services in GDP among its peers. 
 
  Between 2000 and 2007, exports of commercial services grew at a compound annual rate of 
nearly 15 percent, which is just below the average rate of peer countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
5
For example, Vietnam’s share of high-tech exports went from 0.7 percent to 3.8 percent of total in the same period 
whereas India’s increased from 2.8 percent to 6.2 percent. Moreover, while the majority of the country’s exports 
(around 54 percent) was classified as low-tech already in 1985, this share further increased over time, to reach close 
to 80 percent in 2006.] 
6
The principal countries are United Kingdom (7.1%), Germany (6.5%), France (4.4%) and Italy (4.1%). 
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 Transport and information communication technologies services] are, respectively, the most 
important types of services exported have been becoming more sophisticated since 2003. 
Potential for financial services, professional services, etc. 
 
  Until the financial crisis, 2008-09, Pakistan had had a steady rising inflow of FDI, as a 
percentage of gross fixed capital formation. Inflows were relatively sizeable compared to 
other FDI has mainly come into the largely non-tradable sectors of banking and telecom. 
 
22.       Export Growth has been a mixed picture but below potential given the low trade to GDP 
ratio.  Specifically, 
 
 Pakistan exports have grown slightly above world’s exports growth but much below that of 
exports of South Asian peers. In 30 years, Pakistan’s exports grew 10 fold as compared to the 
25 fold increase for the rest of South Asia. 
 
 In terms of export volumes (Intensive Margin-IM), performance has been irregular. Some 
years of very good performance have combined with a few years of low export growth, 
possibly reflecting developments in the macro-economic environment and in foreign demand 
 
 Export growth spurts occurred like other sectors in Pakistan’s experience growth spurts at the 
end of the 1980s coinciding with crises induced reforms in the early part of the 2000s. 
Recent suppressed demand has affected all sectors but food and agriculture has maintained a 
positive terms of trade impact. 
 
 Growth has been highest in the extractive industries, metals, and chemicals machinery, and 
through the down turn, electronics and transportation equipment were buoyant as were 
extractive industries and food, beverages. 
 
23.       Diversification  of  exports  across  markets  and  products  reduces  the  vulnerability  of  the 
country’s export portfolio to partner-specific shocks and to extreme volatility in export prices. The 
recent global crisis has highlighted the critical importance of diversification in reducing the risks of 
volatility in global demand and explains why this topic is rising in the agenda of low-and middle- 
income countries. 
 
 Geographically,  the    US  and  European  market  shares  for  Pakistan’s  exports  fell  by  9 
percentage points (from 61 percent in 2000 to 54 percent in 2009) while there is a small 
increase in exports to the emerging bloc of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) as did 
Gulf countries.  Gravity Model says Pakistan is under-exporting with the large and fast 
growing economies of the 21st century including Japan, Brazil, Russia, and of course India. 
 
 In  terms  of  products  Pakistan  is  mildly  diversified,  more  concentrated  than  China  and 
Turkey, but less concentrated than other middle-low income countries. More worrisome, 
however, is that in almost a decade, the period 2000-2008, there was an increase in product 
concentration  in  many  countries,  including  China,  Malaysia,  Bangladesh  and  Turkey, 
whereas Pakistan’s index not only did not decrease but slightly increased. 
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24.       Overall, Pakistan is broadly moving toward new products and markets; but the pace in terms 
of new products is slower than those of potential competitors. 
 
 In terms of products, Pakistan’s share of exports in products that the rest of the world also 
exports has declined slightly over the last ten years, but it appears to be moving towards new 
exports that are economically significant. 
 
 In terms of market destinations, Pakistan’s export share in countries it currently exports to 
has reduced slightly, but it has increased its reach to markets that cumulatively are larger 
relative to the world in 2008 than in 1998. 
 
25.       As in most other countries worldwide, Pakistan’s exports are concentrated in the hands of a 
few large exporters. The bottom 80 percent of exporters accounted for only 5.3 percent of total 
export value in 2010, down from 7.7 percent in 2003.  Specifically, 
 
 Export entry and exit rates are lower than in peer countries but new entrants more than offset 
the loss in exports by exiting firms. Each year, anywhere between 16 and 37 percent of firms 
exit and another 19 to 37 percent enter. While at first sight there seems to be significant 
destruction and creation of exporters in the data, entry and exit rates are lower than in other 
middle-low income countries). Moreover, the net effect on the number of exporters seems to 
be marginal. This suggests that the number of exporters is not expanding any significantly 
over time. Yet, new exporters seem more effective than sunset exporters. 
 
 Churning along the destination-country margin also generated positive export growth. By 
contrast, there is a more anaemic performance in terms of sector and product differentiation. 
Again, taking 2002/03 as the base year over the 2002-2010 period, existing firms were 
instrumental in exporting to new countries, and even while there was evidence of exits, the 
net effect on the export growth rate was positive. 
 
  Sector and product churning over the 2002-2010 period, was overall not very significant, and 
it seems that on average exits outweighed entries. 
 
 Usually a higher positive contribution to export growth along the sector/ product margins 
should be expected that along the firm margin, due to the higher fixed costs of entry into export 
than for expanding the product range. In Pakistan, the sector/ product margin of growth is 
underperforming. 
 
 The rates of survival in Pakistan are not low, at least compared to a group of middle -low 
income countries, for which customs data at the firm level are also available. For instance, in 
one year, 43 percent of firms exit, and by year 7 only 24 percent survives.  Still, compared 
with other countries Pakistan is more effective in keeping exporting firms in the market – at 
least in the short run. 
 
 Dynamism was significantly reduced after 2004 and has still not recovered. On average, 
fewer firms entered and exited the export market since 2004. Similarly incumbent exporters 
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became more conservative over time in terms of export markets, sector and product 
experimentation. In short, entries and exits by new firms, existing firms in new countries, 
sectors and products, all fell over the second half of the past decade. 
 
Box 1 
Determinants of Export Growth 
Econometric Results 
 
Firm level information has allowed, the OLS correlation between export growth and some key 
outcomes analyzed in through the papers.  The Fist is that r Pakistan can maximize its chances of 
exporting by eliminating barriers to trade and by using trade policy to create the conditions that 
foster firm dynamism, experimentation and quality upgrading of their products. 
 
Diversification is good for export growth. Diversification, be it in terms of firms, products or 
destinations is positively correlated to export growth, with an effect that is sizeable and significant. 
Pakistan  has  been  quite  successful  in  increasing  its  exports  by  having  more  firms  starting 
exporting and by having more exporters entering new markets. The performance in terms of 
helping firms breaking into new sectors and products has however been less satisfactory. 
 
Tariff Structure Complexity in destination markets is an obstacle to export growth. A 1% increase 
in tariff “complexity” in the destination country leads to a 13.2% decrease in export growth by 
Pakistani firms. We measure tariff complexity as the standard deviation at the (HS-4 digit) sector 
level of individual HS-6 digit MFN and applied tariffs. 
 
Firm level exports are constrained by fixed costs associated with entering in the exporting activity. 
Econometric analysis on firm level export growth shows, for example, that a 1% change in the 
amount of impediments at the border implies a 16.7% change in a firm’s export growth   Trade 
impediments at the border have a sizeable and statistically negative effect on all the extensive 
margins of trade and as a result, mpede resources to flow to the most productive firms, sectors and 
products. 
 
Fluctuations  in  export  growth  are  linked  to  developments  in  the  global  demand.  Largely 
determined by external and market conditions, demand can explain an important share of 
fluctuations and cyclical patterns in the export performance. Amidst very uncertain and volatile 
conditions for global demand. 
 
 
 
Pakistan Policy Framework - Trade Policy 
 
26.        Chapter III examines Pakistan’s trade policy, one of the key contributors to trade orientation 
and export growth. For the past two decade, uses as the primary tool for policy objectives, use of 
tariffs  -  statutory  and  regulatory,  and  exemptions  of  such,  along  with  various  types  of  export 
subsidies – in terms of finance, fiscal tax exemptions, as opposed to the more opaque quantitative 
restrictions and explicit licensing requirements.  Clearly, periods of simplification and liberalization 
at the end of the 1980s and again at the end of the 1990s, have coincided with the soon to follow, 
growth spurts in trade, both in terms of the extensive as well as the intensive margin. 
 
27.       Beginning in the mid-1990, Pakistan embarked on period of multilateral and unilateral trade 
liberalization program that was noteworthy for its depth and coverage. The program reduced 
government  intervention,  lowered  and  simplified  tariffs  and  abolished  remaining  quantitative 
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restrictions.   This along with favorable macro-economic environment and complementary reforms 
contributed to the export and growth spurt, which continued through until the mid 2000s. 
 
28.      However, during the last seven years, Pakistan’s policy framework has seen major policy 
reversal. With a limited, but effective bias toward policies of indigenization programs, Pakistan’s 
trade policy became increasingly complex as it was now more susceptible to input from vested 
interests. 
 
29.       Complementing the policy reversal from Pakistan’s open trade regime was an external and 
internal deterioration in the business environment, in part due to deficient economic governance and 
infrastructure services. New import substitution policies started being implemented; with the pace 
accelerating since the crisis in 2008   Trade policies have become increasingly oriented to provide 
extra protection to the processing margins of determined local products and producers. 
 
30.       Pakistan is now ranked as the sixth most protected economy in the world according to the 
Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI). While the OTRI of Pakistan is still not higher than India 
at the 88th percentile of countries, it reflects an increased complexity of trade policy and the reversal 
of some of the early progress towards reforms. Pakistan’s protection of the domestic market is the 
main determinant of the high OTRI. 
 
31.       Pakistan’s   institutional   system   of   trade   policy   application   now   contains   a   strong 
administrative protections system. For example, the “Strategic Trade Policy Framework 2009-12” by 
the Ministry of Commerce, the National Tariff Commission (NTC, )the websites of the Engineering 
Development Board (EDB) he Ministry of Industry,-suggest that protection of domestic industries 
along with infant industry arguments through tariffs and other measures are integral parts of the 
Government’s economic strategy.  The Planning Commission’s recent document envisions a system 
without such an approach to industrialization. The Planning Commission Government of Pakistan 
(2011) recommends that the way forward should include the re-establishment of the unilateral trade 
liberalization program.7 
 
32.      Reconciling the protectionist objectives with ad-hoc interventions while also aiming at 
streamlining its trade policy and pursuing greater openness, it is worth recalling that “customized” 
domestic protection entails important costs and risks. 
 
 Public support will be distortive, going to industries with high costs and low productivity at 
the expense of more efficient industries. 
 
 Schemes  that  grant  protection  increase  scope  for  smuggling  and  under-invoicing.  The 
cascading principle, evoked by many governmental documents, makes this likely especially 
for final goods. 
 
 
7
Tthe Planning Commission Government of Pakistan (2011) the immediate abolishment of the present system of 
distortive duties; the maintenance of a neutral real exchange rate policy; the re-establishment of normal trade 
relations with India, and acceleration of already signed free trade agreements, notably with China and Malaysia. See 
Planning Commission Government of Pakistan (2011) “Pakistan: Framework for Economic Growth”, pag.74. 
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 Domestic market protection achieved through tariff protection generates an anti-export bias. 
Since exporting firms do not have any benefit from domestic tariff policies. 
 
 Protection increases the complexity of the tariff regime and associated information costs. 
 
33.       In particular, the ensuing approach of pursuing very precisely targeted protection measures 
have given rise to an increase in tariff complexity as the applied levels of protection have now 
diverged dramatically from customs duty rates for many products, given the range of untrackable 
exemptions plus the addition of regulatory duties (Box 2). 
 
Box 2 
Trade Policy in Pakistan 
Increased Tariff Complexity 
 
The deviation of applied tariff rates from official rates is based on an increasingly complex structure of 
tariffs,  exemptions  and  refunds.  Duty  drawback  and/or  concessions  due  to  free  trade  and  other 
arrangements are to be expected and are featured in many countries’ tariff policy. However, the contrast 
between MFN ad valorem rates and effective duties observed in Pakistan are even more dramatic than most. 
 
The official schedule in 2009/2010 suggests that custom tariffs have 14 slabs or bands, ranging between 0 
and 150 percent with 40 percent of tariffs at 5 percent or less in ad valorem terms. 
 
Transportation (automotive sector) attracts the highest tariff levels, as high as 60 percent in some cases 
with peaks above 90 percent for a few products (19 at HS 6-digit level). A large segment of agricultural 
goods are taxed at 35 percent,1 but the official MFN schedule-based average is much lower, i.e. around 
15.9 percent. Meanwhile, the average tariff for industrial sector is around 13.2 Finally, about 45 percent 
of the official schedule displays low tariffs, ranging from 0 to 5 percent. 
 
The applied schedule using customs data at the transactions level for 2009/2010 at the 8-digit level shows 
that Pakistan applied some 40 different rates. 
 
Over 50 percent of the effective tariffs are either 5 percent or less in ad valorem terms, with more bands 
appearing at the upper end of the scale, creating a higher level of dispersion. In addition, at least 2 
percent  of  transactions  appear  to  levy  a  rate  between  zero  and  less  than  2  percent  ad-valorem, 
tantamount to “nuisance taxes”. Nuisance taxes, while adding to the cost of business, increase the 
administrative burden of collecting them potentially outweighing the benefit to the government from 
marginal revenues. 
 
 
34.       Since 2007, protection doubled for many products, while others went down to zero for certain 
importers while in 2008, almost 400 products were subject to regulatory duties on top of customary 
duties. At the same time, tariffs were reduced in the inputs not produced by Pakistan which enhanced 
the escalation in the tariff regime and created a very heterogeneous system of effective protection. 
This complexity unweighted averages of MFN tariffs a poor benchmark for assessing Pakistani trade 
policy, particular as this statistic has been decreasing over time.  Some specific characteristics of 
Pakistan’s trade policy on the import tariff side. 
 
 Official custom schedule suggests a systematic escalation of tariffs by stages of processing. 
Raw materials and inputs attract low tariffs while consumer goods are taxed higher - twice as 
high in many cases. This pattern is more prominent and dramatic in consumer durable goods. 
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 Tariff dispersion is exploded through duties and exemptions covering half of tariff lines. 
Local  content  requirements  were  dropped  in  2006  for  WTO  compliance,  in  favor  of  a 
complex mix of regulatory duties and partial exemptions for inputs (see Box 3). 
 
 Transparency and predictability were the other casualties of this approach. Regulatory duties 
and special duties issued by Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs) are notified in the official 
Gazette, but not consolidated in any published format nor included in the tariff schedule. 
 
 Regulatory duties climbed to as high as 100 percent, while special duties up to 35 percent, 
mostly applied to finished goods and consumer durable goods. 
 
Box 3 
SRO Exemptions As A Trade Tool 
 
 
Exemptions and partial exemptions provided for industries under SRO regimes are a key source of 
deviation from MFN rates and a serious distortion in incentives since they are exemptions for inputs 
for specified firms or groups of firms. 
 
Analysis of the level and structure of Pakistan’s tariffs is complicated by SRO based exemptions and 
partial exemptions to tariffs, sales and other domestic taxes. Though provided on the FBR website, 
the complexity the SRO itself make it difficult to discern the applicable taxes and other measures 
imposed on individual tariff items, particularly when multiple SROs apply. 
 
The most prominent set of SROs are 565(1)2006, 567(1) 2007 and 575(1) 2007, accounting for 23 
percent of Pakistan’s imports in 2009/2010). On average, firms or industries under these three SRO 
provisions received concessions up to about 11 percentage points from the statutory rates, applied 
non-uniformly across industries   The exemptions under SRO (565, 567 and 575) cover several 
sectors, including chemicals, automotive, rubber and plastic industries as well as the agricultural 
sector. 
 
Almost half (44 percent) of all SROs provided exemptions to the machinery and appliances sector, 
which also accounted for a quarter of all regulatory duties (22 percent) - selectively applied to the 
finished  goods  segment  of  this  sector.  There  is  an  additional  scheme  of  exemptions  for  the 
automotive sector that discriminates by Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) versus After Sales 
part and is implemented under SRO 655 (1) and 656 (1) 2006, and SRO 693 (1) 2006. 
 
A common feature of all SROs is that their within sector incidence varies considerably distorting the 
incentive structure and complicating an already complex tariff system. (e.g. optical photography and 
related products with a high technological and capital intensity content enjoy low effective protection 
while footwear and head gear have high effective protection rate)s. Accounting for preferential 
agreements, about 18 percent of applied tariff variability is caused by the use of exemptions, of 
which 11 percent are detected at the firm level. 
 
 
 
 
35.       Tariff escalation and schedule complexity results in effective rates of protection (ERP) are far 
greater than nominal rates. By taking into account protection on both outputs and inputs, ERPs 
provide a more accurate the representation of incentives protection of “value added.” Showing the 
expected amplification of the escalation and reinforce the earlier assertion about the escalatory tariff 
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structure.8   The outcomes also demonstrate that the tariff structure complexity - i.e. exemptions and 
regulatory  duties,   in   some   dimensions,   reflects   indigenization   objectives   in   a   number   of 
manufacturing activities. 
 
36.       The pattern of protection in place in Pakistan discourages of high value-added products, new 
entry and innovative activities.  Resources are pulled into value added activities with high effective 
protection, which tend to have low value-added goods, or low-value added production methods. As 
well, these sectors with higher effective protection tend to be less competitive; they typically are 
domestically oriented biasing not only production, but resource allocation against export competing 
sectors.  As  an  example  derived  from  product  level  ERP  measurements,  refrigerators,  air- 
conditioners, and deep freezers, targets or indigenization programs, have effective protection rates 
between 65 percent and 150 percent, while cotton yarn, an export industry, has an ERP of 5 percent. 
 
37.       As a result of the first generation reforms in early 2000s, the use of quantitative restrictions, 
as protective devices, was reduced but measures to increase the protection of the domestic market has 
returned.  In  addition  to  the  EDB-administered  “Indigenization  Program”  described  above  - 
amounting to a de facto local content requirement - with its discretionary control over new entrants to 
the industry and discrimination against import of domestically-available materials.  Given the tax on 
exports, authorities, have countered with a subsidy through two sources:  export finance subsidies 
and fiscal subsidies. 
 
Complementary Policy Issues –Scarcity, Governance and Logistics 
 
38.       Chapter IV examines three sets of domestic issues:  (i) fundamental problems that are pre- 
requisites to doing anything else in the area of economic development. Macroeconomic stabilization 
and management, water scarcity and power shortages; (ii) key investment climate issues, covering 
infrastructure, governance and functioning of factor markets; and (iii) trade logistics. 
 
39.      Fundamentals: Macro, Water and Power. While other key problems—such as large 
macroeconomic imbalances, domestic political instability, domestic security concerns and regional 
tensions—have hampered Pakistan realizing greater gains from its trade reforms.  It is also arguable 
Pakistan’s heavily distorted tax and tariff system, which includes price and other support schemes for 
selected agriculture commodities; concessionary financing and export oriented concessions for and 
textiles and clothing; and other schemes artificially incentivizing selected sectors perpetuated rigidity 
in industrial and agriculture markets as highlighted in World Bank (2006) and ADB (20068) reports 
and become evident in preceding discussions. They particularly point out rigidities in the land and 
labor markets said to have been a major constraints for greater growth and dynamism of the private 
sector. 
 
 
 
 
8 
i.e. Rraw materials are free of import restrictions, intermediates with moderate ERPs and   import substituting 
industries (beverages, tobacco, motor vehicles and accessories, and vegetable oils and fats) with very high effective 
protection rates. Services industries protection is mostly negative or infinity, owing to the fact that most services are 
non-tradable for now. 
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40.       Infrastructure, Economic Governance, and Factor Markets: To sustain these goals over the 
medium term, a strong investment climate is needed and return to a strong growth path, deeper 
analysis and policy recommendations are made along the following four areas: 
 
 Removal of infrastructure constraints particularly in the energy sector. The power sector’s 
inadequacies have damaged manufacturing growth with supply constraints reaching a critical 
point. Unlike other areas where differences exist across size groups, sectors and geographic 
areas, there is universal agreement regarding the primacy of the power sector issues as an 
investment  climate  constraint.  In  addition,  the  notable  improvements  in  telecoms  and 
logistics remain undervalued by an aging and inefficient transport system. 
 
 Strengthened  governance  of  market  mechanisms.  Though  improving  in  recent  years, 
antiquated laws, regulatory compliance and red tape at various levels of government are still 
problematic, burdensome and costly. More importantly are areas related to corruption in 
business-government interface, property right protection and contract enforcement, speedier 
and  more  certain  mechanism  for  corporate  exit and elimination  of biases in  tax,  labor, 
financial and energy pricing which hinder the incentive to grow and formalize. 
 
 Increased depth and improved functioning in labor, land and financial markets. Though 
firms consider access to these factors less of an issue than other constraints such as electricity 
or governance, the analysis points to a low level equilibrium in these areas. In the case of 
labor markets, low skills are only a problem for the few firms which have an educated labor 
force. In finance, large established firms have access to standard relationship banking, but 
new entrants are shut out. Risk based or capital market products are non-existent. 
 
 Attention to firm level technology adaptation and the role of public private partnerships 
(PPPs) in spearheading progress. The low level of technology used by Pakistan firms has at 
its core both demand and supply side issues. In addition to infrastructure, PPPs should be 
investigated, as applied to public goods in cluster development, environmental and social 
standards, technology upgrading and quality assurance. New, risk based financial products 
are also required to support entrepreneurship and innovation. 
 
41.       Trade  Facilitation  and  Logistics.  A  good  logistics  system  can  play  a  decisive  role  for 
Pakistan to attain access to foreign markets at lower logistics costs. It also helpts to bring new firms 
and new products to the markets by foster integration of domestic markets and helping to exploit new 
trends in intra-industry trade. By helping reducing trade costs, upgrading the quality of services, 
improving connectivity with foreign markets and moving upstream in the supply chain the trade 
facilitation and logistics system is the key to export diversification. 
 
42.       Pakistan has a core transport and logistics system and environment that support trade in 
various types of commodities of varying cost, time and reliability sensitivities, ranging from 
agricultural products to electrical and other manufactured products.   However, based on the 2010 
Logistics Performance Index (LPI) data, Pakistan’s overall logistics performance was below that of 
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India and Bangladesh as well as below the global average of all countries.  Moreover, the South Asia 
neighborhood as a region lagged behind most regions, only surpassing Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
43.       In the main, the LPI data suggest that Pakistan’s performance main weaknesses are in the 
areas of infrastructure, customs and logistics competence.    Connectivity in Pakistan features great 
geographical disparities. Outside the system connecting specialized markets in the Karachi – Lahore- 
Islamabad—Sialkot-Peshawar, which is relatively well functioning, trade logistics services are 
generally of a poor quality, especially when compared to other countries of a similar level of income. 
 
44.       The national logistics hub in Pakistan is located in the south of the country. As one moves 
north and west of the country and away from the core national corridor, access to high quality 
infrastructure and services reduces.   In the relatively lagging regions, exports of niche products such 
as fresh produce for instance, would be challenged without better connectivity between the remote 
areas and export gateway.  Given the nature of some of the prospective export commodities, which 
have high volume to weight ratios and the distances involved, it would appear the key to improving 
domestic connectivity lies in developing multi-modal systems based on rail and consolidation of 
trade volumes. 
 
 Railways. Presently Pakistan Railways plays a relatively limited role in the country’s freight 
transport despite having a network that extends over much of the country.   Despite almost 
eight thousand kilometers of broad gauge routes linking all the major centers as well as to the 
Iranian  network,  the  railway  market  share  continues  to  decline  while  there  has  been  a 
leveling off in the volume of freight traffic. 
 
Railway tariffs are part of the problem as they are based not so much on cost of providing the 
service but on broader objectives to allow trade in the various commodities.  Different types 
of cargo are charged different amounts even if they may weigh the same and are transported 
over equivalent distances. The railways then make losses and have to be subsidized by the 
government which caused the rolling stock and general maintenance to deteriorate rapidly. 
 
 Roads and Trucking. Road transport is the dominant mode of overland transport in Pakistan, 
accounting for more than 80 percent of cargo volumes shipped.  Despite the poor condition of 
parts of the road network, Pakistan has the lowest road freight transport rates in the world. 
This is partly due to the structure of the industry. The majority of trucks on the roads are 
operated informally as small fleets and are old and highly fuel inefficient.  As a result, low 
rates are obtained by keeping old fleets and overloading vehicles. Competition and high 
operating costs reduce margins for the industry and hamper efforts to modernize the fleet. 
 
In recent years there have been some changes in the sector with the emergence of an 
increasing number of formal companies running large fleets, in excess of 50 vehicles. The 
largest fleet operator is the state controlled National Logistics Cell (NLC) which owns more 
than 1500 trucks. There has also been a change in the organization of the independent 
truckers as some of the larger road haulage companies have developed relationships with the 
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independent truck operators in which they contract for their service on a regular basis as a 
supplement to their own fleet. 
 
In 2007 the Government of Pakistan drafted a trucking policy which it is now implementing. 
The policy is designed to complement the NCTIP and serve as the basis for modernizing the 
trucking sector.  It contains several progressive provisions which, if realized would contribute 
to a higher quality of service from the trucking sector. Some of the key proposals in the 
policy are: (i) enhancing access to finance, (ii) central information depository for motor 
vehicle registration, and (iii) vehicle worthiness certification. 
 
 Air transport.- Air transport is the second most important mode of transport for international 
shipments in Pakistan, but is mostly covered by international carriers. Of the almost thirty air 
carriers serving the country, only three are from Pakistan. Five international carriers provide 
40 weekly scheduled all-cargo services in and out of Pakistan. Karachi, Lahore and Sialkot 
are the only cities with access to scheduled dedicated cargo services. There are many more 
exports than imports, most of them passing through the main airports of Islamabad, Lahore 
and Karachi. Using the total turnaround cost methodology, Pakistani airports strike as one of 
the most expensive in terms of landing charges. 
 
Pakistan’s role in the worldwide airline network structure is far from central, and might 
present only limited opportunities for transit traffic.   Pakistan sits astride main air traffic 
routes connecting Europe and the Middle East with Southeast Asia and Australasia and given 
the preeminence of other hubs like Dubai and Bangkok, it seems unlikely for Pakistan to 
become a credible connecting hub in the short run, Its geographical location might eventually 
favor short and medium haul connections in South and Central Asia and the Middle East. 
 
 Ports. More than 90 percent of Pakistan’s international trade is transported by sea.  Most of 
the trade traffic is through Karachi where there are two container terminals, the Karachi 
International Container Terminal (KICT) and Port Qasim.   Of the two, KICT handles the 
most volumes.   All major shipping lines provide services to either Karachi or Port Qasim. 
However, connections to Europe are indirect, with hubbing mostly through Salalah in Oman. 
 
Across the developing world cargo stays long periods of time in ports while in Pakistan, the 
port authorities allow for up to 5 days of free storage time in the premises of the port. 
Therefore, recent statistics suggest cargo dwell time in Karachi is 7 days - much higher than 
the 2-3 days prevalent in most efficient ports in the world.  Beyond the average duration of 
stationing in the port, it would be valuable to understand the distribution of the actual dwell 
terms to get a sense of the reliability of the system. 
 
 Customs. Pakistan Customs has been implementing a modernization program for the past 
several  years  and  include  the  use  of  the  Harmonized  Code,  creation  of  a  Single 
Administrative Document), and electronic submission and processing of declarations at the 
seaports  and  the  major  land  borders.  These  improvements  have  allowed  a  significant 
reduction in clearance times and an increase in the collection of duties and taxes. The rate of 
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physical inspections has been reduced but remains higher than would apply with an effective 
system  of  risk  management.  Still,  the  decision  regarding  inspections  is  often  based  on 
informal payments with a typical clearance times for cargoes with proper documentation at 
two days for imports and one for exports. 
 
The procedures for handling transit cargoes have been simplified but the time and procedures 
required for transit permits and inspections are neither transparent nor efficient. A Risk 
Management Unit in Customs has developed some risk profiles and is supposed to select the 
level of inspection applied for individual shipments but lacks a formal system of Authorized 
Economic Operators. X-ray scanning was introduced at QICT but only for exports to the US. 
 
Preferential Trading Agreements 
 
45.       Chapter V looks at the exports benefit from gaining preferences in the large export markets 
despite the low tariff margins.  Fewer than 42 percent of Pakistan’s imports receive preferences but 
84 percent of Pakistan’s exports go to countries granting preferences to Pakistan, but with low 
preferential tariff margins. Only 0.3 percent of Pakistan’s exports to the top 20 importers receive a 
preference margin of 10 percent or above, mainly in armaments and commodities, but 30 percent of 
exports have a preference margin between 0.1 and 2.5 percent. 
 
46.       Despite trade agreements, 83 percent of world trade takes place on a non-discriminatory, 
most favored nation basis. Half of world trade is subject to MFN zero-tariffs, while preferential trade 
agreements exempt the high MFN-tariff items from preferential treatment but continue at the MFN 
rate. Finally, preferences tend to fall on elastic goods, further reducing the efficacy of preferences. In 
conclusion, the scope for preferential market access is not optimistic in the near future. 
 
47.       Pakistan is pursuing a strategy of economic integration through preferential trade agreements 
and bilateral trade integration along with membership of multilateral preferential trade agreements 
reflecting more general global trends in trade policy. In the last two decades, the number of 
preferential trade agreements has increased four-fold, to around 300 agreements in 2011. Pakistan 
joined the South Asian Free Trade Agreement in 2006 since 2005 Pakistan has sought bilateral trade 
agreements with China, Iran, Malaysia, Mauritius and Sri Lanka. The attention to bilateral agreement 
also reflects public awareness that Pakistan under trades with the large and fast growing economies 
in the region, including India and China. 
 
48.       To test for trade creation and diversion, the standard gravity model demonstrates empirically 
Pakistan’s great untapped potential for expanding its trade relations, both on the export and import 
side. As would be expected gravity estimations suggest that Pakistan’s trade is more elastic to trade 
frictions and distance than the world average. In particular, the elasticity of Pakistan’s trade to is 
about 30 percent higher than the world average.  Not only sharing a border appears to be a trade cost 
for Pakistan’s exports, but the overall effect is so important that it doubles the cost of distance and 
appears to represent an additional substantial burden to trade. As expected, from the model, trade 
with India is 40 percent below its predicted potential, while Pakistan is a missing market for India. 
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49.       Significant trade creation effects may originate from agreements with China and Malaysia, 
due to the deeper nature of these agreements into areas beyond market access issues (Box 4). 
Analysis shows that deep PTAs had positive trade creation effects while. By contrast, shallower 
PTAs had a statistically not significant or weakly significant effects overall. 
 
Table 4 
Preferential Trade Arrangement with China 
What Does It Mean? 
 
The biggest impact would result the PTA with China, while tariff reduction in the framework of PTAs with 
Malaysia and India would have a smaller effects. 
 
The PTA with China goes beyond market access in goods, and seeks a framework of trade and investment 
rules able to address the emergence of supply-chain production as a prominent mode of twenty-first century 
economic integration. Specifically, the PTA covers non-tariff measures, services and regulatory matters, 
including provisions regulating the mutual recognition of services suppliers and other technical barriers to 
trade, international property rights and the establishment of Chinese investment zones in Pakistan. 
 
Meanwhile, full tariff liberalization with China would have sizeable negative implications for Pakistan’s 
trade partners   - imports from some East Asian countries, the EU-27 and the US would be affected 
negatively by hypothetical full tariff liberalization with China.  The largest negative impact would be felt by 
Japan, while a handful of other East Asian countries (Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia) as well as those from 
the EU-27 and the US would also be affected negatively.   Imports from the rest of trading partners would 
be marginally impacted. 
 
 
50.       The way forward in terms of preferential trade agreements should be to scale up the efforts 
use bi-lateral or multi-lateral PTAs to reduce domestic impediments and trade barriers in order for 
Pakistan to benefit from the geographical advantage of being in a high growth region. At the same 
time market access and deeper integration within the South Asia region, in particular with India will 
be the key for future growth. There should also be a conscious effort to develop the country as a 
regional hub for trade and logistics, by enhancing domestic connectivity, service trade and export 
opportunities. In this regard, developing logistics links to Pakistan's neighbors should be the priority. 
 
Building Pakistan’s Capacity for Trade and Domestic Policy Analysis 
 
51.       Recognizing  the  importance  of  global  competitiveness  and  integration  for  growth  and 
poverty reduction, the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) of Pakistan launched an initiative in 2007 to 
develop an institute capable of providing policy advice backed by high quality research and analysis. 
New leadership was set in place in July 2007 at the Foreign Trade Institute of Pakistan (FTIP) to 
transform what had essentially been the training institute for officers of the Commerce and Trade 
(C&T) Group occupation category of the federal civil service, into such an institute.  A government 
change in March 2008 saw continued support for the FTIP restructuring, and a revamped institute, 
renamed the Pakistan Institute of Trade and Development (PITAD), was launched in January 2009. 
 
52.       In a short period, the FTIP/PITAD made significant strides in its transformation, exhibited 
dynamic growth and attempted to fill a void in a lackluster national research environment on 
competitiveness and integration.  In the meantime, the Bank moved beyond a retail model of research 
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support to developing countries (where Bank staff provides research outputs) to one that included a 
wholesale model (where the Bank provides data and analytical tools so that researchers in developing 
countries are able to produce research themselves and develop home-grown solutions to policy 
problems). 
 
53.       In  this  context,  and  consistent  with  the  South  Asia  Regional  strategy  and  the  country 
partnership strategy, Non- Lending Technical Lending Assistance (NLTA) was extended to Pakistan 
to support evidence-based policy making. The goal for PITAD was the provision of: (i) quick 
response, high quality policy analyses, (ii) effective monitoring and evaluation of trade-related 
policies  and  outcomes,  and  (iii)  longer  term  research  on  trade  and  competitiveness  to  support 
research-based, proactive policy-making. The aims of the NLTA were to provide activities and 
advisory services to PITAD that aimed to primarily: (i) build its research capacity, and to a lesser 
extent, (ii) upgrade its training function, and (iii) coalesce and stimulate a disjointed trade research 
community under PITAD’s leadership, thus boosting the research output of the wider community and 
promote policy discussion and debate. 
 
54.       Given discussions on client priorities and goals, as well as Bank project constraints, activities 
carried out under the NLTA in support of PITAD includes: (i) identification and prioritization of 
capacity needs, (ii) delivery of capacity building activities and (iii) designing strategies for 
implementation of capacity requirements. Specifically, 
 
 Research  advisory  services  were  broad  ranging  and  focused  on  reinforcing  a  strong 
foundation of fundamental skills as well as introducing frontier research topics and 
methodology. 
 
 A detailed design for developing a trade database was submitted that would utilize hitherto 
insufficiently used national trade data, with the intention of eventually making it publicly 
available. 
 
 Training activities were  narrow in scope and included training on trade indicator analysis for 
PITAD  and State Bank of Pakistan researchers  (including exposure to the Bank’s open  data 
initiative, and delivering   two lectures on the global recession, its trade impact and trade 
policy responses. 
 
 Activities to achieve the goal of coalescing the trade community was first informed by an 
assessment of the state of the trade research and cooperation among the community, the 
organization of joint meetings with data producers and various players in the research 
community, and proposals to promote cooperation in a disjointed and sparse community. 
 
55.      Results of the activities are (i) the provision of the high-quality analytical outputs to the 
Commerce Department that informed policy-making, (ii) the launch of a working paper series by 
PITAD in 2011, on issues that are currently vital to Pakistan, and (iii) awareness by PITAD staff of 
new  research  findings,  newly  available  data,  new  research  methods  and  emerging  issues.  In 
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developing  its  outreach,  PITAD  has  also  initiated  greater  links  with  domestic  data  producing 
agencies in particular the Bureau of Statistics, as well as with regional research networks. 
 
56.       While much progress has been made by PITAD, the research capacity in Pakistan still needs 
to mature further.   The progress at PITAD and results and outcomes it has facilitated mandates 
further support to the institution to raise the quality of its analysis, pursue policy monitoring and 
evaluation that would contribute to optimal policy adjustment and reform sustainability.  The way 
forward identifies design and implementation strategies geared to (i) increase the quality and scope 
of analytical work by introducing new methodologies, topics and data; (ii)   increase research 
productivity by developing systems to reduce fixed costs of analysis; and (iii) attract and keeping 
high quality research staff.  It also discusses upgrading PITAD’s training program and activities to 
catalyze the wider trade community. 
 
Policy Recommendations 
 
57.       Pakistan’s recent trade performance stagnated in recent years.   Despite positive signs of 
exports dynamism, with substantial churning of firms, firms have not been successful in breaking 
into sectors and products able to deliver higher export growth. In addition, the performance has 
become poorer after 2004, well before the global financial crisis, and has still not recovered. 
 
58.       Amidst very uncertain and volatile conditions for global demand, Pakistan can maximize its 
chances of increasing domestic competitiveness and hence exports by creating the conditions that 
foster firm dynamism, experimentation and quality upgrading of their products and by eliminating 
domestic impediments and barriers to trade. 
 
59.       Diversification is critical to enhance export performance, be it in terms of firms, products or 
destinations. To achieve the objectives of more dynamic and diversified export base, Pakistan needs 
to take substantial measures to develop a competitive business environment and in eliminating 
barriers to export. This will have a clear impact in terms of lowering the entry costs for exporters and 
for firms to venture in new products and sectors by creating a level playing field for firms, promoting 
intra-industry competition, and creating a more transparent business environment. It is also likely to 
attract foreign direct investment. 
 
60.       In particular, the following policy actions are proposed: 
 
 Promoting intra-industry competition requires first and foremost the abolition of the present 
system of distortive regulatory duties and highly complex trade regulations. This complexity 
creates uncertainty, reduces transparency, and reduces firm dynamism. In particular, 
“customized” domestic protection entails important costs and risks. 
 
 In the medium-term, a simplification of the tariff regime is recommended. This would have 
important positive effects in the long run, with the transitory effects of adjustment in terms of 
output  and  employment  limited  to  some  sectors  and  a  relatively  small  impact  on  tariff 
revenues. 
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 Pursuing  greater  regional  integration  through  deep  agreements  This  note  also  brought 
supporting evidence that Pakistan could achieve great advances in trade performance by that 
look beyond market access and improvement of the country’s overall logistics system. 
 
 Accelerating the implementation of deep preferential trade agreements s. Significant trade 
creation effects are likely to originate from the agreements with China and Malaysia, due to the 
deeper nature of these agreements and their coverage beyond market access issues. 
 
 Scale up efforts to benefit from the geographical advantage of being in a high growth region 
The many domestic impediments and trade barriers have thus far prevented the countries from 
benefitting from high growth in the region.  Opening up with India and facilitating deep forms 
of trade integration is necessary to benefit from the high growth rates of the neighbor. 
 
 Weaknesses in the logistics system also restrain Pakistan’s competitiveness and exports. By 
helping reducing trade costs, upgrading the quality of services, improving connectivity with 
foreign  markets and  moving upstream in the supply chain, a  sound trade  facilitation and 
logistics system is of great importance for the country. 
 
Pakistan’s overall logistics performance was below that of India and Bangladesh as well as 
below the global average of all countries and suffers from infrastructure, customs and logistics 
competence. Outside the core north-south corridor, trade logistics services are poor. In order to 
upgrade the quality and reliability of the logistics services, five areas of action are suggested: 
 
o Improving port performance is critical to lowering logistics costs. The stated average is 
much higher than the 2-3 days that is prevalent in most efficient ports in the world. 
 
o Improving regulation of the trucking industry is another crucial step. There are already a 
number of initiatives underway to address the problems of the road haulage sector. 
Overall, the trucking policy seems comprehensive and well founded.  . 
 
o Developing the land transport links to Pakistan’s neighbors, including India, should be 
the priority, since this allows to develop a multi-modal system which connects the more 
remote north and north-west areas of the country to the well established national logistics 
hub located in the south. 
 
o Addressing domestic connectivity disparities to create trade opportunities especially in 
fresh produces requires a holistic approach.  Exploring dry ports and railway expansion 
within a logistics cluster based approach can lead to the expansion of exports of new 
products, specially fruits and vegetables. 
 
61.       Finally, improving coordination is essential. The majority of Pakistan’s logistics providers 
are small-scale enterprises offering a limited range of services and competing on cost with relatively 
little consideration for reliability or value. 
  
CHAPTER I: AN ECONOMY SHAPED BY CRISES 
 
 
 
 
A.        Introduction 
 
1.         To understand well the depth of Pakistan’s current challenge in transforming the economy to 
one governed by well functioning markets, open and fair competition and participation in the global 
supply chain, a solid understanding of Pakistan’s initial conditions is needed. Pakistan’s economy— 
its  structure,  performance  and  prospects—has  been  shaped  to  a  large  extent  by  the  impact  of 
domestic, regional and international crises, that had little to do with economics but nevertheless left 
lasting marks. Crises, in fact, some of which had historical roots to times prior to independence, have 
characterized Pakistan’s economic history more than any other single factor—much more so than 
characterize the development history of other aspiring middle-income countries. Many observers 
over the years, inside the country and outside, have expressed little hope that the economy would be 
able to withstand the many crises it faced. But it has; in some cases using crises as catalytic enablers 
for reform (such as in the early 1980s and 1990s), but usually muddling through to the next one 
based on a heavy injection of state intervention. In most cases these crises had a significant and 
enduring impact on the society, politics and ultimately the structure of the economy. 
 
2.         One of the key impacts left by the historical prevalence toward crisis and crisis management, 
is the sub-optimal structure of the economy, in terms of (i) concentration on low value added, 
resource intensive product mix, (ii) a relatively stagnant enterprise sector bifurcated into a few export 
oriented textile mills and garment producers, a few primary products, and (iii) many small 
establishments, somehow operating on the edge of formality and competition. As will be illustrated 
in later chapters, this structure of exports has been concentrated for a long time on low unit value, 
low technology products that are not growing in the world economy and have little technological 
spillovers of the type common to those integrated in the global supply chain. Moreover, the economy 
seems unable to adjust to the changing market conditions, without the new industry, without 
innovative gazelles and without technological advancements. Little creative destruction is allowed to 
take place so that resource allocation remains concentrated in traditional and dominant firms. 
 
3.         In setting the scene for the country’s goal of diversifying the areas where Pakistan can 
compete in international trade—at home and abroad, the chapter provides historical underpinnings to 
some of the steep challenges Pakistan faces in overcoming its initial conditions due in large part to 
the   particularly   disadvantaged   nature   of   the   economy’s   structure   which   developed   since 
independence, as will be described below. However, perhaps more importantly, the chapter discusses 
how Pakistan’s volatile economic history has left it without the institutional structure necessary for 
the economy to make large adjustments when necessary, and therefore has forgone diversifying 
through  participation  in  the  world’s  rapidly  growing  supply  chains.  In  doing  so,  the  chapter 
highlights how security, State building and other political motives drove key aspects of the economy 
policy making and thus left the economy with these challenging initial conditions. Pakistan is a 
relatively new country with new institutions – and the severe political turmoil faced by its citizens 
prior to, during and since independence has prevented the proper formation and development of 
markets and institutions capable of participating in the world economy. 
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1. The Perfect Storm Facing Pakistan 
 
4.         The metaphor, “the perfect storm,” has been well applied to the current state of the country, 
an economy experiencing great macro and micro difficulties; a struggling attempt at sustained 
democracy following unfinished civilian governments and episodes of military rule, conflict between 
the military and the civilian leadership; and a breakdown in law order, particularly in the urban areas 
amidst intense ethnic rivalries in the country’s largest city and the rise of Islamic extremist forces 
waging a domestic war, particularly in the urban areas. The impact on the economy of the latest crisis 
is becoming apparent, with high interest rates crowding out domestic borrowing, power shortages 
causing severe production disruptions, and political uncertainly hindering expansion through 
investment, hiring and risk taking. 
 
5.         As will be discussed in detail below, Pakistan’s economy has never been fully free of crises 
that touched all features of the economic landscape. But each time, they are deeper and wider in 
scope due to the lasting impact of each and the cumulative effect of many. In 2012 the country came 
under intense pressure due to accusations of poor governance in the Federal Government as well as 
issues related to continuing deterioration in domestic security, uncertainty in the amount of 
development finance from donors; a running dispute with the senior judiciary; conflict between the 
civilian leadership and the military high command; and ethnic and gang warfare in Karachi that has 
claimed hundreds of lives. The cumulative impact has been crises management to avoid 
macroeconomic instability in the face of slow growth, a decline in private and public investment and 
shortages in vital production inputs such as electricity, gas and water. 
 
2. The Risk of Greater Inequality and Unrest 
 
6.         In 2011, Pakistan’s GDP increased by 2.4 percent, following slow increases in the three 
previous years and made the 2008-11 the longest downturn in Pakistan’s torrid economic history. 
Income per head of the population increased by only 0.4 percent and given the sharp deterioration in 
income and wealth distribution, a good part of the increase was captured by the well-to-do, leaving 
the poor poorer. With one-third of the population already absolutely poor, the low rate of GDP 
growth would lead to the pool of poverty expanding at 10 percent a year. In addition, while earlier on 
the back of trends toward urbanization, the rise in the world prices of food items, means that the poor 
in the countryside have done better than those in the urban areas—particularly in the large cities— 
adding to turbulence and sometimes dangerous unrest the country’s major urban centers. 
 
7.         In terms of longer-term perspectives regarding inequality and stability, with the country 
constant political turmoil and security uncertainty, the Government has not been paying much 
attention to the longer-term needs of economic policymaking. In particular, the need to provide a 
growing economy to employ the country’s youth has been considered as a goal, but without great 
urgency, consistency and certainty. Pakistan today has one of the world’s youngest populations with 
the median age at 21 years. In other words, 90 million of the country’s 180 million people are below 
this age. As the youth in Pakistan watch the turmoil in the Arab world, concerns have been rising 
how the underemployed in the country can be brought in to formal employment so as to be part of the 
system rather than against it. 
 
3. Internal and External Finance 
 
8.         The government is spending much more than what it is able to collect by way of taxes. In 
2011, the tax-to-GDP ratio dropped to 8.6 percent, the lowest among all large developing countries. 
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But this decline was not matched by reduction in all overall government expenditures. Islamabad 
became more profligate; spending huge amounts on non-development activities. The share of public 
sector development expenditure declined to a bit more than 2 percent, the lowest in history. In real 
terms, expenditure per capita on such basic services as primary education and health care declined to 
the point where only a quarter of the population was reached by the public sector. 
 
9.         The other area of concern is external finance. Having pursued an import substitution strategy of 
economic growth for decades, Pakistan never made a serious effort to develop its export industry. 
Exports remain focused on cotton-based products. Much of the government’s energy has been spent on 
increasing market shares for textiles in Europe and the United States. There it has run into competition 
from other poor countries. Some of these nations are designated as “less developed countries” and, 
therefore, have preferential access to the markets of rich nations. With exports not increasing as fast as 
the increase in international trade, Pakistan’s share in world commerce has declined. With a growing 
trade deficit, Pakistan is now faced with a difficult external accounts situation 
 
4. Prospects for the Near Term 
 
10.       After a significant improvement in balance of payments on account of large disbursements— 
about $8 billion in 2009 and 2010 from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—external deficits 
have moved into the danger zone. Pakistan has terminated its program with the Fund. It seems 
apparent that, without major adjustments, the downturn of the last four years will persist. The 
government in Islamabad, led by the Pakistan People’s Party, is embroiled in disputes with the 
powerful military and with senior levels of an increasingly assertive judiciary. Relations with the 
United States have frayed and economic aid that was promised to be maintained at a level of $1.5 
billion a year over the five-year period between 2009 and 2014 has been stopped. The rate of 
increase in GDP may not be much more than 2 or 3 percent and another 6 to 7 million people will 
join the ranks of the poor. 
 
5. The Formative Crises in Pakistan 
 
11.       Two examples of formative crises in the US and India underscore that the crisis-change 
nexus, though not unique to Pakistan, can leave very different marks on the histories of nations. In 
both cases, crises were catalysts for bold changes as leadership acted fearlessly and with imagination. 
 
In the US, the New Deal policies adopted by the administration of President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt in response to the Great Recession of the 1930s is an example a deep crisis reshaping 
an economy. A significant expansion of the economic role of the state in the economic safety net 
was one of the most lasting policies adopted at that time, including the creation of the Social 
Security system. 
 
In India, the handling of the Indian foreign exchange crisis by then Finance Minister Manmohan 
Singh led to India’s modern day policy framework. Faced with a severe balance of payments 
crisis in the Government reversed the decades-old economic model which placed the state on the 
commanding heights of the Indian economy9 in favor of a more open system. His action plan 
 
 
 
9 
The first generation of Indian rulers—in particular Jawaharlal Nehru, the country’s first prime minister who 
governed from 1947 for 17 uninterrupted years established the “license raj” that put most investment decisions by 
the private sector in the hands of the bureaucracy. This kept the Indian economy pinned down to a rate of growth of 
between 3 and 3.5 percent. 
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aimed to dismantle all kinds of controls to which the economy had been subjected and in a wide 
sweep of his pen, unleashed the pent-up dynamism of the Indian entrepreneurs.10 
 
12.       Crises have indeed also been important features of Pakistan’s history. Several of these have 
had profound consequences for the shape of the economy, the structure of its political system, and 
the way the country’s citizens look at the world outside. In dealing with them, the policymakers of 
the day adopted approaches that left their mark on the development of the country. Crises were 
caused by different sets of circumstances, and have numbered into the double digits, depending on 
how one characterizes crises. For the purposes here, four crises are highlighted due to their very 
strong impact on the economic structure today. 
 
Dividing Society: Before Pakistan emerged as an independent Muslim state, colonial rulers in British 
India became concerned that the economic system was putting the Muslims under considerable 
economic pressures, particularly in Muslim dominated areas. While the laws that were put on the 
books to protect the Muslim peasantry achieved the objective, there were unintended consequences 
of exacerbating the Muslim-non-Muslim divide and contributed to the mass movement of people in 
the months around the time of the carving out of a new Muslim state. Resettling refugees and social 
divide has become an enduring challenge for realizing the benefits of economic integration— 
nationally, regionally and internationally. 
 
A Difficult Neighborhood: In the years immediately following the partition of India and the creation 
of Pakistan, the creation of a predominantly Muslim Pakistan and a predominately non-Muslim India 
led to potential conflict that surfaced the moment Pakistan was born. There was the perception 
among the first generations of Pakistani leaders that first administration in India was attempting to 
undo partition and fold back the newly created Muslim state into India. This perception was to 
become the basis of public policymaking in Pakistan for decades and led to a series of crises related 
to  the  emerging  conflict  with  India—deeply  affect  the  structure,  direction  and  performance 
Pakistan’s economy ever since. 
 
State Dominance of the Economy: The ideological underpinnings of the administration in power 
was more important as the source of crises in India than was the case for Pakistan as for almost four 
decades, the Indian state was put on the commanding heights of the economy. However, in Pakistan 
two administrations devised and implemented economic policies based on ideology: socialism in the 
case of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) and Islam in the case of President Ziaul Haq 
(1977-88). While the changes were less substantive in the latter case, in the former case, the policies 
adopted had lasting adverse consequences. 
 
Impact of Poor Governance: Two periods in Pakistan’s history are relevant: the first in the decade 
following the birth of the country when there was enormous jockeying for power, no institutions to 
intermediate between contending political forces and the resulting political chaos and economic 
confusion. Pakistan was placed under military rule and a new economic model due to the differences 
 
 
10  
Much  has  been  written on  the  unleashing of  the  Indian  economy as  result  of  the  reforms  undertaken by 
Manmohan Singh. There are those who believe that the revival of the Indian economy began with Singh’s 1991 
dismantling of the license raj. However, others date the resurgence to the reelection of Mrs. Indira Gandhi as prime 
minister in 1980. According to the economist Bishriupriya Gupta, “a consensus has emerged in the literature that, 
irrespective of the period considered, economic reforms [of 1991] do not indicate a structural break in India’s 
economic growth. This happened a decade earlier. One of the more interesting accounts is by an Indian entrepreneur 
who lived through the license raj. See Das, Gurucharan. 2002. India Unbound: The Social and Economic Revolution 
from Independence to the Global Information Age, New York, Anchor, 2002. 
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among the newly empowered political forces.11 Neither he nor his program survived and he was 
forced to resign. Poor governance of a similar type reappeared in 2008-12, causing an already bad 
economy to turn to crisis. 
 
13.       While crises have affected all aspects of life in Pakistan, the focus of this study will be on 
economics. It will investigate the consequences of some of the economic crises in Pakistan’s 
exceptionally turbulent history since it birth on August 14, 1947. An investigation of these four 
different sets of crises will help shed light on how Pakistan got to where it is today, the challenges 
before policy makers given the initial conditions and the limited capacity in the economy for major 
changes. Therefore, the adoption of public policies should take long-term view as well as a more 
immediate perspective. 
 
14.       The choice of episodes in many ways is idiosyncratic. Other economic historians will select 
differently for good analytical reasons. For example the following episodes could have been chosen 
but were not for reasons of brevity and relevance: 
 
 The decision by General Ayub Khan to move the capital from Karachi to Islamabad and its 
political and economic consequences was also a turning point. 
 
 The encouragement  given  by the  Zulfikar  Ali Bhutto administration to  the  unemployed 
workers to migrate to the Middle East had many unanticipated consequences. 
 
 Nationalization of educational institutions at the same time devastate public sector education 
contributed to another historical crisis in human resource development. 
 
 Pakistan’s  failure  to  implement  the  structural  policies,  such  as  those  embodied  in  IMF 
programs, have kept it dependent on large flows of external assistance from other sources. 
 
 Close relations with the United States has had a strong impact throughout the economy and 
disruption in these relations, going forward can also have lasting and profound consequences. 
 
15.       The consequences of crises on Pakistan’s economy require investigation on how episodes in 
Pakistan’s history have affected the economy’s structure, institutions and society. A few crises have 
had a profound and lasting effect on the Pakistani state and the structure of the Pakistani economy. If 
the crises are severe, they can lead to changes in the structures of the economy. If crises keep piling 
up as they have done in Pakistan, the cumulative impact can be considerable. The impact of repeated 
crises, in other words, can be enormous and long lasting. They can also limit the room for maneuver 
available to policymakers at any given time. It is therefore, necessary to factor in history in order to 
understand the initial conditions from which to develop a sustainable approach to economic 
development. 
 
B.        Crisis Number 1: Public Policy and the “Mussalman problem” 
 
16.       Pakistan’s very creation was the result of the perception by growing segments of the Muslim 
population that they will be discriminated against by a government that would be made up largely of 
non-Muslims who will be in majority. When the British left in 1947 and handed over the reins of 
power to the successor states of India and Pakistan, about a third of the population was Muslim. 
While the British administration in India attempted to protect its Muslim subjects from what was 
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viewed as predatory behavior of the economically more powerful non-Muslim community, the result 
was the unintended consequence of exacerbating the Hindu-Muslim divide—described sometimes as 
the “Mussalman problem”.12 
 
1. Famines in British India—An Inheritance of Transport and Irrigation 
 
17.       The British administration reacted to the recurrent famines in the late 19th and the early 20th 
centuries in the northeastern parts of the Indian sub-continent in a way that was to deeply affect the 
areas that were to become part of Pakistan.13 The famines had caused great human suffering and 
risked reuniting India against the British rule.14 As Royal Famine Commissions were set up to advise 
the colonial government, the decision was taken to increase the amount of food India itself 
produced—focusing on the supply side of the equation. One way to affect supply was to bring 
surface irrigation to the vast virgin lands in the Indus Basin plane and the British invested heavily in 
developing irrigation in central and south Punjab and north Sindh.15 
 
18.       Investment in the system of irrigation was accompanied by a number of other initiatives by 
the colonial administration to ensure that the surplus food that would get produced would be 
transported to the deficit areas, including an elaborate system of roads and railways to connect the 
Punjab and Sindh with the northeastern parts of British India. In building the road system the focus 
was on further developing the fabled Grand Truck Road built by Emperor Sher Shah Suri in the 
middle of the 16th century. The railway system on the other hand was an entirely new development. 
India was divided into several railway regions. The North Western Railway, for example, transported 
food surplus from the Punjab and Sindh to Bihar, Bengal and Orissa, the perennially food deficit 
areas of British India and also ensured that the colonial administration could quickly move troops to 
the restive north. The railway system served a third purpose by providing employment to the 
community of Anglo-Indians that had grown in size and were loyal to the British rule. Most senior 
positions in the railway systems and the department of telegraph—two areas where the British were 
anxious to protect their interests—went to the Anglo-Indians. 
 
19.       The British also strengthened the system of administration in the newly developed areas 
called the “colonies”. For this they relied on the members of the Indian Civil Service, the ICS, which 
many historians of colonial India have called the “steel frame” that held together the large geographic 
space over which the British ruled for almost a hundred years.16 The principal British administrator 
in the area was called the “deputy commissioner” whose main function was to collect revenues for 
the government from landowners and collecting taxes. However, the emphasis in the colony districts 
was to maintain law and order and provide security to the newly settled farmers, to oversee the 
movement of grain surpluses, to provide basic services such as primary health care and education to 
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the increasing population, and to keep close contact with the administrative headquarters in the 
capital city of Lahore. 
 
20.       The colonial government’s response to famines in India, therefore had profound impact on 
the structure of the areas which would become the Pakistan economy. These areas were fully 
integrated with the larger Indian economy, becoming the granary of British India as well as the 
supplier of raw cotton to the textile mills in Bombay and Gujarat. Thus, at the time of the partition of 
British India in 1947, India was by far the most important trading partner for the new state of 
Pakistan, picking up the bulk of its exports and providing it with most of its imports. 
 
21.       This integration and the impressive infrastructure inheritance, including a developed system 
of surface irrigation and a well built road and railway systems were the direct consequences of the 
repeated famines in northeast British India and the public policy response to them. As a result, 
Pakistan in 1947 was well integrated economically and physically, laying the ground for another 
crisis, discussed below, which destroyed the close integration but left Pakistan unprepared to rebuild 
its economic ties. 
 
2. Communal tensions in British India—A Risking State Role in Agriculture 
 
22.       It was strategically important for the British to maintain the loyalty of the Muslim community 
in the Punjab and as a result, the structure of the economy of the Indian province of the Punjab had 
strong communal undertones. The loyalty of this community towards the British rulers during the 
days of the 1857 mutiny had made it possible for the colonial power to reassert is authority over the 
rebels.17 When the British began to recruit Indians to the British Indian Army, the Punjab became a 
major supplier of foot soldiers with most coming from the Muslim and Sikh communities of the 
province’s countryside. 
 
23.       While much of the peasantry in the area was either Muslim or Sikh significant agricultural 
services was in the hands of the Hindu community, including supply of seeds at the time of planting, 
storage and marketing of food surpluses and provision of credit. The growing indebtedness of the 
Muslim peasantry to the Hindu money-lenders was an area of concern for the British.18 The British 
administrators serving in the districts of the Punjab were convinced that the peasants and small 
landholders who were mostly Muslims and Sikhs were not benefiting as much from growth in 
agriculture that had followed the arrival of canal irrigation in the province. The believed the reason 
was that a significant increase in incomes was captured by the middlemen. This could be prevented 
by using all manners of controls: by determining who could trade, how trading should be done, 
where should trading take place, and what prices the traders could charge from the producers as well 
as consumers. 
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24.       Over time the British administration in the Punjab put on the books a number of laws that 
were written in response to a slowly building crisis—the increasing economic dominance of Muslim 
peasantry by non-Muslim moneylenders. A few examples are noteworthy: 
 
In  1901  the  colonial  administration  passed  the  Land  Alienation  Act  to  prevent  transfer  of 
collateralized land from the Muslim peasants to Hindu moneylenders by dividing the Punjab 
population into two socio-economic classes: agriculturalists and non-agriculturalists. This social 
engineering served to keep land in the hands of the Muslim and Sikh agriculturalists but sharpened 
and institutionalized the Hindu-Muslim divide. 
 
In 1929, the British again used the legislative process to extend the reach of the state into the 
agricultural economy, through the Agricultural Marketing Act—the main purpose of which was to 
regulate the role of the middlemen in commerce, most of who belonged to the Hindu community. 
 
25.       While social reasons for these acts are long gone, the legislations remain on the books. For 
instance, the Punjab Agricultural Marketing Act has been amended several times, most recently in 
2002 to bring it in line with the establishment of a new system of local government.19 The Marketing 
Act inhibiting the development of domestic commerce in Pakistan, in particular in the marketing of 
agricultural products. 
 
26.       Taking these two episodes together—public policy responses to recurrent famines and the 
fear that the Muslim peasantry would turn against the administration if it did not protect their social 
and economic assets—it is clear that at the time of independence Pakistan inherited an economy 
dominated by a state regulated agriculture sector that was developed to serve the strategic interests of 
the colonial rulers. Large agriculture surpluses were sent as food to the food-deficit areas in northeast 
India and as raw materials for the manufacturing sector in the country’s western parts. This structure 
of the economy would have possibly continued had two developments not occurred, one on the eve 
of Pakistan’s birth, the other a couple of years later. 
 
3. Ethnic Conflict of 1947 
 
27.      The ethnic conflict that took place in the northern parts of British India after the colonial 
administration decided to leave the sub-continent in the hands of two successor states caused some 
14 million people, as estimated by some, to move across the yet-to-be-fully defined border between 
northern India and West Pakistan.20 As eight million Muslim refugees—about 10 percent of the 
Muslim population of British India—arrived from India to Pakistan while six million Hindus and 
Sikhs moved in the opposite direction. Of the Muslim refugees, around a quarter were from urban 
populations while the remaining came from rural districts of the Punjab. 
 
28.       There were basically two streams of refugees that flowed into Pakistan. Those from the urban 
areas of India went mostly to Karachi, the first capital of the state of Pakistan while those from the 
Indian Punjab went to the part of the province that became Pakistan. Those from the urban areas 
rightly believed—given the weight of the state in the modern parts of the economy—that there were 
better prospects for jobs in the government, which was to be located in Karachi.  The people who had 
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worked on the land in the Indian part of the Punjab on the other hand were able to settle on the land 
vacated by the Sikhs in the Pakistani part of the province.21 
 
29.       Resettlement  of  refugees  on  what  came  to  be  called  “evacuee  properties”  had  many 
significant consequences. On the one hand, it was a remarkably successful operation: it settled eight 
million people who had arrived into the country as virtually destitute having left their assets and 
possessions in India. On the other hand, the amount of discretion that was allowed the settlement 
officers operating at various levels bought in corrupt practices into the operation. This was to set the 
tone for future bouts of poor governance in the country. 
 
30.       The community of urban migrants had skills needed by the new state and their influence over 
policymaking outweighed their proportion in the population. However, as they did not have the 
political base to establish an important political position there was considerable turmoil with the 
leaders who had large following in the rural community and the constitution was delayed.22 Constant 
political wrangling was the main reason cited by General Ayub Khan behind his decision in 1958 to 
put Pakistan under martial law.23 
 
31.       Political  turmoil  was  not  the  only  consequence  of  the  ethnic  conflicts  and  population 
movements  that  accompanied  the  partition  of  India.  The  new  ruling  establishment  under  the 
influence of the urban refugee community focused on building an urban economy and neglected 
Pakistan’s considerable agricultural potential for a decade and a half. While attempts were made to 
reverse the bias by the government headed by General Ayub Khan, the path had been set and was 
exacerbated by the next crisis—the dispute with India over the rate of exchange between the 
currencies of the two new sovereign states. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 State Intervention—particularly in agriculture 
 
 Lack of tax collection 
 
 Role of State as employer 
 
 Good agriculture irrigation and 
 
 Road network but underutilized due to neglect of agriculture 
 
 Railways as employment 
 
C.        Crisis Number 2: Relations between India and the New State of Pakistan 
 
32.       Nothing  has  mattered  more  for  Pakistan’s  economic  and  political  development  than  its 
relations with India. Pakistan today would be a very different place—economically, socially, 
culturally and politically—had there been a better relationship with India. At the beginning, it was 
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not destined to be tension filled. Even Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father, did not 
believe the divide between the two nation-states would become so sharp and decisive. 
 
33.       However, actions taken and responses adopted by the countries’ new leadership led to a 
distance between Pakistan and India that was notable in its pervasiveness and consistency. The first 
Indian government took actions that were viewed as hostile by neighboring Pakistan. 
 
 India stopped the flow of electricity to Lahore, at that time Pakistan’s largest city. 
 
 India threatened to divert waters from the rivers that flowed from its territory to Pakistan. It 
had the canal head works to control the flow. 
 
 New Delhi refused to accept Pakistan’s decision to devalue its currency in 1949 and stopped 
all trade with its neighbors. 
 
34.       In the midst of all this, the new Pakistani government had to settle eight million refugees who 
had arrived from India in a population of 24 million, while managing the departure of six million 
Hindus and Sikhs from the country. When Pakistan took its first census in 1951, one out of four of its 
citizens was a refugee. The young state of Pakistan had arrived at the first of the many crossroads at 
which it was to stop many times in its tortuous journey. 
 
1. India’s Refusal to Release Foreign Funds Owed to Pakistan 
 
35.       India was a debtor country before the Second World War but a creditor country afterward. The 
enormous supply of men and materials from India for the war effort of the United Kingdom (UK) had 
built  up  sterling  balances  that  stood  at  1.2  trillion  pounds. 24  After  protracted  discussions,  before 
relinquishing its control of India, the U.K. had agreed to pay a part of this amount to the successor states 
of India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s share in these balances was negotiated at 17 percent. 
 
36.       When Pakistan gained independence, it had no foreign currency to pay for the desperately needed 
imports and badly needed the release of the sterling balances. However, while the balances were transfer 
to India, the Pakistan share did not reach Pakistan. Although India promised to release the payments no 
immediate action was taken. It was later learned that the Government of India was holding back on the 
pretext that Pakistan would use it in prosecuting the war which was going on in Kashmir.25 
 
37.       One major consequence of this payment crisis was that an impression was created among the 
first generation of leaders that India was determined to undo partition. Nehru had bitterly opposed the 
campaign to divide British India along communal lines and, convinced that the Muslim state was 
economically not viable; it would prudently seek readmission into the Indian Union.26 It was in this 
context that Pakistan designed its India policy and in the process did its economy a great deal of 
harm. This episode along with several other Indian decisions persuaded the Pakistani leadership to 
reduce its reliance on India by detaching its economy from that of India’s. While the strategy was 
implemented, the cost was high in terms of the Pakistani economy, society and political system. 
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2. Indus Water Dispute 
 
38.       As discussed above, the British Indian administration invested heavily in the development of 
a vast integrated irrigation system in the province of the Punjab and in the northern parts of Sindh to 
provide food grains to the food deficit areas in the northeast. When the line of partition was drawn 
separating Muslim parts of the province from non-Muslims ones, little attention was paid to the 
geography of the irrigation system. While the canal system was in Pakistan, the head works were left 
on the Indian side. 
 
39.      A formal agreement, called the “Standstill Agreement,” on water sharing was negotiated 
between India and Pakistan before power was transferred to these two successor states; India would 
not use the head works to disrupt the flow of water into Pakistan. However, actions in 1950 affected 
the supply of water to Lahore and the surrounding areas. Considered provocative, the Pakistani 
Government signaled that it would be prepared to go to war if the supply of water was disrupted. The 
result was the “Indus waters dispute” that lingered for a decade and a half and resolved by the 
signing  of  a  treaty  in  1960  with  The  World  Bank  serving  as  intermediary  in  the  protracted 
negotiations that led to the drafting of the Indus Water Treaty. 
 
40.       The final agreement was reached when it was decided that the waters in the eastern rivers that 
were being used by the irrigation system in Pakistan would be replaced by giant “link canals” that 
transferred water between the rivers in Pakistan. This was an expensive proposition and could not be 
undertaken by Pakistan using its own resources. The World Bank established an Indus Water 
Replacement Fund and work was begun on what was to be one of the largest construction project 
ever undertaken in the developing part of the world.27 The treaty has worked for more than half a 
century and survived open military conflicts as well as serious disputes over construction of water 
works. Treaty implementation and dispute resolution panels are still overseen by the World Bank. 
 
3. Fixing the Value of the Pakistani Rupee National Economic Sovereignty 
 
41.       In 1949, the Sterling Area countries devalued their currencies against the American dollar. 
The adjustment was large, as much as 40 percent decline in value. Based on its own reading that raw 
jute export, its main foreign exchange earner, was price inelastic, Pakistan was the only country that 
decided not to change the value of its currency, delinking it from the Indian rupee. The devaluation 
of that magnitude was feared to be highly inflationary, in particular for the urban areas, an important 
constituency for the new political establishment. With no industry of its own, the country was 
dependent on imports for most consumer goods and their price would have gone up significantly. 
 
42.       The decision not to devalue was not acceptable to New Delhi and the Indians stopped trading 
with Pakistan. The trade war with India was to have profound long-term consequences for the 
Pakistani economy. To begin with, Pakistan lost its largest trading partner and one of the two most 
important destinations of Pakistani exports—the other being China—and the most important origin 
for its imports. The jolt delivered by the policymakers in India resulted in reorienting Pakistan’s 
pattern of trade. Over time the distant United States became Pakistan’s largest trading partner while a 
small proportion of trade formally crossed the border with India. 
 
43.       Pakistan was also pushed into rapid industrialization. This is it did by adopting a strategy that 
departed from the conventional development approach of that period. Led by India, most developing 
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countries relied on the state to industrialize— “. . . putting the state on the commanding heights of its 
economy”,  a  phrase  Jawharlal  Nehru  used,  having  borrowed  it  from  Lenin,  to  underscore  his 
economic philosophy. Pakistan, on the other hand used the state to provide the private sector with 
incentives—cheap credit, import licenses, infrastructure development by the state—to invest in 
industry, which responded by investing heavily in consumer goods industry. For several years the 
rate of growth in industrial output outpaced that of agriculture by a factor of six to seven. Though the 
sustainability may have been in question, the rapid industrial performance was interrupted by the 
next big crisis—the decision by the next Government to nationalize industry, finance and commerce. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 Delinking Indian and Pakistan economies 
 
 Rapid Industrialization program based on fiscal and financial incentives. 
 
 Incentives to Private Industry to Industrialize. 
 
D.        Crisis Number 3: The Ideological Shift in Public Policy 
 
44.       For most of the time in Pakistan’s economic history, pragmatism was the basis of policymaking 
with various administrations largely following the prevailing thinking on development at any given time. 
The men in uniform were inclined to leave economic matters in the hands of civilian bureaucrats—many 
of whom were trained in western universities or, as in the days of President Ayub Khan, worked in close 
association with foreign advisors,28 often following development thinkers in the West. In that sense 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s philosophy applied during the 1970s represented a fundamental departure from the 
normal way the Pakistani leadership managed the economy. 
 
1. Socializing the Economy 
 
45.       After the military had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Indian army in 
December 1971, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took over the reins of the government. After the civil way which 
was to break-up the country and the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh, Pakistan—or 
what was left of it after the departure of East Pakistan—turned to Bhutto to lead it towards a different 
future. He took over the administration and moved rapidly to cast Pakistan in the image envisaged by 
him and his political organization, Pakistan Peoples’ Party.29 
 
46.       The economic program saw the socialization of the asset ownership and production systems 
as the answer to the problems it was believed Pakistan faced. In particular, it was claimed—even by 
the Chief Economist of the Planning Commission—that the significant rewards from the remarkable 
rate of growth during the “decade of development” were captured by a narrow elite, suggesting that 
22 industrial and financial houses had benefitted the most. Notwithstanding serious flaws in the 
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argument, the “22 families” became a potent slogan in the elections and contributed to the electoral 
triumph of Bhutto and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in the 1970 poll.30 
 
47.       Bhutto’s Government nationalized  large enterprises in all modern  sectors of  the economy. 
followed by actions to bring under state control thousands of small agro-processing enterprises. In July 
1976, the government unexpectedly took over about 3,000 four mills, with a total employment of 30,000 
persons.31 The Bhutto regime also brought on the books laws for to provide better working environment 
and higher compensation to the workers in the modern sectors of the economy. 
 
48.       The private sector which had flourished for 25 years after independence was marginalized 
and the country’s standard of living declined. There was a severe slowdown in the pace of industrial 
output and private investment in the sector. The prime minister was overthrown by the military in 
July 1977 but the long term damage to the economy has been secured, as 35 years later, the role of 
the state in economic policy making has not been clarified. 
 
2. Conclusion 
 
 Loss of Market Institutions 
 
 Financial Repression and Misallocation of Resources 
 
 Mindset of private sector and labor regarding the paternal state 
 
 Opportunities lost in the economy (Lost Decade) 
 
E.        Crisis Number 4: The Evolving Pattern of Governance 
 
49.       Good governance goes beyond corruption more generally, implying the distance between the 
government and the people it was meant to serve. It includes responsibility for providing public 
services to the citizenry and their quality and holding public servants accountable for their work. 
Responsibility, deliverability and accountability, therefore, are three important attributes of good 
governance. Samuel Huntington wrote a number of years ago, the feeling of relative deprivation 
becomes acute when the economy is growing rapidly but most of the incremental income is captured 
by narrow economic and political elites.32 
 
50.       Equally, poor governance has many meanings. It means the indifference of those in power 
towards delivering the services people need; to ensure security for the lives and properties of the 
citizenry; to respect the rights of all minorities, ethnic as well as religious; to hold themselves 
accountable for their actions; to provide stability and continuity of policies; and to create an 
environment which leads people to develop confidence in their future. 
 
51.       Poor governance has a negative impact on economic performance; this is one reason why the rate of 
economic growth has stalled in Pakistan since the return of democracy in early 2008. It has contributed to 
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Pakistan not achieving the rates of GDP growth attained by other large South Asian economies. In addition 
to poor governance a number of structural problems prevented the country from reaching its potential. 
Among these contributors to economic growth poor governance is one of the more important ones. 
 
52.       Political uncertainty and poor governance, came together from before the current Government 
and since. There are many indicators of the decline in the quality of governance. To take one, corruption: 
according to the 2011 report issued by the Berlin-based Transparency International, Pakistan ranks poorly 
on that score. It is close to the bottom in the organization’s ranking of countries around the globe. 
 
53.       There are several measures a well-intentioned government could have adopted to improve the 
quality of governance. Of these four are of particular importance: 
 
 an accountability system for public officials, 
 
 government brought closer to the people, 
 
 modernized legal and regulatory systems along with institutional enforcement, and 
 
 autonomy, accountability and appropriateness to the judiciary. 
 
1. The Ultimate Accountability - Transfer of Power to the People through Elections 
 
54.       In 2008 the reins of government were gradually transferred from the military to the elected 
representatives  of  the  people.  The  transfer  should  have  taken  place  after  the  elections  held  in 
February in which the PPP won the most seats but not the majority. Following the election, the 
economies worsened as the following events took place that substantially weakened political and 
economic governance in the country. 
 
 A grand coalition that included both the PPP and the PML (N) formed a government at the 
center in Islamabad. But the coalition lasted for only two months. 
 
 Once in power the new president was reluctant to relinquish the authority the presidency had 
accumulated under military rule. It took two years to bring back the parliamentary system of 
government, but the President circumvented it as head of the PPP. 
 
 PPP leadership was able to keep the government by persuading two other large parties to stay on 
its side, in one case agreeing to autonomy to local governments led by elected officials called the 
Nazims which will further cloud the governance structure post 18th amendment. 
 
 Forces of extremist Islam were signaling to those who were opposed to it by suggesting that 
they would use the weapon of assassinations to get their way. Governor Taseer of Shahbaz 
Bhatty, was assassinated a couple of months later on January 4, 2011 by a member of his 
security guard after he had issued a statement in defense of a Christian woman and urged 
other to take to the streets to protest against blasphemy laws. 
 
 Rapid weakening of relations with the United States from the Raymond Davis affair, the Raid 
to Capture Bin Landen and the friendly fire incident in which American’s erroneously killed 
24 Pakistan soldiers. 
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 Confrontation with the Judiciary which has prosecuted the Prime Minister and overturned 
Government policies, even in the area of the economic sphere. 
 
2. Bringing Government Closer to the People 
 
55.       There is hope that the reshaping of the structure of government following the passage of the 
18th  amendment to the constitution will improve the quality of governance by bringing the state 
closer to the people. But there is also anxiety that the devolution of so much authority to the 
provinces could cause disruption in a number of areas. There is a particular concern that unless the 
process of devolution is managed carefully it could result in the deterioration of public services to the 
poorer segments of the population.33 To avoid this, devolution and experiences have to teach. 
 
56.       The first is that the organization of the government must not stop at the center or at the 
provinces and has to include local government. The country has engaged in constant experimentation 
and has tried half a dozen systems of local government over the last sixty years instead of keeping 
one in place and improving it at the margin. Though there was good substance in the Local 
Government Ordinance of 2001,34 the 18th amendment neglects provision regarding the mode of 
authority and resources at the local level. 
 
57.       The second is the importance of institutions in helping economies to move forward. Pakistan 
has treated institutional development with callous indifference and even well functioning institutions 
to wither away. During transition periods, there was preference for the new instead of improving the 
established. This is a danger of the government restructuring required by the 18th amendment. 
 
58.       The third is to adopt holistic approaches rather than ad hoc and truncated methods for 
addressing critical problems. Social development and the services that would promote it are the most 
important areas for government’s involvement. What is needed is a grand strategy that involves the 
participation of many people and many institutions. As the several miracles in East Asia have 
demonstrated passion shown by senior leadership can produce remarkable results. 
 
3. Institutional Governance 
 
59.       Since 2008, the country has been limping through a period of political transition. The army 
had by then governed for 33 years out of the 61 years of independence but gave way to one 
consisting of elected representatives of the people.  However, within a couple of months the country 
entered a period of political uncertainty that has lasted to this date, contributing to economic stress 
and the risks which kept away the potential investors. 
 
60.       And although, the quality of governance in Pakistan is relatively poor, contributing to a major 
economic downturn, this has not prevented the well-to-do from becoming rich, leaving the rest of the 
citizenry way behind. Political scientists from the days of Samuel P. Huntington have been 
emphasizing that relative deprivation—their term—can be a powerful sentiment for forcing political 
change. It has been deployed in Pakistan’s torrid history for bringing about regime change as 
governments of President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto fell largely because 
people were unhappy with what they received from the establishment. 
 
33 
Institute of Public Policy, State of the Economy: Devolution in Pakistan, April 2011. 
34 
This was underscored by a study produced by the Institute of Public Policy that examined the working of the 
system. The research project was funded by the Government of Punjab. See Institute of Public Policy (2008) 
‘Strengthening the System of Local Government in Punjab’, Lahore, 2008. 
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61.      Some movement has taken place on the last two on the list, with accomplishments in 
modernizing the legal and regulatory systems to support a market economy. Some attempts were 
made to set up institutions of accountability, most recently by the administration headed by President 
Pervez Musharraf. The National Accountability Bureau, or NABA, was meant to “put the fear of 
God into the rich and powerful who had been looting the state”, Musharraf wrote later in his 
autobiography. “But as had happened so many times before, it too became politicized…certainly 
Pakistan is struggling with Governance issues large and small.” 
 
4. Legal Systems 
 
62.       A legal system is as effective as the judiciary that administers it. Largely because of the support 
by the citizenry through the various civil society organizations, and the heavy involvement of the legal 
community—the “black coats” movement—during the waning days of the Musharraf regime, Pakistan’s 
judiciary at the senior levels has begun to provide comfort to the people. Pakistan’s policymakers have 
not fully grasped the importance of a well-functioning legal system for providing good governance. No 
significant attempts have been made since the founding of the country to reform the legal system so that it 
adequately addresses the varied needs of the citizenry. Dispute settlement and holding accountable those 
who break the law are two of the more important attributes of a good legal structure. 
 
63.       The Supreme Court, led by Justice Iftikar Chaudhry, had displayed independence that was 
unusual in the history of the senior courts in Pakistan. A tradition of acquiescence began in 1954 when 
the superior country then under the leadership of Chief Justice Mohammad Munir held Governor 
General Ghulam Muhammad’s dismissal of the Constituent Assembly to be within the scope of chief 
executive’s base of authority. The court used the doctrine of necessity as the justification of its 
decision. Since then, the “doctrine of necessity” has been used as a way of justifying the actions taken 
by authoritarian rulers to assume even greater executive authority or to acquire it. Accordingly, once an 
act by the chief executive has come to take its course it would disruptive to go back to status quo ante. 
This way of dealing with authoritarianism as well as military coups became a legal tradition in 
Pakistan. The Chaudhry court seemed inclined to move away from this tradition by holding the 
executive accountable to the law of the land and issued a number of decisions that went against it the 
executive, included the decision to annul the privatization of the Karachi Steel Mill. 
 
64.       Though Chaudhry was reinstated by a “dissident bench” of the Supreme Court a few months 
after his first dismissal in March 2007, he was removed again in November 2007 when the country 
was put under a “state of emergency” and all judges in the superior courts who had shown some 
independence of the executive branch were removed. Even after Musharraf’s resignation in August 
2008 and the election of Asif Ali Zardari to the presidency, Chaudhry and his dismissed colleagues to 
the Supreme Court were not returned until mid-March when pressure from the opposition forced the 
Government to do so. The black coat movement and the assertion by the Supreme Court of its 
authority has resulted in a profound change in public opinion about the standing of the judiciary and 
its role in political development.35 
 
65.       The courts operating at these levels have begun to take a deep and increasing interest in the 
political and bureaucratic systems’ accountability. The current conflict between the Supreme Court 
and  the  PPP-led  government  in  Islamabad  is  likely  to  be  resolved  in  favor  of  the  judiciary 
 
35 
According to the economist S. Akbar Zaidi, “for a country which is notorious for not following the law, in any 
manifestation of its practices – constitutional, civic or corporate – we are now faced with a judicial invasion and an 
onslaught of lawyers and legal opinions in the public sphere”. A. Akbar Zaidi, “Judicial invasion”, Dawn, January 
20, 2012, p. 7. 
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notwithstanding the resolution passed by the National Assembly on January 16, 2012 expressing 
confidence in democracy. An efficient and effective judicial system is an important part of the 
democratic structure, not separate from it. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
66.       The crises have impacted economic development in Pakistan by establishing difficult initial 
conditions, creating an environment of extreme uncertainty and due to the need for constant crises 
response, have prevented Pakistan from carrying out longer term structural reforms. The second was 
economic.  The repeated swings between civilian and military rule meant the absence of continuity 
in the making of economic policy. In its almost six and half decades of history, Pakistan has dealt 
with many crises, of which four formative ones were discussed here. 
 
67.       In each case, policymakers of the day were able to put in place policies and programs that 
delivered the country out of difficulty for a period of time, but not without lasting impact. In 
particular, Pakistan was able to settle eight million refugees arriving from India with hope but with 
few  economic  assets.  Later  it  dealt  with  a  trade  embargo  when  the  first  administration  in  the 
country’s history refused to devalue the currency. The charged issue of water supply in Pakistan 
required a decade long negotiations leading to the Indus Water Treaty. 
 
68.       The crisis of governance has been one of the more serious problems for the economy. In 
1958, the military marched into politics and stayed in charge for 11 years. It returned three more 
times and stayed for a total of 33 years. The few gaps in its rule were filled by some form of civilian 
governance. This political roller-coaster caused a failure in the construction of a durable system of 
governance. These policy swings did not produce an environment that would have provided comfort 
to  the  investors  willing  to  commit  their  capital  over  the  medium  and  long  term.  Different 
governments tried different economic models, leaving much confusion in the minds of those who 
was prepared to invest capital in the development of the economy. For example: 
 
 In the 11 year period from 1947-1958, private enterprise ruled supreme. The state was 
present on the margin, willing to help but not to intervene and obstruct. 
 
 The advent of the military rule led to the articulation of an industrial policy in which the state 
became an active partner.36 
 
 The  government  of  Zulfikar  Ali  Bhutto  nationalized  all  large  industrial,  financial  and 
commercial enterprises and discouraged private enterprise. 
 
 The military government (1977-88) that followed adjusted the balance between the state and 
private enterprise in favor of the latter but did not go far enough. 
 
 In 1991, the leadership of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, made the state step back decisively, 
leaving space for private enterprise. 
 
69.       In the process, Pakistan was often confronted with a shortage of external finance, serious 
enough to push the country towards near-default on its foreign obligations. This happened several times 
in the late 1990s, and again in 2008. Each time Pakistan went to the IMF for help, it failed to 
 
36 
For instance the governments headed by Ayub Khan allowed no more than 12,500 spindles in a mill to spread 
ownership of large amounts of capital, laying the basis for an inefficient textile industry that continues today. 
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implement the program.  On the other hand, during periods of natural disasters in such as floods in the 
1950s, a major earthquake in 2005, and floods again in 2010 and 2011, even weak governments were 
able to tackle the problems caused by these events, by mobilizing the resources available. 
 
70.       The current structure of the Pakistani economy and its relations with many countries in the 
region were shaped to a considerable extent by the past. The crises discussed in this chapter illustrate 
how history can contribute to a better appreciation of the way the Pakistani economy has evolved 
since the country’s birth in 1947. History also helps to define the “path dependence” in which those 
making public policy must operate.37 In order propose solutions, it is important to understand how 
the past may have contributed so that responses can be calibrated. This time, at the beginning of 
2012, however, the country is dealing not with one or two or three crises but perhaps as many as a 
dozen and those in power have not been able to come up with an adequate public sector response. As 
the situation worsens, the lessons from the history of crisis management in the country are clear: the 
longer it waits the more difficult, painful and time consuming. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 “. . .often if something that seems normal or inevitable today began with a choice that made sense at a particular 
time in the past, but survived despite the eclipse of the justification for that choice.” John McWhorter as quoted by 
David Brooks, “Tools for thinking”, The New York Times, Global Edition, March 30, 2011, p.11. 
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CHAPTER II: COMPETITIVENESS AND TRADE OUTCOMES 
 
A.        Introduction 
 
71.       Given  that  most,  if  not  all  success  stories  in  growth  accelerations  worldwide  have  an 
outward-looking strategy, Pakistan’s growth strategy has typically, and currently includes an explicit 
policy goal of greater integration in the world economy. However, as described in Chapter I, the 
crisis management paradigm that has plagued Pakistan since independence has left Pakistan’s 
economy with challenging initial conditions in terms of the economic structure and the ability to 
adjust rapidly changing market signals. 
 
72.       The under-performance in terms of the economy’s trade orientation, particularly in light of its 
favorable geographic and natural endowments, has been well documented, particularly in recent 
years38 and continues to remains a key characteristic of the Pakistan economic landscape. Moreover, 
the further decrease in the trade to GDP ratio during the last decade—a period of high growth in 
world trade—is a clear symptom of structural obstacles to greater global integration. 
 
73.       The analysis shows that despite some progress in diversifying markets and products, Pakistan 
continues to rely heavily on saturated, slow-growing Western markets in its few traditional sectors 
such as textiles and apparel along with strong positions in rice and cotton. There is declining level of 
sophistication of its exports as little upgrading has occurred to earn higher value per unit of export, 
even where Pakistan clearly has a comparative advantage. Because of internal problems with trade- 
related incentives, business environment, and governance, and years of external shocks, described in 
detail in Chapter I, Pakistan’s export strategies have largely been ineffective as reflected by its 
overarching performance indicators. 
 
74.       But deeper analysis reveals positive signs in the country’s trade performance as well showing 
positive areas to build upon. As Pakistan’s private sector has typically show a strong resilience, and 
adaptation, there has been experimentation with new products while there is evidence that new firms 
have been entering foreign markets. A somewhat surprising but key finding of the chapter is that 
growth in new products and new markets was the main driver of the overall growth of exports during 
the period 2002-2007. There are also some positive signs in trade in services (although perhaps, not 
fully picked up in official statistics), which has acquired some momentum, possibly because it can 
override tangible, physical constraints faced by the goods sector and due to the often overlooked but 
highly dynamic sectors in the Information Technology (IT) servicing and development fields. 
 
75.       The comprehensive and detailed analysis of trade and specially exports performance over the 
10 years which follows is intended to guide a systematic generation of hypotheses about Pakistan’s 
export performance, prospects, and challenges.39 As depicted in Figure 1, the framework for carrying 
out the analysis decomposes trade growth into four dimensions: 
 
 
 
38 
World Bank 2007, Planning Commission, 2011, Manes 2010, Lahore University 2009. 
39 
The principal source for the analysis is the UN COMTRADE database available through the World Integrated Trade 
Solutions (WITS) platform for the entry and survival analysis (sustainability margin) firm-level data was used, based on a 
customs transactions database for the period 2001-2010. Performance of Pakistan’s exports is compared to a number of 
“peer” countries, selected based on factors including: location, similarity in country characteristics (level of income, size, 
geography, sectoral structure), and their presence as competitors to Pakistan’s exporters in key markets. Peer countries for 
comparison using aggregate flows are China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. For the firm level data, middle income 
countries such as Bulgaria, Colombia, Peru and South Africa are used as comparators. 
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 Intensive Margin: level, growth, and market share performance of existing exports 
 
 Extensive Margin: diversification of products and markets 
 
 Quality Margin: Technology, quality and sophistication of exports 
 
 Sustainability Margin: Entry and survival of new exporters 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Measuring Trade Competitiveness A Conceptual Framework 
 
Source: Authors, derived from Cadot et al (2011). 
 
76. This chapter is divided according to two types of analysis. The first examines aggregate trade 
flows to analyze growth, market shares, diversification and sophistication and compares these 
indicators with peer countries to gauge performance at the national level. The second part of the 
chapter considers analysis at the firm level to assess entry, exit and survival of companies attempting 
to enter the export market. Finally, an econometric exercise is carried out to underscore factors which 
determine export performance in Pakistan as a basis for the chapter’s conclusions. 
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B. Growth, Diversification and Sophistication 
 
1. Orientation and Growth 
 
77. With   a   positive   but   subdued 
export  growth  over  the  past  decade, 
Pakistan  has  recently  suffered  from  a 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Index of Export Growth, 1980 - 2011 
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grown in the last 30 years above world’s 
exports growth but much below the 
accumulated growth of exports of South 
Asian peers (Figure 2). Specifically, 
Pakistan’s exports grew 10-fold in 30 
years, much less than the 25-fold growth 
observed  in  the  rest  of  South  Asia. 
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During this period of time, the most 
intense growth of Pakistan’s exports was 
observed at the end of the 1980s and at 
beginning of the 1990s. The most recent 
period, however, is associated with a 
deceleration of export growth. The 
contraction of both exports and imports 
during the financial crisis took place at 
the same time as the recovery of both 
flows that started in the third quarter of 
2009 with exports growing slightly faster 
than imports, led by rice, textiles like 
men’s shirts of cotton, women’s apparel, 
petroleum  oil  and  bed  and  bathroom 
linen, as well as cotton yarn. 
 
2. Openness to Trade 
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78.       Pakistan’s recent trade orientation is one of stagnation, as indicated by a decrease in its trade - 
to-GDP ratio over the last decade. At the same time peer countries have leapfrogged with high 
growth rates.40 Pakistan’s position below the predicted line indicates that it “under-trades” by half 
compared to countries at comparable levels of per-capita income.41 This is the case for all other 
populous countries it is compared with (Figure 3). Pakistan’s average trade-to-GDP ratio for the 
period 2007-09 was smaller than what it was a decade earlier (1997-99), in contrast to the shares of 
 
40 
The trade-to-GDP ratio is a basic indicator of global economic integration and gives an indication of the 
dependence of domestic producers on foreign demand and of domestic consumers and producers on foreign supply. 
Theoretically and empirically, there is traditionally a concave relationship between trade openness and per capita 
income: countries tend to trade more as incomes rise, but at a decreasing rate. 
41  
An  OLS  regression (using  cross-country data  from  WDI)  of  trade/GDP  on  the  log  of  per  capita  income 
(Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) current $), its squared value, cost of exporting (using Doing Business indicator 
2008-2010) and population, gives a predicted trade share of 65 percent as compared with the actual trade share of 
less than 32 percent. 
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its peers. In 1997-99, Pakistan’s trade-to-GDP ratio was as high as China’s, and much higher than 
India’s. Ten years later, shares of both China and India almost doubled while Pakistan’s fell. 
 
Figure 3. Trade Orientation 1990s versus 2000s 
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3. Composition of Exports 
 
79.       From a sector point of view42 , Pakistan’s exports are dominated by labor-intensive light 
manufacturing——textiles, clothing, footwear and leather. This group’s share in exports in 2007-09 
was 65 percent. The second most important export sector was the agrifood sector with slightly more 
than 11 percent of total exports. Despite the geo-political and security difficulties posed by the war 
on terror, all sectors of Pakistani exports appear to have seen a healthy growth during the period 
1999-2007. Almost all sectors experienced double-digit annual export growth, with extractive 
industries, metals, and chemicals growing above 20 percentage points annually. During 2007-09, 
years coinciding with the financial crisis, however, the manufacturing sectors, especially the textiles 
and apparel industries saw a drop in demand and annual growth was much slower in all sectors 
except machinery, electronics and transportation equipment, possibly partly sustained by the vitality 
of the electronics sector globally. 
 
80.       One of Pakistan main challenges is the lack of product diversification indicated by the fact 
that 10 products (4-digit Harmonized System (HS)) represent half of Pakistan’s exports each year 
during the last decade. 
 
Table 1. Composition and Growth of Exports by Sector, 1997-99 and 2007-09 
 
 
 
 
 
Textiles, apparel, leather, 5,860,275 81.25 11,400,000 65.44 9.16 -3.05 9.77 11.59 
Agriculture, dairy, seafood 5,301,82 7.35 1,980,391 11.38 10.94 3.45 2.86 1.89 
Extractive industries 106,941 1.48 1,650,572 9.49 30.58 20.63 0.18 0.42 
Other manufacturing 315,141 4.37 739,045 4.25 11.22 -1.34 0.63 0.74 
Iron, steel, other metals 68,640 0.95 552,095 3.17 26.89 -1.55 0.16 0.36 
Food, beverages, tobacco, 227,851 3.16 455,360 2.62 3.24 19.40 0.47 0.49 
Chemicals, plastics, rubber 42,172 0.58 394,995 2.27 20.32 11.49 0.08 0.20 
Machines, electronics, equipment 61,309 0.85 227,942 1.31 11.37 14.10 0.04 0.06 
 
42 
The sectoral classification follows Hanson (2010). Export values reflect mirror data in Comtrade. 
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81.       Top Pakistan’s exports products are the ones in which the country has a revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA),43 like textiles, apparel, leather, footwear, agriculture products, meat and dairy and 
seafood (Table 1). For rising products such as mineral, metals and machineries and electrics, the 
country has no comparative advantage in relation to the rest of the world. The export growth of these 
products is reflected though in increasing values of RCA. In section 3.3 there is a further analysis 
relating sectors and revealed comparative advantage. 
 
82.       Geographically, the EU and the US represent the most important destinations of Pakistan’s 
exports.  The  US  and  European  markets 
absorb 31 percent and 23 percent of 
Pakistan’s total exports respectively. China 
represents the third most important 
destinations, with an 11.5 percent share. 
Afghanistan,  Oman,  Turkey,  and  the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) have recently 
become important destinations. A key 
theme in the later part of the chapter is how 
Pakistan is under trading with its neighbors 
according to economic indicators such as 
distance, income per capita, etc. Reasons 
for this were discussed in Chapter I, but 
will be address in the later part of the 
chapter from a trade lens. 
Table 2. Selected Economies Market 
Composition of Exports, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
EU 4,416,240 31.1 10.3 -7.3 
USA 3,345,885 23.6 7.3 -6.4 
China 1,632,546 11.5 7.5 -3.1 
Brazil-Russia-India 558,617 4.1 21.1 1.0 
Turkey 618,949 4.4 30.6 7.9 
Rest of World 3,596,671 25.3 13.7 -9.8 
Total 14,198,908 100.0 10.7 -6.3 
 
4. Diversification and Concentration Indices 
 
83.       Diversifying exports across markets and products reduces the country’s balance of payments 
exposure to partner-specific shocks, volatility in export prices or various other commodity-specify 
shocks. Chapter I demonstrates how Pakistan’s many crises have highlighted the critical importance 
of diversification of the economy to mitigate the many shocks which come its way. Increasingly, 
services trade has become an important source of export diversification, in the world and will 
increasingly become so for Pakistan.44 
 
84.       However, Pakistan’s export bundle is relatively diversified in terms of products. Contrary to 
the macro level indictors and the prevailing perception among observers.  The Herfindahl Index 
which measures concentration of export value at product and market level, 45 places Pakistan as one 
of the less concentrated among peer countries (Figure 4). During the current decade, Pakistan’s index 
has increased, but the trend has also been observed in the majority of peer countries, such as 
Bangladesh, China, Malaysia, and Turkey. 
 
85.       As well, surprisingly, Pakistan has indeed diversified it destination. The prominence of US and 
European markets in Pakistan’s exports reduced by about 9 percentage points, from 61 to 54 percent since 
 
 
43 
The RCA index is one measure for calculating the relative advantage or disadvantage of a certain country in the 
trade flows for a certain industry. An index above one indicates the country’s share of exports in that sector or 
product exceeds the global share. 
44 
The World Bank Group Trade Strategy 20011-2021: Leveraging Trade for Development and Inclusive Growth. 
45 
A diversified export portfolio will have an index close to zero. Export of one product or to one market will have 
an index with a value of closer to 1. 
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Figure 4. Herfindhal Index, 2000-2008 
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2000. Like other countries, there has been a small increase in exports to the emerging bloc of Brazil, Russia, 
India and China (BRIC) and Afghanistan, Oman, Turkey, and the UAE are more important destinations. 
 
86.       Despite  this  diversification  of  destinations  in  recent  years,  Pakistan’s  exports  remain 
relatively more concentrated than peer countries. Pakistan’s emphasis on industrialized countries 
export markets makes the country too vulnerable to economic developments in these countries and 
does not seem to fit within Pakistan’s gravity model—one predictive method for trading partners. 
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5. Gravity Model Results 
 
87.       Deepening this recent trend is key, as Pakistan appears to be still under-exporting with large 
and fast growing economies - including Brazil, India, Japan and Russia - below what could be 
expected (above the 45-degree line in Figure 5) based on a gravity model of trade.46 For example, 
Pakistan’s exports to Sri Lanka have grown in response to a bilateral trade agreement in place and 
trades heavily with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as re-export points for trade 
with third countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
Bilateral exports are related to the bilateral characteristics of trading partners including, distance, contiguity, 
common language, colony, common colonial power, GDP, GDP per capita, etc. The model also incorporates three 
innovations: (i) a measure of remoteness to incorporate relative distances alongside absolute distances, (ii) control 
for zero trade flows so as to incorporate the information of zero flows, rather than dropping, and (iii) control for firm 
heterogeneity without using firm-level data by inferring features of marginal exporters from the export destinations. 
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Figure 5. Gravity Model of Trade for Pakistan, 2007-09 Pakistan's Export Pa tners, 2 07-09 
PREDICTED VS. ACTUAL (GRAVITY) 
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6. Growth Orientation of Export Products and Markets 
 
88.       Optimally, exports in which Pakistan specializes should be those which are “pulled” by rapid 
world growth in the demand for the product. However, when examining Pakistan’s trade share in 
expanding strategic markets, little correlation exists between those products and the growth of 
Pakistan’s exports. In other words, Pakistan’s top export categories—cotton, apparel, leather—are 
not growing as rapidly as other products growing in the world market, such as fruits/grain/oil seeds, 
cereals, chemicals, plastics, etc.  Similarly, apart from China and Turkey, Pakistan’s top export 
markets are not among those that have seen the highest rates of growth over the past decade. 
 
89.       Graphically, world growth is related to the importance of such high-growing products in a 
country’s  export  portfolio  (Figure  6).  A  positive,  upward-sloping  relationship  is  desired  as  the 
highest export share products would be growing in world markets. For Pakistan however, the growth 
orientation of products is closer to flat showing a much lower correlation of Pakistan’s product’s 
shares of own exports with the world growth of these products as compared to China and Malaysia.47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
The 6 digit HS product must represent at least 0.5percent of total exports, and the export market must receive at least 
0.5percent of Pakistan’s total exports. With higher threshold both correlations become more adverse. 
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Figure 6. Correlations between Pakistan & World Export of Key Products, 1999-2009 
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90.       Still, at low levels of activity, there is evidence that Pakistan firms indeed moving to products 
and markets with greater opportunities, though much less so than potential competitors. The evidence 
at the aggregate level is that the intensive margin (IM) of exports has declined while the extensive 
margin (EM) has improved slightly. The indications are therefore, that Pakistan’s has lost some share 
in products that the rest of the world also exports (IM) has declined slightly over the last ten years, 
but appears to be moving towards some new exports that are becoming economically significant 
(EM).48 At the same time, Pakistan’s export share in markets it currently exports to (IM) has reduced 
slightly, but it has increased its reach to markets that cumulatively are larger relative to the world in 
2008 than in 1998 (EM) (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Intensive and Extensive Margin in Products and Markets, 1998-2008 
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91.       In comparison, countries such as India, Indonesia and Vietnam, however, have managed to 
increase their share of export in goods which the rest of the world produces too (IM) as well as the 
breadth of their export portfolio relative to all exportable products (EM). India and Vietnam have 
increased their existing share of exports to existing markets, but have not added new markets to their 
portfolio of destinations. Indonesia has done both. 
 
 
48 
Following Hummels and Klenow (2005) The IM indicates how big is Pakistan in what it exports, and the EM 
measures how globally important is what it exports. “From a big fish in a small pond to a small fish in a big pond.” 
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Figure 8. Pakistan’s Export Reach: Product & Market Discovery & Death, 1998 - 2008 
7. Value and Reach of Exports 
 
92.       Over the 10 year period, 1998-2008 Pakistan has expanded the number of export markets 
served from less than 80 to well over 110 (Figure 8). 49  The number of products in the newly 
expanded or existing markets has increased. Products that disappeared did not constitute large export 
amounts, whereas the possibly new exports in 2008 earned large amounts, with some already seen to 
reach around 25 markets. 
 
93.       Products  that  expanded  their  reach  of  markets  include  those  in  which  Pakistan  has  a 
comparative advantage. Textiles and apparel are obvious, but a product that stands out for rapid 
expansion is manicure/pedicure sets belonging to the surgical industry, or products like eye makeup, 
beauty make up, shampoos, medicaments or wedding and gauze with pharmaceutical substances. 
There are new agricultural products growing, such as rice, or agro industry like chewing gum, 
chocolates, biscuits, fruit juice and sauces.50 
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49 
Figure 8 shows products and markets with (i) existing products in 1998 and 2008 in green, (ii) products that were 
not exported in 1998 but were in 2008 in orange – as new discoveries, and (iii) products that were exported in 1998 
but not in 2008 – as death or suspension in black. 
50 
A visit to Sialkot provided the opportunity to meet exporters who were successfully exporting an expanding 
volume of surgical instruments all over the world, but mainly to the countries of the EU. 
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Figure 10. Service Exports in Pakistan by Type, 1997-2009 
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8. Export of Services and FDI 
 
94. Trade in services, although picked up only partially in official statistics, has acquired some 
momentum, possibly because it can override 
tangible, physical constraints faced by the 
goods sector. Increasingly, services trade has 
also become an important source of export 
diversification 51   but  outside  Bangladesh, 
Pakistan has the lowest share of services in 
GDP among its peers. In terms of services 
exports, Pakistan shows some growth, but less 
than that of its peer countries: Bangladesh, 
China, Egypt, India, Malaysia, and Turkey. 
Between 2000 and 2007, exports of 
commercial services grew at a compound 
annual rate of nearly 15 percent, which is just 
below  the  average  rate  of  peer  countries 
(Figure 9). 
Figure 9. Export of Services, 2000-2009 
 
95. Transport and information communication technologies services are, respectively, the most 
important types of services exported (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Service Exports Share of Commercial Service Exports (%) 
 
 
 
 
Insurance and financial services 1.2 4.6 5.0 21.7 1.2 
Computer, communications and other services 27.1 34.9 34.0 3.7 -0.4 
Transport services 65.4 48.0 48.5 -4.3 0.1 
Travel services 6.3 12.4 12.5 10.2 0.1 
a Average value in 2008-09 
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI) 2010. 
     
 
96. The evolution of the services exports by category is shown below (Figure 10). 
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51 
The World Bank Group Trade Strategy 20011-2021: Leveraging Trade for Development and Inclusive Growth. 
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97. Except for the years of the financial 
crisis,   2008-09,   the   recent   past   provided 
Table 4. FDI Inflows, 2005-2009 
(as percent of Gross Fixed Capital Formation) 
Pakistan  with  a  steady  inflow  of  FDI  which    
was  significant  in  the  percentage  of  gross 
fixed  capital  formation.  Inflows  were 
relatively sizeable compared to other Asian 
economies (Table 4) with FDI coming mainly 
into the  largely non-tradable  sectors of 
banking and telecom. These two important 
backbone   services   gave   a   boost   to   the 
country’s overall productivity, dynamics and 
therefore exports.52 
 
9. Technological Content 
  Bangladesh  6.0  5.3  4.0  5.7  3.3   
  China  7.7  6.4  6.0  5.3  4.0   
  Egypt  32.3  47.8  42.2  31.2  22.3   
  India  3.0  6.8  6.3  9.6  8.4   
Indonesia 12.3 5.6 6.4 6.6 2.9 
Iran 5.7 2.7 2.2 1.8 4.0 
Pakistan 11.5 16.4 18.7 18.3 8.2 
Thailand 15.8 16.4 17.4 11.4 9.2 
  Turkey  9.9  17.1  15.9  12.5  7.3   
Viet Nam 11.6 11.8 24.8 25.5 12.8 
Source: UNCTAD 
 
98.       The technological sophistication of exports is low for a country which has good educational 
and  research  institutions,  and  a  large  population  (Figure  11).  Yet,  despite  a  rising  number  of 
graduates in the secondary levels of the technology field, Pakistan has not yet converted raw talent to 
exports as high tech exports constituted less than 2 percent of the basket in 2008; a share broadly 
unchanged in the past 25 years. More importantly, while just over half of Pakistan’s exports were 
classified as low-tech in 198553 the share of this category increased to 65.4 percent in 2008. 
 
Figure 11. Technological content of exports, 1982 - 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
According to the World Bank Group’s latest report on FDI regulations, Investing Across Borders 2010, 27 out of 
a total of 33 sectors are fully open to foreign capital participation. In the financial services sector, the Banking 
Companies Ordinance allows a maximum of 49 percent foreign ownership of Pakistani banks, while foreign capital 
participation in local insurance companies is allowed up to a 51 percent share. 
53 
Lall, S. (2000). “The technological structure and performance of developing country manufactured exports, 1985 - 
98”, Oxford Development Studies, 28(3), pp. 337–369. 
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99.       To contrast Pakistan with other success cases, demonstrates how potential may or may be 
converted into performance outcomes. For example, Vietnam’s exports went from 0.7 percent to 3.8 
percent of total in the same period while India’s increased from 2.8 percent to 6.2 percent. 
 
10. Product Quality 
 
100.     The opportunities to compete of quality are not the same for all products. Commodities and 
homogeneous manufactures offer less scope for quality upgrading as newer, differentiated products 
trade with quality competition and higher unit values. When supply is competitive, higher prices are 
generally associated with higher quality and therefore greater product differentiation. Increased 
exports quality is often measured at highly disaggregated levels to show firms augmenting export 
value per unit, such as that shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Unit Values for Products, 2000- 2010 
 
 
6302 Bed linen, table linen, toilet linen and kitchen linen. 
5205 Cotton yarn (other than sewing thread), containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, not put up for retail sale. 
1006 Rice. 
6203 Men’s or boys’ suits, ensembles, jackets, blazers, trousers, bib and brace overalls, breeches and shorts (other than swimwear). 
5209 Woven fabrics of cotton, containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, weighing more than 200g/m2. 
5208 Woven fabrics of cotton, containing 85% or more by weight of cotton, weighing not more than 200g/m2. 
4203 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, of leather or of composition leather. 
5513 Woven fabrics of synthetic staple fibers, containing less than 85% by weight of such fibers, mixed mainly or solely with cotton 
2710 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, other than crude; preparations not elsewhere specified or included h 
6110 Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans, waist-coats and similar articles, knitted or crocheted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Product Unit 
2000 2007 2009 CAGR (%) 
Mean 
% of UV 
Exp (USD) SD 
Mean 
% of UV 
Exp (USD) SD 
Mean 
% of UV 
Exp (USD) SD 
 
 
00-07 07-09 
6302 kg 10.5 6.5 10.7 14.3 11.5 70.2 15.4 6.8 11.9 8.6 -23.3 
5205 kg 14.0 2.6 0.8 10.0 2.8 0.9 9.5 2.9 0.8 1.0 1.2 
1006 kg 3.4 0.6 0.9 5.8 0.6 0.6 5.2 1.0 1.4 0.0 25.5 
6203 item 3.4 8.0 5.8 4.4 42.1 295.9 5.1 19.8 69.8 26.9 -31.5 
5209 kg 4.4 3.9 1.8 3.7 5.1 3.9 3.5 6.9 9.6 3.9 16.5 
5208 kg 4.1 4.1 2.1 3.7 5.3 3.5 3.6 4.9 2.5 3.6 -3.6 
4203 kg 5.3 19.9 11.9 3.0 30.0 75.8 3.6 29.0 30.6 6.0 -1.7 
5513 kg 3.9 4.1 2.1 2.9 4.4 2.3 2.0 4.8 3.9 1.1 4.8 
2710 kg 0.5 0.3 0.1 2.8 3.2 5.2 1.9 30.4 82.1 38.3 209.9 
6110 item 4.5 6.9 3.9 2.7 9.9 6.4 2.5 15.8 52.1 5.3 26.0 
Total exp 54.0 53.3 52.1  
 
 
101.     Pakistan’s exports mix a set of differentiated goods, such as linens, men’s suits, leather 
knitted or crocheted jerseys with a predominance in commodities, such as rice, cotton yarn which had 
largely a low price and low volatility in world markets, until recently. Over the last decade, Pakistan 
has upgraded overall export quality of differentiated products as shown by the increase in the mean 
unit value and standard deviations between 2000 and 2007, albeit, at a slower pace than average 
quality upgrading by world exporters (Table 5 and Figure 12). While relative prices for Pakistan 
exports  has  remained  stable  for  homogeneous  products,  relative  unit  value  for  important 
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Figure 13. Export Sophistication Change, 1988-2006 
12
00
0 
80
00
 
40
00
 
differentiated products has decreased, such as in linens (4203) (the most important product in terms 
of export value) and knitted or crocheted jerseys (6110), signaling challenges in quality competition 
post MFA, (2004). 
 
Figure 12. Relative Unit Values for Pakistan Exports, 2000-2010 
 
Source: Text. 
 
11. Sophistication of Exports 
 
102.    Other measures confirm the modest increase in Pakistan’s export sophistication. Export 
sophistication  (EXPY)  over  time  gives  an  important  indication  of  the  relative  growth  in 
sophistication of the export basket.54 In the past two decades Pakistan export sophistication has not 
grown in accordance with its Asian peers. Already, by 1986, Vietnam had caught up and surpassed 
Pakistan’s export sophistication (Figure 13). 
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54 
Hausmann and Klinger (2007) have shown for a large pool of countries that export sophistication at present is a 
good predictor of economic growth in the future. Felipe (2010) estimates that a 10 percent increase in EXPY at the 
beginning of period raises growth by about half a percentage point. 
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Export Sophistication 
Box 1. Sophistication of exports in Pakistan 
 
Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2006) show that the level of “sophistication” of products matters for economic 
growth. Countries that have a more sophisticated export basket, proxied by a measure named EXPY, enjoy 
accelerated subsequent growth while those with less sophisticated export baskets tend to lag behind –in essence, 
countries become what they export. In a sample of 100 developing countries that the World Bank has classified as 
either low or middle income, Pakistan lies below the regression line implying that its export basket is “poorer” than 
it is. This is based on one of the measures of export sophistication (EXPY) which assesses the export baskets of 
countries by the incomes of countries that produce similar products, weighted by the share of those exports in the 
national total. Developing new products is much more important for countries below the line. In contrast, countries 
above the line can expect to see growth from existing products. This includes not only China and India, but also 
Thailand and Turkey that stand out for producing goods that are deemed sophisticated and therefore notable for 
countries at comparable levels of economic development. 
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12. Revealed Factor Intensity of Exports 
 
103.     At the highly disaggregated HS 6-digit level, the factor content of Pakistan’s exports55 is 
consistent in its domination by low human and physical capital content. In 1997 and 2007 Pakistan’s 
biggest export earners utilized capital  - on either dimension - below the median exports, 56  but 
between 1997 and 2007, Pakistan’s human capital increased while physical capital (per worker) fell. 
The picture in 2007 was more positive as the median values of capital content increased and some 
major export earners using more than the median capital. There were also a greater number of 
exports earning more than US$10,000 (each bubble in Figure 14). Several big export earners that 
existed in 1997 but not in 2007 embodied much more capital than the national average while the 
majority of “new” exports—active in 2007 and not 1967, were moderately capital-intensive. 
 
 
55 
Database available at http://r0.unctad.org/ditc/tab/index.shtm. The indices are computed by weighting the factor 
endowments of all countries exporting a particular product; weights are derived from a modified version of the 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA). Goods that are predominantly exported by countries rich in human capital 
are revealed to be intensive in human capital. See Cadot et al. (2009). 
56 
The first two graphs on the top panel below plot products with human capital content on the x-axis and physical 
capital content on the y-axis, with bubble size representing the US dollar amount of exports in. The dashed reference 
lines are median values of revealed human and physical capital for exports (above US$10,000). The quadrants are 
formed by lines corresponding to the medians of capital intensity and log of export values for Pakistan. 
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Figure 14. Pakistan revealed factor intensity (RFI) of exports 
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104.     Though exports depend on an array of factors, 57 fundamentally, exports out of line with 
comparative advantage have a theoretically higher rate of failure. Several areas to investigate are: (i) 
whether the exports that die represent attempts to produce goods that require a different mix of factor 
endowments, and (ii) how close to the average endowment point are factor intensities of exports. 
 
13. Product Space Analysis 
 
105.   The  product-space  analysis  indicates  what  merchandise  goods  Pakistan  exports 
competitively, and whether the portfolio has undergone a structural transformation over the past 
decades (Figure 15). 58 The product space maps indicate all tradable products at the SITC 4-digit 
level, with the black dots representing exports in which Pakistan has a RCA. 59 The “garment cluster” 
on top, is where Pakistan has had products in both years with RCA greater than 1. Pakistan has also 
performed well in textiles—a capital intensive generally produced by more advanced countries. 
Between 1993 and 2008, Pakistan increased the number of agricultural and labor-intensive products 
in which it had comparative advantage, but not in sophisticated products. 
 
 
57 
For example, Easterly et al. (2009) cites a role for fortuity in a random product being a “hit” in a certain destination 
leading to substantial growth, imitation and concentration of a few successful export items at a given time. 
58
Firms can build up competence in producing a certain good and redeploy human, physical and institutional capital 
more easily for goods that are “nearby.” However, structural transformations are not smooth movements along a 
continuum but a messy process beset by market failures. Hidalgo et al. (2007). Products are grouped to form dense 
and sparse parts of the map. RCAs in denser parts suppose “country-level” opportunities for product upgrading. 
59 
The center of the product-space, for example, is quite dense with better connectedness among industries related to 
metallurgy, vehicles, machinery, etc. To the bottom right of the product-space lie the more sophisticated electronics 
and chemical industries. The scattered industries on the upper half are largely agricultural and resource-based. 
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Figure 15. Product Space, 1993 and 2008 
 
 
 
 
106.     Overall, on the sophistication front, Pakistan presents a picture of inadequate upgrading into 
higher-value exports over time. The textile industry is dominant, and given that it is more capital 
intensive than apparel, Pakistan is better placed to move laterally into more sophisticated 
manufacturing activities requiring a similar mix of skills and endowment, e.g. from cotton-based 
textiles to man-made fibers and fabric. Using this analysis allows the main set of exported products 
to be placed in one of four categories for further analysis at the industry, firm or product level: 
 
 Consistently Competitive Products: 103 products with an RCA greater than 1 in both 1993 
and 2008, textiles and garment items such as linen, cotton, curtains, carpets, men’s coats, and 
leather clothing. Figure 16 shows top products from this category (at least 0.5 percent share 
in Pakistan’s 2008 exports). On the product space map, the textile cluster comes closest to the 
denser, high-value manufacturing industries. There is no Pakistani export (with RCA >1) 
firmly embedded in this part of the product space. 
 
 Growing Competitive Products: 38 products did not have an RCA greater than 1 in 1993, but 
did in 2008. These “emerging” products with at least 0.2 percent share of national exports in 
200860 include high value exports like beddings and mattresses, frozen fish, jewelry, cement 
and metal waste with shipping-dependent heavier products likely to be more competitive in 
regional markets. 
 
 Marginal Products: 400 products had an RCA of less than 1993 and 2008. Those, with a 
share in national exports of at least 0.05 percent, include vacuum pumps, chemicals (acids), 
wheeled tractors, telecom parts, food processing machines. 
 
 Falling Products: 20 major products were competitive in 1993 but were not in 2008, of 
which three of them which had an export share of at least 0.05 percent in 1993, including 
some textile and garment products no longer able to withstand external competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 
Note that the product space maps consist of 775 products, whereas medium to large sized countries typically 
produce more than this number. Several products that Pakistan exports cannot be mapped on the product space. 
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Figure 16. Product Space Movements, 1993 - 2008 
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C.        Firm Dynamics In Exporting: Entry, Exit and Survival 
 
1. Introduction 
 
107.    Focusing on the dynamics of firm behavior in exporting between 2002-2010, this section 
examines how export values are distributed across destination countries, sectors and products, and 
describes the entry, exit and survival of exporting firms in these markets over time.61 Two aspects of 
churning are examined: the extensive margin refers to the entry and exit of new firms, new products 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
A sector refers to HS 2-digit industry classification, while by product refers to the HS 8-digit.The term country 
will be used interchangeably with destination. 
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and new markets, and the intensive margin referring to the survival of firms and products and 
deepening in existing markets.62 
 
108.    The focus will be on identifying the type of churning creating the dynamic in exporting 
described in the earlier section. Dynamic firm relations encompass two aspects of those relations: 
newly established and those which continue to survive and continue to grow. Both types will be 
examined in terms of (i) the extensive margin: entry of firms into the exporting of new products 
and/or to new destination countries, and (ii) the intensive margin: survival and persistence of these 
relationships. 
 
2. Distribution of Exports 
 
109.     Exports from Pakistan are skewed towards large exporters (Figure 17)63 and the skewness of 
the data seems to increase over time, indicating that exports becoming more concentrated towards 
fewer larger firms. 
 
Figure 17. Distribution of Export Values, 2002 -2010 
 
 
 
110.     The contribution of export values by the top exporters shows how values are skewed towards 
the largest exporters that account for anything between 38 to 45 percentage points of the total export 
value in a given year. On the other hand, the bottom four fifths of exporters account for only 5 - 7.5 
percent  of  total  export  value.  Large  differences  between  the  top  percentiles  and  the  bottom 
percentiles exist no matter what way the data is spliced. The concentration however has not changed 
much over time between 2002 and 2010 (Table 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
There is debate about the relative impact of each margin with some concluding that the extensive margin is the 
primary avenue for export growth (Hummels and Klenow 2005), while others have found the dominant role to be 
played by the intensive margin (Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein 2008). 
63 
Normally distributed exports would have the line (median) in the middle of the box specifying the 25 
th  
and 75
th 
percentiles with whiskers (5
th  
and 95
th 
percentile) equidistant from the box. The plot depicts that export values are 
positively skewed with the median pulled to the lower end and the 95
th 
percentile stretched away. 
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Table 6. Distribut 
 
By Groups 
ion of Exports Across Firms, 2002-2010 
 
By Percentile 
 Top 
One 
Top 
Five 
Top 
Ten 
Bottom 
80 
2002 40.3 70.6 83.1 7.4 
2003 38.6 69.4 82.3 7.7 
2004 41.1 72.8 84.9 6.4 
2005 41.7 73.4 85.2 6.2 
2006 43.0 73.7 85.6 6.1 
2007 42.3 73.5 85.5 6.1 
2008 42.4 74.3 86.2 5.7 
2009 43.2 74.8 86.3 5.7 
2010 45.3 76.5 87.4 5.3 
 
 
111.     Concentration  in  Pakistan  is  lower  than  in  many  other  industrialized  and  developing 
countries. In Belgium, France, Germany and Norway, the top 10 percent of exporters account for a 
share of exports of 90 percent or more while Great Britain and Italy are less concentrated than 
Pakistan.  However,  as  compared  to  more  similar  peer  groups,  including  Bulgaria,  Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru and South Africa, Pakistan is also less concentrated (Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18. Herfindahl index and Top Exporters Share, 2004-2009 
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112.     The lower concentration of exports in Pakistan is due to the presence of a large number of 
small exporters. While the average size of exporters in Pakistan is lower than in countries such as 
Bulgaria,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Peru  and  South  Africa,  the  median  is  higher,  suggesting  that  in 
Pakistan large exporters determining the bulk of exports, but small exports are plentiful. 
 
Figure 19. Average and Median Export Value per Firm, 2004-2009 
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Figure 19. Average and Median Export Value per Firm, 2004-2009 
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113.     As in most countries, Pakistan’s top exporters account for a large proportion of export values and 
export more products to more destination countries. The total number of firms, destinations, sectors and 
products in the database are summarized by each year in the first few rows and broken down by averages 
by groups. The top 1 percent of firms export between 21 and 50 products to 20 destinations, while the 
lowest 80 percent of firms export two to four products to 1 to 2 destinations (Table 7). 
 
Table 7. Destinations, Sector and Products, 2002 - 2010 
 
Total Number 
 
Firms 14,747 14,701 14,730 14,565 14,696 15,076 15,358 15,676 15,925 
Destinations 203 212 220 219 216 209 208 202 205 
Sectors 98 98 97 97 97 99 98 98 98 
Products 2,470 3,043 4,068 4,361 3,843 4,726 4,329 4,523 4,422 
Average for all Exporters 
Destinations 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.3 
Sectors 2.5 2.6 3.2 3.1 2.9 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.6 
Products 3.8 4.3 5.8 6.3 5.6 6.5 5.8 5.6 5.5 
Average for Top 1% Exporters 
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Destinations 19.6 19.3 20.7 20.2 21.3 21.6 18.9 20.2 20.8 
Sectors 7.8 7.4 10.0 9.3 6.5 5.4 4.9 5.1 4.8 
Products 26.6 27.5 47.3 49.5 33.2 29.2 22.8 23.1 21.2 
Average for Top 5% Exporters 
Destinations 11.9 12.7 13.1 13.4 13.4 13.2 12.8 13.0 12.8 
Sectors 6 5.7 7.9 7.0 5.1 4.6 4.3 4.7 4.6 
Products 16.4 16.7 27.6 28.5 19.6 18.6 15.4 16.7 15.8 
Average for Top 10% Exporters 
Destinations 9.4 9.7 10.3 10.6 10.7 10.6 10.2 10.1 10.2 
Sectors 5.4 5.2 7.0 6.2 4.7 4.4 4.0 4.2 4.2 
Products 12.8 13.3 21.0 21.6 15.8 16.0 13.5 14.0 13.6 
Average for Bottom 80% Exporters 
Destinations 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 
Sectors 2.0 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.4 
  Products  2.4  2.9  3.5  3.9  4.0  4.9  4.4  4.1  4.1   
 
 
114.     As summarizing by the map in Figure 20, the distribution of exports across destinations in 
2003 found five countries - China, Germany, UAE, the UK, and the US - accounting for half of total 
export values and 20 countries accounting for over 80 percent. Moreover, export values are skewed 
toward the range products being exported to various countries, meaning the destination is product 
specific. 
 
Figure 20. Distribution of Exports, 2003 
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115.     When cross tabulating the number of products and number of countries in 2002—by number 
and by value, further evidence of a few dominant firms is apparent. One third of firms sell one 
product to one country while 2 percent of firms sell more than 11 products to more than 11 countries. 
However, by value, firms exporting one product to a single country account for around one percent 
of total exports while firms exporting more than 11 products to over 11 countries account for more 
than half (Table 8). 
 
Table 8. Export behavior: Countries & Products, (2002) 
 
 
 
1 Product 32.4 1.2 3.7 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 36.2 2.2 
2 to 5 17.5 2.8 24.1 10.0 2.6 2.9 0.6 1.9 44.7 17.7 
6 to 10 1.4 1.0 6.8 8.0 3.1 6.2 1.3 7.0 12.6 22.2 
11 and above 0.2 0.4 1.9 7.0 2.1 9.5 2.4 41.1 6.5 58.0 
Total 51.3 5.4 34.6 25.9 5.8 18.7 1.9 50.1 100.0 100.0 
 
 
116.     Compared to peer countries, Pakistan has a low average number of products per exporter but 
a high average number of destinations per exporter (Figure 21). Together, this means Pakistan posts a 
high concentration of exports in the hands of a limited number of large exporters. 
 
Figure 21. Product vs. geographical portfolios, 2004 - 2009 
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117. When exploring the characteristics of high-performing “gazelle” exporters (firms with an 
episode of an annual growth rate of at least 75 percent for four consecutive years between 2001 and 
2010), a few important observations emerge: 
 
 Smaller firms on average concentrate growth in a few products but are well diversified in 
terms of destination markets. 
 
 Larger  top-performing  firms  diversify  exports  across  more  countries  and  across  more 
products and away from South Asia. 
 
 But, smaller firms, export mostly to other South Asian countries while larger exporters 
diversify away from other South Asian countries. 
41  
3. Extensive Margin 
 
118.     Survival rates provide an overview of how well exporters are able to continue and deepen their 
trade relations across new markets. Rates of entry and exit which reflect the dynamics of firm movements 
in and out of destinations and products, shows a significant churning of exporters—anywhere between 16 
to 37 percent of firms exit while another 19 to 37 percent enter each year (Table 9). 
 
Table 9. Export Entry and Exit, 2003-2010 
 
 
 
 
2003 5,481 37.3 5,435 37.0 -46 -0.3 
2004 4,368 29.7 4,397 29.9 29 0.2 
2005 3,798 26.1 3,633 24.9 -165 -1.1 
2006 3,497 23.8 3,628 24.7 131 0.9 
2007 2,870 19.0 3,250 21.6 380 2.5 
2008 2,775 18.1 3,057 19.9 282 1.8 
2009 2,664 17.0 2,982 19.0 318 2.0 
2010 2,597 16.3 2,846 17.9 249 1.6 
 
 
119.     While this seems to be significant, the rates are in fact lower than peer countries and the net 
effect is marginal (Figure 22). 
 
Figure 22. Entry and exit rates in Pakistan and Peer Countries, 2004-2009 
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120.     In examining products and sector that see the most churning in the data (i.e. the most popular 
new products exported by new firms), there is some concordance between sectors with the 
introduction of new products and a large increase in export value owing to the introduction of these 
products. Looking at the top ten HS2-digit sectors arranged in this way, 
 
 Sectors with entry of new products and rising export values include, mechanical appliances, 
(84), electrical machinery and equipment, (85), organic chemicals (29), and live animals (01). 
 
 Sectors with entry of new products and little export value include tanning and dyeing extracts 
(32), inorganic chemicals, (28), precision equipment (90), and iron and steel (72). 
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121.     It is also clear that certain markets 
are more difficult to break into. In 
particular, when comparing the average 
value of exports with the percentage of 
exporters that export to a given country, 
most countries account for a small share 
of total exports, and that, on average firms 
on  average  export  small  values  (Figure 
23). In other words, there are only a few 
countries where firms with large export 
values are able to break into. 
 
Figure 23. Destination popularity and Export Values, 2002 
 
122. When comparing exports by 
country and products, there is a strong positive correlations between the percentage of exporters to 
each  country  and  the  total  share  of 
products     exported,     indicating     that 
countries that are more popular 
destinations also account for a larger 
proportion of product shares (Figure 24). 
Thus there is evidence that some 
destinations are popular with smaller 
exporters, while others seem more 
difficult to reach, and that more popular 
destinations also account for more 
products  and  exporters.  This  suggests 
that country-specific entry costs may 
determine the export strategies of firm. 
Figure 24. Products and Exporters, 2002 
 
123.       Understand the extensive margin requires examination of how churning in markets is associated 
with types of firms and destinations. When comparing the destinations entered and exited to the export 
value of each firm it is clear that churning is taking place at the lower end of the export value size 
distribution. Large firms have small number of export destinations entered and or exited (Figure 25). 
 
Figure 25. Entry and Exit, by Firm Size, 2002-2003 
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124.     Focusing on the destination countries, it is equally clear that the fraction of entries and exits 
are lower in larger export markets. In other words, most of the churning of firms seems to be taking 
place in smaller destinations by export size (Figure 26). 
 
Figure 26. Entry and Exit, by Destination Popularity, 2002-2003 
 
 
 
 
125.     Similar analysis across product categories yields a similar result. The fraction of entries and 
exits are lower for products with higher export values. Thus, consistent with the other dimensions of 
churning, entry and exit seems to be taking place predominantly in products with small average 
export size (Figure 27). 
 
Figure 27. Entry and Exit, by Product Popularity, 2002-2003 
 
 
 
 
126.     Entry and exit is more frequent for smaller firms, for smaller destination countries and for 
smaller products by export size. Two phenomena are driving these results: 
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 Larger exporters in terms of firm size, number of destinations reached, or number of products 
exported, are less likely to switch export strategies. Their success is determined by 
developments at the intensive margin. 
 
 Second, export values become larger the more continuous the interaction, whether within 
particular destination countries or within product categories. 
 
127.     The conclusion therefore is that continuous interaction within the destination, suggests that 
determinants  of  the  intensive  margin,  including  a  macro-economic  environment  conducive  to 
stability and growth is important to ensure good export performance. In addition, deepening of 
exporting relationships through survival is also a determinant of sustained export performance. 
 
4. Intensive Margin 
 
128.     As noted, even when looking at the extensive margin, ultimately success at the intensive 
margin is critical to the sustained export performance. Therefore, in describing exporter survival over 
time, association is made with particular [firm, country, etc ] characteristics. 
 
129.     The survival rates show that of the 5,435 firms which started exporting in 2003, only 57 
percent of the original 2003 cohort managed to continue the exporting in 2004 as 43 percent of firms 
exit from exporting in the first year. By 2010, after 7 years, only a quarter of the original cohort still 
exports64 (Table 10). 
 
  Table 10. Survival Rates by Cohort, 2003 -2010   
 
2002   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14,747 
 
2003 
 
63% 
 
5,435        
 
14,701 
 
2004 
 
49% 
 
57% 
 
4,397       
 
14,730 
 
2005 
 
42% 
 
44% 
 
55% 
 
3,633      
 
14,565 
 
2006 
 
36% 
 
36% 
 
41% 
 
54% 
 
3,628     
 
14,696 
 
2007 
 
33% 
 
32% 
 
36% 
 
42% 
 
66% 
 
3,250    
 
15,076 
 
2008 
 
30% 
 
28% 
 
32% 
 
36% 
 
53% 
 
57% 
 
3,057   
 
15,358 
 
2009 
 
28% 
 
26% 
 
29% 
 
32% 
 
46% 
 
45% 
 
56% 
 
2,982  
 
15,676 
 
2010 
 
26% 
 
24% 
 
27% 
 
29% 
 
41% 
 
40% 
 
44% 
 
58% 
 
2,846 
 
15,925 
Notes: The top of each row provides the count of new exporters entering the market in the given year. The last column provides the 
sum total of exporters in each year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
2002 data refers to all active exporting firms as new entrants and incumbents are combined in the first year. 
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130.     Furthermore, the value of exports 
varies significantly with continued 
participation  in  markets.  While  the 
average value of exports rises marginally 
with increasing years of experience, there 
is increasing divergence between the top 
and bottom quarter of exporters. The 
finding is suggestive of new entrants 
testing new markets with small shipments 
which increase with firm experience. It 
also   suggests   that   not   all   firms   can 
equally increase export values over time 
with some firms much more successful 
than others (Figure 28). 
 
Figure 28. Distribution of Export Values By Years of 
Experience, 2010 
 
131.     Although the survival rates of Pakistan’s firm into exporting seem low, a comparison with 
those of exporters from other middle income countries for which these data are available shows that, 
after one year of export activity, the persistence of Pakistan’s firms into exporting is higher than in 
other middle-income countries (Figure 29). 
 
 
positive sign, taking account of other 
analyses showing a lack of exit by non- 
productive  firms  could  signal  a  limited 
Figure 29. Survival rates after 1 year of export activity, 
2004-2008 
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At the extensive margin, a vibrant 
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growth  firms  and  products. 65  Pakistan’s 
performance  in  this  respect  is 
considerably   deteriorating   over   time. 
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65 
Melitz, 2003. Interestingly, less domestic competitive pressure also translates in a heightened persistence of 
export relationships (from further on). 
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Table 11. The Margins of Export, Annual Export Growth, 2002-2010 
 
 
Firm Entry 
Firm Exit 
9.3 
-7.8 
5.1 
-7.3 
4.6 
-2.8 
6.0 
-4.4 
5.0 
-3.0 
6.0 
-3.2 
4.9 
-3.4 
4.9 
-3.5 
Net Firm 1.5 -2.2 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.8 1.5 1.4 
Country Entry 9.8 9.4 10.4 7.4 7.9 9.4 7.6 8.4 
Country Exit -8.1 -7.3 -7.9 -7.2 -6.1 -5.7 -7.0 -5.7 
Net Country 1.7 2.1 2.5 0.2 1.8 3.7 0.6 2.6 
Sector Entry 5.4 10.0 4.2 1.9 2.4 1.5 1.5 1.3 
Sector Exit -19.9 -2.4 -5.9 -5.0 -2.8 -2.1 -1.1 -0.9 
Net Sector -14.6 7.6 -1.7 -3.1 -0.5 -0.5 0.4 0.4 
Product Entry 18.5 29.6 31.0 17.4 20.3 12.4 10.3 9.5 
Product Exit -18.3 -14.6 -23.0 -19.8 -17.4 -12.9 -9.1 -7.4 
Net Product 0.2 15.0 8.0 -2.4 2.9 -0.5 1.2 2.0 
Net Extensive -11.2 22.5 10.5 -3.7 6.1 5.5 3.7 6.5 
Intensive Positive 42.9 20.2 30.8 35.9 32.1 48.0 27.2 39.4 
Intensive Negative -14.0 -29.8 -25.8 -0.0 -27.2 -19.6 -26.1 -21.4 
Net Intensive 28.8 -9.6 5.0 16.0 4.9 28.4 1.1 17.9 
Total 17.6 12.9 15.4 12.3 11.0 33.9 4.8 24.4 
 
 
5. Contribution of Destination, Sector and Product Margins to Export Growth 
 
133.     To investigate further whether the lower dynamism of firms exports has had a detrimental 
effect on export growth, the year-on-year contribution of the extensive and the intensive margin to 
aggregate export growth is decomposed,66 in order to compute the contribution of the extensive and 
the intensive margin to export growth.67 The decomposition provides the contribution to aggregate 
growth by each of the margins (Figure 30). 
 
Figure 30. The Margins of Export, Annual Export Growth, 2002-2010 
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66 
Exports growth is computed using the mid-point growth rate Davis and Haltiwanger 1992 as applied to firm-level 
exports by Bricogne et al 2011. 
67 
As compared to other methodologies which only allow a static assessment of the extensive margin Hummels and 
Klenow 2005. 
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Box 2. Contribution of Intensive and Extensive Margins to Export Growth 
 
Reading Figure 30 - Decomposition of Export Growth for 2002-2003 
 In each of the columns the average annual growth relative to the indicated period is reported. The aggregate figure for all 
trade flows is reported in the last row. 
 The first row indicates that annual export growth in 2002-2003 due to entry of new firms into exporting equaled 9.3 
percent. Since the corresponding loss in export growth due to the exit of firms equaled 7.8 percent, the net contribution of 
firm churning was 1.5 percent. 
 The next set of rows accounts for the decision of existing exporters to enter new foreign markets (country entry) or to exit 
existing foreign markets (country exit). Entry into new markets accounted for 9.8 percent of export growth in 2002-2003, 
which was partially offset by exits (8.1 percent), leading to a net contribution of the destination country margin equal to 
1.7 percent. 
 The next set of rows depicts decisions regarding entry, exit and net contribution to the growth rate by HS2-digit level 
sectors. In 2002-2003, existing exporters contributed to growth of 5.4 percent by entering new sectors, but this 
contribution was more than offset 19.9 percent by exits, so that the net contribution to growth was negative by 14.6 
percentage points. 
 The net contributions of individual products, i.e. at the HS8-digit level carry the same logic, wherein the net contribution 
equaled 0.2 percent between 2002 and 2003. 
 The sum of the net contribution of firm, destination country, sector and product extensive margin gives an overall 
extensive margin, which posted an 11.2 percent contraction for 2002-2003. 
 The intensive margin illustrates the contribution of expanding the value of exports versus that of reducing it. The 
difference between these two dimensions equals the intensive margin, which was of 28.8 percent between 2002 and 2003. 
 
134.     The key results of the decomposition along export margins can also be viewed through visual 
inspection (Figure 30). The first observation is the expected result that firm churning, (entries and 
exits of firms from activity, from markets and from products), is associated with a positive selection 
effect: new entrants more than offset the loss in exports by exiting firms.68 A closer inspection of the 
sub-components of the extensive margin suggests however, that the picture is less favorable. 
 
135.     First, churning along the destination-country margin was relatively stable over the 2002-2010 
period, despite Pakistan’s focus on bilateral and regional agreements. Despite various agreements 
entered, the country-extensive margin’s contribution to export growth did not increase, providing 
some evidence that bilateral and regional agreements have not been effective in diversifying markets 
to the extent needed. 
 
136.     However, more importantly were the contributions of firm, sector and product margins of 
export growth which are key factors of export dynamism, particularly for countries under transition. 
New firms starting to export, existing exporters expanding into new sectors and existing exporters 
increasing their product offer within a sector, are key outcomes of a well functioning  domestic 
market. Yet this positive effect on export growth is underperforming for Pakistan. 
 
137.     There has been a lower contribution of this product and sector margin to export growth than 
the  contribution  of  the  net  expansion  of  firms  into  new  destinations.  This  is  in  contrast  to 
conventional analysis which sees the fixed costs of entry into a new market as normally higher than 
the fixed costs of expanding the product range. In other words, stronger economies of scale from 
 
 
 
 
68 
International experience shows that export growth in developing countries takes place mostly at the extensive 
margin, as the reallocation of resources from less to more efficient firms and products is a main engine. 
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expanding the product range should translate in higher export growth contributions for the product 
extensive margin than for the market extensive margin.69 In Pakistan, one sees the opposite. 
 
138.     In addition, the performance of export growth along these important firm, product and sector 
extensive margin has deteriorated over time. While quite dynamic along these margins at the beginning of 
the 2000’s, since 2004, the export growth premium has decreased considerably. While the net contribution 
of the firm extensive margin to export growth are visible and broadly stable over time, it is the steep fall in 
the contribution of the product and sector margins that should be the primary concern to policy makers. 
 
139.    The ability to enter new markets is partly driven by entry costs and infrastructure in the 
destination markets and can be steered by trade policy measures. However, the ability to produce 
new exporters and their ability to venture in products or sectors rests on factors relating to the 
domestic economy’s ability to generate growth through efficient resource allocation and creative 
destruction. The evidence and concern is that the export sector lost capacity to select high export 
growth sectors and products within sectors, 70 along with corresponding indicators that, since 2004, 
the ability of firms to innovate and select high growth products was greatly diminished.71 
 
140.     The crisis period of 2007-2009 saw a large fall in consumer demand in developed and 
emerging countries, and a subsequent fall in world trade. For Pakistan, on average fewer firms 
entered and exited the market and the period was associated with less churning, the net effect of firm 
churning continued to remain positive. This is the case across all dimension of export decomposition, 
(i) entries and exits by new firms, (ii) existing firms in new countries, (iii) sectors and products, all 
fell over the recession years. In addition, data for the latest period available (2009-2010) seems to 
indicate that Pakistani exporters have yet to recover from these effects of the recession years and that 
their performance continues to be less dynamic than in the pre-recession period. 
 
141.     Remarkably, while the extensive margin of exports has seen a fall over the recession years, 
the contribution of the intensive margin to export growths has rebounded and even grown—this 
despite performance of the intensive margin being varied over the years, with some years good and 
some not so. In recent years, the valuation effects linked to the cycle of commodities markets and the 
spectacular fall and recovery in foreign demand are likely contributors of Pakistan’s performance at 
the intensive margin. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
142.     This chapter analyzed different dimensions of the trade performance in Pakistan. While the 
poor aggregate performance is a well known problem faced by the Pakistan economy, this chapter 
goes beyond it by exploring other dimensions such as the sophistication and quality of its export 
basket, diversification, and the survival rate of its export relationships. These analyses shed light on 
binding constraints to improved export performance. 
 
 
69 
Arkolakis and Muendler, 2011. 
70 
This is clearly visible from the trends over time for the following components of the extensive margin: export 
growth generated by the decision of exporters to expand their product range and to start exporting in a different 
sector of activity. However, it should be noted that the net effect is negative, leading to a lower contribution of these 
margins to export growth. 
71 
2004 corresponded to a change in the trade policy strategy of Pakistan, whereby increasing complexity was 
introduced in the system. As noted, the lower numbers of firms entering the export activity with increasing survival 
rates over time also suggests the protection of incumbent exporters at the expenses of aggregate productivity and 
overall export growth. 
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143. Insufficient growth orientation of both products and markets and lack of sophistication of 
exports seem to be the main problems for Pakistan’s trade competitiveness. 
 
 In terms of orientation and growth, Pakistan is lagging behind the peer countries, as revealed 
by the trade to GDP ratio. The concern relies in the deterioration of Pakistan’s position 
between the 1990s and 2000s. Furthermore, the export share over GDP shows a downward 
trend in the last years. 
 
 A gravity model confirms that Pakistan is clearly under trading with emerging markets such 
as Brazil, India, Russia, Mexico, and principally with the neighboring India. 
 
 The analysis also showed that there are problems of quality/sophistication in the export 
basket of the country. The sophistication of Pakistan’s export basket is low and has increased 
at a very slow pace, mainly when compared to China and India. 
 
 The product space analysis showed that there were 103 products with an RCA greater than 1 
in both 1993 and 2008. These are mainly textiles and garment items such as linen, cotton, 
curtains, carpets, men’s coats, and leather clothing. 
 
 Even worse, indications coming from the unit values of some of these products, suggest that 
Pakistan exporters may be facing difficulties to catch up with the quality upgrading taking 
place elsewhere in the world. Moreover, there is no Pakistani export (with RCA >1) firmly 
embedded in the denser part of the product space. 
 
 Regarding diversification, while still highly concentrated, Pakistan is showing positive signals 
both at products and market level. Even though the 65 percent of Pakistan’s export value is 
concentrated in the textiles, apparel, leather, footwear, the share of extractive industries, metals, 
machinery and electronics and some agricultural products is increasing. 
 
 There is some evidence of services exports, with growing rates in the period 2000-2007 over 
15 percent average per year. But the export value of services remains low well behind the 
peer countries. There has been an increase at the margin in exports to the emerging BRIC 
bloc, also a good sign of diversification. 
 
 The  product  space  analysis  suggests  that,  with  some  external  facilitation,  Pakistan  has 
installed capacity to move readily into fairly sophisticated manufacturing industries. They 
include vacuum pumps, chemicals (acids), wheeled tractors, telecom parts, and food 
processing machines. 
 
 Like many other countries Pakistan posts a high concentration of exports in the hands of a 
limited number of large exporters. 
 
 The dominance of few exporters has increased over time and it seems associated with low 
rates of product innovation and experimentation and a low ability of the Pakistani export 
sector to enter into new higher growth sectors, as evidenced by the breakdown of export 
growth by margins. 
 
 The fact that firms tend to export only a few products each may be a symptom of market 
distortions due to the dominant position of a few firms. This hypothesis is also consistent with 
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evidence  that  entry  and  exit  rates  are  lower  than  in  countries  at  a  comparable  level  of 
development and that the overall extensive margin contribution to export growth is subdued. 
 
 Export growth could be increased both by facilitating export activity and experimentation by 
large exporters and by reducing the sunk costs to start exporting for smaller firms or 
occasional exporters. The econometric exercise suggests that reducting the fixed costs and 
physical burdens to export may play a key role in boosting the export sector in Pakistan. A 
reduction of tariff complexity in Pakistan, may also have an important role. 
 
 Larger exporters (defined in terms of volumes of exports or number of destinations reached or 
number of products exported) seem reluctant to change export strategies (it is these firms that are 
usually most responsible for performance at the extensive sector and product margin). Their 
success is mainly determined by developments at the intensive margin. This and the fact that they 
determine the bulk of exports suggest that determinants of developments at the intensive margin, 
including a macro-economic environment conducive to stability and growth and incentives to 
innovate, are important to ensure good export performance while reducing uncertainty and 
financing costs would spur innovation. 
 
 As concerns smaller firms and exporters, the above results suggests that export values are 
likely to become larger the more continuous the interaction, whether within particular 
destination countries or within product categories. 
 
 Hence, strategies helping the survival and/or deepening of exporting relationships of the smaller 
firms are also likely to be important as a determinant of export performance. These however 
should not be the result of eliminating competition domestically, but of more effective export 
support, technology transfer, learning and skill acquisition strategies. 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Trade Outcomes Assessment Summary of Key Findings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy objective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy challenges 
“Increasing export value 
of existing products 
across markets, and to 
specific markets across 
products” 
Poor performance in 
terms of aggregate 
exports. 
 
Missing opportunities in 
terms of growing markets, 
including and especially 
in the region (India) 
 
Lack of sustained product 
competitiveness (RCA) 
“Increasing unit 
values of existing 
export flows” 
 
 
Sophistication of 
Pakistan’s export 
basket is low and has 
increased at a very 
slow pace. 
 
Unit value prices 
suggest difficulties 
to catch up with the 
quality upgrading 
“Maintaining export 
relationships, and 
minimizing loss of 
export value” 
 
Low survival of 
export relationships 
 
High rates of new 
firm entry and 
experimentation with 
new products 
“Increasing export value 
from new markets and new 
products” 
 
 
New products and new 
markets have been 
incorporated in Pakistan’s 
exports (2002-07). 
 
Much less dynamism 
observed since the crisis 
 
Some progress on 
diversification into services 
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CHAPTER III: TRADE POLICY FOR EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION 
 
A.        Introduction 
 
144.     Based on the challenging competitiveness outcomes described in the previous chapter, there 
is a broad recognition that a new trade oriented strategy is required. Vision documents by the 
Planning Commission, including Vision 2030 and the recently adopted New Growth Strategy, 
recognize that strategic choices are needed to achieve sustainable growth.  In the manufacturing 
sector, a rapidly changing and internationally competitive environment is requiring substantial rather 
than marginal changes across a number of activities in order to shift the production paradigm to 
include technology adoption and knowledge-based industrialization alongside the traditional low 
value-added, resource-driven activities which has driven Pakistan’s export basket for the past half 
century. 
 
145.     One of the choices to be made is the need to confront policies which have created an anti- 
export bias that has kept Pakistan’s trade orientation so low.  Vision 2030 acknowledges that “The 
lack of diversification in Pakistan’s manufacturing sector has been due to heavy protection granted to 
resource based industries, high rates of import duties on raw materials used in the machinery, 
equipment, and chemical industries, and zero or low rates of import duties on finished and semi- 
finished goods relating to these sectors. This is further compounded by widespread smuggling of all 
consumer durables. Many of these issues have been resolved to some extent through tariff 
rationalization in the last few years, but further fine tuning is needed to encourage investments in 
manufacturing”.72 
 
146.     This chapter will analyze some of the outcomes of Pakistan’s trade policy, including effective 
protection, exchange rate bias, and other trade restrictiveness estimates utilizing a database of firm - 
level and customs transactions level data. In doing so, the study seeks to identify the source of these 
distortions and recommend measures to mitigate them in order to provide for neutrality in tax and 
tariff regime. The discussion also draws on strategies adopted by peer countries that have made 
significant progress in export growth and diversification. 
 
147.     Following a discussion of Pakistan’s trade policy and trade performance from historical and 
comparative perspective as the starting point for the analysis, the chapter evaluates tariff policy and 
its inherent anti-export bias along with the associated exchange rate regimes. The chapter also 
provides a qualitative review of other policies, such as non-tariff barriers, export subsidies and non- 
trade measures. Based on the starting point and the lessons of trade reform from peer countries 
reforms, recommendations are provided along with the associated short-term impacts on fiscal 
revenue, imports and protection. 
 
B.        Trade, Tariff, Tax Policy in Pakistan: Evolution and the Current Regime 
 
148.     Early trade reforms: comprehensive, extensive and sustained. Pakistan made bold and swift 
reforms in the early part of the previous decade, reducing prohibitively high tariffs, reducing non- 
tariff and para-tariff measures, as well as exchange measures. A steady program of tariff reductions 
was adopted through a ‘top down’ approach, which brought down the highest tariff rates. The 
average tariff was reduced from 46 percent in 1997/98 to 20 percent in 2001/02 [through five- 
percentage  point  cuts]  (Table  13).  At  the  same  time,  the  number  of  tariff  bands  was  reduced 
 
 
72 
Pakistan in the 21st Centenary: Vision 2030, chapter 7, page 2. 
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gradually, from 14 to 4. By 2003, nearly all quantitative restrictions (QRs) were eliminated and the 
state owned enterprises that controlled imports and exports of some products were also eliminated.73 
 
Table 13. Evolution of Tariff Protection, 1997-2010 
 
 1997/98 2001/02 2004/05 2006/07 2007/08 2010 
1.  Bound tariff lines (percent of all tariff lines) n.a. 36.6 .. 98.0 98.0 98.0 
2. Simple average applied rate 46.0 20.4 16.8 15.0 14.5 14.9 
Agricultural products   19.0 15.4 14.9 15.2 
Industrial products   16.5 14.9 14.5 12.1 
Textiles and clothing   21.7 19.4 19.3 18.4 
3.  Tariff quotas (percent of all tariff lines)  20.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
4.  Domestic tariff "peaks" (percent of all tariff lines)a n.a. 26.4 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 
5.  International tariff "peaks" (percent of all tariff lines)b n.a. 0.0 52.0 41.5 40.0 36.0 
6.  Overall standard deviation of tariff rates n.a. 0.9 11.9 11.3 11.7 15.8 
7.  Coefficient of variation of tariff rates 0.5 57.1 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 
8.  Duty free tariff lines (percent of all tariff lines) n.a. 16.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 5.8 
9.  Non-ad valorem tariffs (percent of all tariff lines) n.a. 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 
10. Non-ad valorem tariffs w/ no AVEs (percent of all tar lines) n.a. 0.0 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 
11. Nuisance applied rates (percent of all tariff lines)c n.a. 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
a Domestic tariff peaks are defined as those exceeding three times the overall simple average applied rate. 
b International tariff peaks are defined as those exceeding 15 percent.. 
c. Nuisance rates are those greater than zero, but less than or equal to 2 percent. Calculations exclude specific rates and include 
the ad valorem part of compound rates. The 2001/02 tariff schedule is based on eight-digit HS96 nomenclature consisting of 
5,477 tariff lines; the 2004/05, 2005/06, and 2006/07 tariff schedules are based on HS02 nomenclature consisting, respectively of 
6,231, 6,336, and 6,803 tariff lines; the 2007/08 tariff schedule is based on HS07 nomenclature consisting of 6,909 tariff li nes. 
Source: WTO TPR 2002 for 1997/1998 data, WTO TPR 2008 for 2001 to 2008 data, 2010 calculated by authors using Pakistan’s 
FBR data. 
 
149.     The early reforms attached a high priority to complementary reforms in both trading rules 
and exchange rate management. In the first case, reforms aggressively pursued an effective rules- 
based trading system and involved active participation in the Uruguay and Doha Rounds. As a result 
Pakistan increased bound tariffs considerably, leaving a large ‘policy-space’ and thereby reducing 
predictability of the trade policy.74 Second, the early trade policy reforms were complimented with 
associated  year  by  year  currency devaluations,  amounting  to  almost  100  percent  in  real  terms 
between 1980/81 and 1996/97 and a further 20 percent over 6 years in support of the second phase of 
trade liberalization. In addition, apart from the real devaluations, the nominal rate was maintained in 
line with inflation differentials with Pakistan’s principal trading partners. In contrast, from July 2008, 
the domestic inflation has surged, causing a steep month-to-month appreciation in the REER index 
which coincided with the increased protection in the system.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
World Trade Organization, Pakistan Trade Policy Report, 2008. 
74 
98 percent of tariff lines in textiles items were fully bound by 2008 and 0.8 percent are partially bound compared 
to the 36.6 percent that were fully or partially bound in 1998/99 (WTO, TOR 2008). However, most bindings exceed 
applied MFN rates and average bound levels amounts to between 3 to 4 or more times the averages applied rates, 
especially in agriculture where gaps are wider. Based on tariff bindings of Pakistan available at 
ttp://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/pakistan_e.htm. 
75 “It is not a coincidence that the increases in the protectiveness of Pakistan’s tariff system (including the new 
regulatory duties) occurred around this time”. Purcell (2010) p.23. 
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150.     Pakistan’s other rigidities and 
macroeconomic difficulties may have 
muted the maximum impact from the 
reforms when weighing Pakistan’s 
reforms against its peers and 
competitors. 
 
151. Reforms    had    impact. 
Merchandise trade-to-GDP increased 
from around 25 percent in 2000 to 
around 30 percent in 2005. In those 
years, export growth raised the capacity 
to increase imports, including capital 
goods and contributed to the GDP 
growth which rose to over 6 percent in 
2004 and peaked at 8.4 percent in 2005. 
During the period 2001-08, exports in 
nominal US dollars increased by 110 
 
Figure 31. Pakistan’s MFN Unweighted Average, 1982-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: UNCTAD TRAINS database and WTO IDB database (both through 
World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS)). 
percent. Furthermore, a simple measure of exports diversification—the Hirschman (H) index—suggests 
that Pakistan’s export portfolio has diversified between 2000 and 2004 by a small but significant amount: 
moving from an HI index of 12.4 in 2000 to 10.9 in 2004.76 
 
Table 14. Simple Average Tariffs, Cross Country Ranking, 2008 
 
 
Chile 1.4 7 38.5 
Turkey 2.4 11 22.9 
Mauritius 4.2 31 59.9 
Costa Rica 5.5 42 46.9 
Malaysia 5.9 44 112.9 
South Africa 7.7 52 29.5 
China 8.6 59 30.4 
India 9.7 68 16.9 
Lao PDR 9.7 69 31.9 
Nigeria 10.7 75 42.5 
Sri Lanka 10.9 82 33.3 
Vietnam 11.7 90 63.9 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 12.3 94 24.1 
Pakistan 14.0 111 14.5 
Bangladesh 14.8 113 16.2 
Developing Countries (134) 9.3  29.1 
Peer country sample 8.7  40.7 
Notes: All tariff rates are based on un-weighted averages for all goods in ad valorem 
rates, or applied rates, or MFN rates whichever data is available. 
 
 
76 
Hirschman (H) index, which is calculated using the shares of all 6-digit products in a country’s exports:Hj = sqrt 
[sum (xi/Xt)2] where xi is country j’s exports of product i (at the three-digit classification) and Xt is country j’s total 
exports. The index has been normalized to account for the number of actual three-digit products that could be exported. 
Thus, the maximum value of the index is 239 (the number of individual three-digit products in SITC revision 2), and its 
minimum (theoretical) value is zero, for a country with no exports. The lower the index, the less concentrated are a 
country’s exports. 
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C.        Current Tariff and Trade Policy Regime: A Descriptive Analysis 
 
152.     Tariffs remain a key trade and industrial policy tool in Pakistan, as pointed out in recent 
studies and reviews,77 and as such, the tariff structure and its deviations have a impact on how 
resources are allocated between sectors, industries and firms and are thus a fundamental determinant 
of Pakistan’s trade competitiveness. While the 
reforms in the official tariff schedule described Table 15. Tariff Schedule by Stage of Processing, 2010 
above are impressive and undoubtedly can be 
attributed  to  some  temporary  impact,  only 
Consumer 
goods 
Intermediate 
goods 
Raw 
material 
looking there  masks much  of the  distortions 
and inconstancies driven often by competing 
institutions  and  their  policies.  Instead,  the 
Mean 20.4 10.8 9.5 
Std. dev. 11.5 8.0 9.6 
diagnosis of applied tariffs instead aided by micro-level firm data (2005-2010) and customs 
transactions data (2009/2010) provides the central analysis for this section. 
 
153.     On an official level, Pakistan’s structure of nominal tariffs has maintained an overall liberal 
open profile. The official tariff schedule shows 99.4 percent of tariff lines as ad valorem with 14 
bands, ranging from zero to 150 percent and a simple average tariff level of 14.9 percent in 2010. 
The greatest frequency of official tariff lines occurs around 5 the percent slab while around 45 
percent of the official schedule displays low tariffs, of 0 or 5. 
 
154.     However, in contrast to the relatively low tariff levels on average are some sector and product 
distortions. A large segment of agriculture goods are taxed at 35 percent generating a higher average 
of around 15.9 percent than industrial tariffs around 13.2 based on the government’s official MFN 
schedule. The transportation sector maintains the highest nominal tariff levels, with some average 
rates reaching as high as 60 percent including 19 products that exceed 90 percent. In addition, though 
regulatory duties were being phased out at the time of Pakistan’s last WTO Trade Policy Review in 
2008, there are recent cases of additional duties being imposed and withdrawn while others remain.78 
In 2009, regulatory duties ranging from 15 to 50 percent on 379 luxury items including motor 
vehicles were imposed (but again have been removed). 
 
155.     In addition to the regulatory uncertainty coming from the use of tariffs as a revenue tool, the 
official customs schedule of average tariffs suggest a structural cascade with tariff escalating by 
stages of processing. Raw materials and intermediate inputs attract low tariffs, while tariffs on 
consumer goods are higher, twice as high in many cases—leading to amplified effective protection 
on the final product. The pattern is more prominent in consumer durable goods such as automotives 
and air-conditioning where inputs range from 0 to 10 percent and final goods as high as 60 percent, 
yielding relatively high levels of effective protection. 
 
156.     More importantly, the significant deviation of effective tariff rates from official rates reveals 
an underlying opaqueness and complexity of trade policy. A significant contrast between MFN and 
effective duty is observed in Pakistan. The official schedule suggests that custom tariffs have 14 
slabs or bands (Figure 32), but in practice Pakistan’s customs data for 2009/2010 at the 8-digit level 
 
77 
(WTO TPR 2008, Pakistan’s Strategic Trade Policy Strategy (2009-2012), and as reflected in the recent report by 
Purcell et. al 2011, commissioned by the Pakistan Institute of Growth, which devoted much if its analysis on 
implications and institutional mechanisms for determining import tariffs in Pakistan. 
78 
For example, a 35 percent regulatory duty was imposed on raw sugar but recently withdrawn in September 2010; 
a 25 percent duty on potatoes from India was introduced and withdrawn in 2009; and a 5 percent regulatory duty 
was placed on pigment and acrylic thickeners in 2010 after the 2009/10 budget reduced the duties to zero . 
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reveals that it applied some 40 different rates. Moreover, when rounding up these discreet rates to the 
nearest 5 percentage point show that actually, there are over 20 different applied bands. At the 
individual tariff line level, over 55 percent of the applied tariffs are either 5 percent or less compared 
to the 40 percent in the official schedule. The rest display a large share over 20 percent. Some of the 
important deviations are due to duty drawback systems and concessions stemming from specific 
bilateral and multi-lateral trade arrangements.  However, much of the deviation can be attributed to 
discretionary firm, industry and sector specific application of the official tariff policy. 
 
Figure 32. Distribution of Tariff Rates, by 
Frequency, 2009-2010 
Figure 33. Effective Tariff, including 
Regulatory Duties, 2009-2010 
 
 
 
Source: Purcell et. al.(2011). Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
157.     In addition, when examining actual trade transactions, at least 2 percent levy a rate between 
zero and less than 2 percent, tantamount to “nuisance taxes” adding to the cost of businesses, 
increasing the administrative burden of collecting them and often outweighing the benefit from the 
marginal revenues.79 Some 122 transactions covering 30 different items have resulted in applied duty 
rates above Pakistan’s bound rates, with the majority of such transactions (82) related to HS code 
370610 (Motion-picture film, of a width of 35 mm or more).80 
 
158.     Deviations due to exemption and regulatory duties occupied half of the published schedule 
accompanied by a complex web of taxes and duties, as well as reductions and exemptions granted 
under various Statutory Regulation Orders (SROs)—principally three for industries: SRO regimes 
565(1)2006, 567(1) 2007 and 575(1), accounting for 23 percent of Pakistan’s imports in 2009/2010 
(Box 3 and Table 16). On average, firms or industries received concession of around 11 percentage 
points from the non-uniform application of statutory rates under one of these three SROs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
Pitigala and Hoppe, 2010. 
80 
HS 370610 is bound at 50 percent, while applied tariffs on many transactions are more than 60 percent and some 
are as high as 115 percent. 
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Box 3. Exception to MFN Regime: Three Key 2006 SROs 
 
The Ministry of Finance/CBR issues Statutory Regulation Orders (SROs), which are approved by the Economic 
Coordination Committee of Cabinet. Most SROs provide exemptions or partial exemptions from normal tariffs, but 
others provide for increased tariffs subject to at least one special condition announced in an SRO. The EDB 
administered SRO’s mostly provide exemptions for inputs and are confined to specified firms or groups of firms and 
are not available to other particularly commercial importers. Three key SRO administered for the objective of 
indigenization or domestic orientation for industry development are SRO 565(I)/2006, SRO 567 (I)/2006 and SRO 
575(I)/2006. 
SRO 565(I)/2006 (“Survey based”) provides a 45 page list of 154 domestically manufactured products. For each of 
these products there is an associated list of inputs (“raw materials, sub-components, components, sub-assemblies, 
and assemblies”) which can be imported at specified low customs duty rates-mostly zero, 5percent or 10 percent. 
SRO 567 (I)/2006 (“Non-survey based”) provides a 28 page list of products for which the normal statutory customs 
duties have been reduced, mainly to zero or 5 percent, but others (e.g. various textile and garment products) to 3 
percent, 6.5 percent and 9 percent. Listed products are organized by industry e.g. Sl. 4 consists of 33 inputs for the 
poultry sector. There are similar groups of surgical, textile and clothing, and pharmaceutical products. 
SRO 575(I)/2006 similarly gives a long (about 40 pages) list of machines & “capital goods” for which the normal 
customs duty is reduced, nearly all to either zero or 5 percent. Machines listed in SRO 575 are listed by user 
industry (e.g. machines for horticulture). Many of these machines are specialized and probably do not have uses 
outside the user industry, others (e.g. gen-sets) certainly have alternative uses. 
Source: Purcell, 2011. 
 
 
 
Table 16. The Statutory and Effective Duty Regime Based on Customs Transactions, 2009/2010 
 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Min Max 
Total 1.00 1.00 0.15 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.00 1.86 
Regulatory Duties 0.10 0.10 0.21 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.00 2.96 
SROs 565, 567 and 0.23 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.3 
FTA related 0.06 0.04 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.08 
Other SROs 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.97 
  Other, under  0.57  0.76  0.14  1.60   
Note: Statutory Duty is the ad valorem rates of regulatory duty (mean and Std. Dev.), whereas Effective Duty is the additive to 
the statutory rate, in this case by about 7 percent on average. Regulatory duty applied across all categories explains Share of 
Imports sum exceeding 100. 
 
 
 
159.     Furthermore, 12 percent of transactions covering 10 percent of imports in 2009/2010 were 
subjected to regulatory duties, adding around seven percent to already high statutory rates. Cases 
existed where regulatory were as high as 100 percent and special duties were up to 35 percent 
(mostly applied to finished goods and consumer durable goods), further amplifying the cascade along 
stages of processing. Moreover, the duties issued through SRO of the CBR and notified in the official 
Gazette are not consolidated in the tariff schedule or any published format.81 
 
160. Application of the SROs approach to trade policy has been selective, highly biased and 
distortionary since in most cases they led to exemptions for inputs for specified firms or groups of 
 
81 
Transactions data in 2009/2010 suggests that de facto applied tariff exceeding bound levels being applied for a 
number of product lines by as much as 3-4 times, departing from agreed norms under Pakistan’s multilateral 
commitments  (section  18(5)  of  the  Customs  Act)  and  the  2007/08  Budget  amended  legislation  preventing 
"regulatory duties" being applied which would exceed Pakistan’s multilateral commitments (WTO, TPR). 
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firms.82 In particular, 44 percent of all SROs targeting exemption were on machinery and appliances 
sector where Export Development Board’s (EDB) indigenization program was most active. By 
confining to selected, established firms and barring others, in particular commercial importers, such 
exemptions act as a de facto licensing scheme (Purcell 2011). Machinery and equipment also had the 
largest share products with regulatory duties (22 percent), mostly targeting finished goods and 
providing for high levels of effective protection within the sector. 
 
161.     The  exemptions  under  SRO  (565,  567  and  575)  also  extended  to  chemical  and  allied 
industries,  automotive,  rubber  and  plastic  industries  as  well  as  agriculture.  Within  the  sector, 
incidence varied considerably. Furthermore, optical photography and products with technological, 
capital-intensive products have low mean tariffs but the largest share of exemptions (30 percent). In 
contrast, footwear were virtually free of exemptions but with high tariffs. 
 
D.        The Nature of Distortions From Tariff Policy 
 
162.      A significant feature of Pakistan’s trade policy is the dispersion in Pakistan’s tariff structure. 
Apart from the statutory structure, customs data from 2010 indicates significant divergence in tariff 
paid across commodities, industries and between statutory and applied rates. Taking all tariff lines , 
the statutory tariff structure has an-weighted value of 14.5 percent with the Gini index equal to 0.426 
(Table 17). The variance of statutory tariffs varies significantly across industries with services facing 
the most, albeit with low rates, and footwear/headgear facing the most uniform tariffs. The effective 
rates in Pakistan are even more unequally distributed with the Gini coefficient value of 0.498 ove rall 
and at the sector level, generally higher levels of inequality, demonstrating the fact that exemptions 
largely exacerbate the already high variation in the official schedule. 
 
Table 17. Average and Dispersions of Statutory and Applied Rates by Sector, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Service 36 0.955 0.4 0.954 0.4 
Raw hides, skins, leather and furs 80 0.554 10.7 0.685 6.2 
Vegetable products 309 0.507 11.7 0.55 9.3 
Mineral products 116 0.498 11.7 0.514 6.5 
Animal and animal products 157 0.459 7.7 0.51 10.7 
Machinery/electrical 1,188 0.442 12.1 0.509 8 
Transportation 481 0.392 14.9 0.482 20.5 
Chemicals and allied industries 1,039 0.384 8.8 0.472 6.9 
Metals 201 0.359 34.5 0.453 9.5 
Miscellaneous 696 0.357 13.6 0.452 11 
Stone/glass 258 0.326 14.9 0.419 15 
Wood and wood products 196 0.319 27.7 0.401 12.2 
Plastics/rubbers 300 0.313 16.7 0.399 13.2 
Foodstuffs 212 0.286 20.4 0.38 19 
Textiles 798 0.217 18.8 0.377 14.1 
Footwear/headgear 51 0.056 22.9 0.143 19.8 
 
 
 
82
While most pertained to exemptions or partial exemptions from normal tariffs, others provided for increased tariffs 
(see Purcell et.al 2011). 
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163.     Tariff dispersion of this magnitude can be problematic on two fronts. First, high within and 
between sectors variations introduce relative price distortions that can worsen the resource 
misallocation induced by tariffs. Efficiency gains from low average tariffs are limited by wide 
disparities. Second, escalated structures, protecting the market for processed products rather than for 
primary products is an obstacle to organic 
economic development.83 
 
164. Determination  of  tariffs  is  a  key 
Figure 34. Decomposition of Tariff Variation 
 
By firm 
consideration for setting policy especially 
tariff  policy.  A  decomposition 84  of  tariff 
variability suggests that about 19 percent is 
determined  at  the  HS  section  level,  21 
percent at the chapter level and 25 percent 
at the heading level. A much smaller share 
of total variation (17 percent) is caused by 
differentiated tariffs below the heading 
level. Most importantly, 18 percent of 
applied tariff variability is caused by the 
use of exemptions, mainly at the firm level 
demands (11 percent) than country level (7 
percent) (Figure 34). 
 
165.     Those who export intensively pay 
Section head 
19% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 
21% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author Estimates. 
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little or no tariffs while non-exporters bear the brunt of the tariff burden. The average applied tariff 
paid is related to export intensity and are inversely related. At the extreme end, exporters with 
highest intensity pay virtually no tariffs due to duty drawback and export processing zone regimes 
under which many of these exporters operate. At the other end of spectrum, being a non-exporter in 
Pakistan subjects one to relatively high tariffs. The key implication is that, barring exemption to 
domestic-oriented manufacturing industries under EDB administered program, small scale domestic 
manufacturers, indirect exporters, informal traders and consumers bear the burden of tariffs. 
 
 
Figure 35. Tariffs by Export Intensity, 2005 -2010 
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83 
Antimiani (2004). 
84 
Using standard regression analysis, the variance in observed tariffs is decomposed into exemptions applied to 
countries at the tariff line level (e.g. as a result of a trade agreement) and the remainder - considered as exemptions 
given to firms. Extending the analysis to levels of aggregation ascribes industrial or commodity preference. 
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Box 4. Insights from Firm Level Data: The Economic Determination of Tariffs 
 
Duty exemption for firms suggests that level of tariff is a strong determinant of receiving exemptions. Using firm level 
trade data from firms’ customs data on tariffs and exemptions, the probability that a firm imported a particular good with a 
duty exemption is based on the firm's overall imports, exports and the overall imports of the particular good by the given 
firm. Additionally, one can control for the good type at the HS eight-digit level, estimating the following regression: 
( ) ( ( )
 
Where           is a dummy representing a given commodity at HS eight-digit level,                           is a measure of a firm's 
export intensity equal to the rank of the firm's exports among other exporters (zero if not an exporter),                            is a 
measure of firm's import intensity defined analogously,                         is the value of the imports of a given good by a 
given firm, and          represents the average tariff rate for the importation of a given good. 
The results for the key parameters (all except dummies) are shown below suggesting that the level of tariff is the strongest 
determinant of whether a firm may get a duty exemption and with a higher tariff the probability is significantly lower. 
The value of the import is also very important determinant and exemptions are more likely when the import values are 
greater. Finally, the results show that the position of the firm as an importer or exporter is an important determinant too — 
firms that are larger importers are less likely to obtain an exemption while firms that are among the greatest exporters are 
significantly more likely to obtain an import duty exemption. 
Estimated key logit parameters 
 
  Coefficient P Chi-S significance 
Tariff -1.22 0.50 -2.44 * 
Log of import value 0.21 0.02 12.09 *** 
Rank of firm's imports -0.18 0.01 -12.40 *** 
Rank of firm's exports 0.21 0.01 24.31 *** 
R2 42.5%    
 N 11,568    
 
 
166.     Pakistan has a poor rating in its Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) compared 
with selected competitors. While, complex to calculate, especially due to tariff and trade taxes in 
Pakistan, analysis of trade restrictiveness, which captures widespread exemption affecting imports 
and other policy barriers85 is useful in understanding the institutional and political determinants of 
trade protection. The OTRI provides a common metric of trade restrictiveness.86 
 
167.     This point is illustrated in Figure 36, which depicts the distribution of observed OTR indices for 
all countries in the world and marks the position of Pakistan and some of its main competitors.87 The 
 
 
 
85 
For example, imports subject to high protection rates are likely to be small and therefore will be attributed small weights 
in an import-weighted aggregation, which would underestimate the restrictiveness of those tariffs. In the extreme case, 
goods subject to prohibitively high tariffs have the same weight as goods subject to zero tariffs: a zero weight. Similarly, 
when computing simple average tariffs, very low tariffs on economically meaningless goods would downward bias this 
measure of trade restrictiveness. Kee et. al. 2008. 
86 
OTRI measures from a perspective of uniform tariff equivalent of observed trade policies on a country’s imports – that 
is, the index shows the uniform equivalent tariff that would maintain the country’s aggregate import volume at its current 
level (given heterogeneous tariffs). 
87 
Following Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008) one can estimate the overall trade restrictiveness indices (OTRI) using the 
latest GTAP database (version 8, base year of 2007) and the current GTAP model (Hertel 1997) for Pakistan and other 
countries in the world. The main source of data for Kee et. al (2008) is the WTO's Integrated Database, and UNCTAD's 
TRAINS, the base year is 2003 or 2004. Despite the differences in source of data and base years the results showed in 
Annex table 2 compares well with   Kee, et. al. (2008) with the correlation coefficient of 0.5. There also significant 
differences between the two estimates which can be attributed to the differences in source of data and the base years (Kee 
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overall trade restrictiveness index of Pakistan places it at the 88th percentile only surpassed by the 
restrictiveness of India and Iran, the value of 9.9, making it one of the most protected countries in the 
world. Compared with OTRI results in 2004 (9.1) in Annex 2, a slight upward bias, worsening of 
Pakistan’s overall protection is reversing some of the early progress towards reforms. 
 
Figure 36. Position of Pakistan's OTRI with respect to other countries, 2010 
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Box 5. Estimated OTRI for the World, 2010 
 
The estimated levels of OTRI for the world are presented below and suggest notable difference between trade restrictiveness of 
world's regions. 
 
 The most restrictive countries of the world appear to be Iran and Zimbabwe with OTRI index values around 16 percent. 
They are followed by India and a number of countries of central and western of Africa. 
 The least restrictive countries are found to be Hong Kong and Taiwan, followed by the member countries of the EU and 
most of other developed countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
et. al. 2009, adopting 2003-2004 base year) as well as the current approach incorporating unprotected services omitted 
from Kee et. al. (2009). 
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E.        Analysis of Anti-export Bias of the Tax and Tariff Regime 
 
168.     Structure  of  Nominal  Rates  leads  to  High  Rates  of  Effective  Protection.  Effective 
Protection (ERPs) estimates88 is an analytical tool that enables the quantification of the magnitude of 
incentives provided  for  domestic  traded  goods production  arising from  the  tariff structure. 89  In 
examining the summary of Pakistan’s tariff protection, Table 18 shows that the general tendency for 
Pakistan tariff structure to be relatively low for capital goods and raw materials and higher for 
finished goods, causing an increase in the ERP.90 Thus, sector level measures of ERP in import 
substituting industries such as beverages, tobacco and motor vehicles and accessories, vegetable oils 
and  fats  yields  very  high  effective  protection  estimates  in  the  region  of  100  percent  or  more 
compared  with  raw  material  and  products  of  intermediate  stage.  There  is  also  large  negative 
protection on services, establishing a clear distinction from industry. 
 
Table 18. Structure of Pakistan's Protection, 2010 
 
 
Paddy 10.0 10.5 Wood products 15.2 19.3 
Wheat 10.0 10.7 Paper products, publishing 15.8 21.4 
Cereal grains nec 4.0 0.5 Petroleum, coal products 8.0 24.6 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 12.2 14.5 Chemical, rubber, plastic 9.9 11.5 
Oil seeds 2.7 2.3 Mineral products nec 19.3 26.6 
Sugar cane, sugar beet 5.0 2.9 Ferrous metals 10.3 11.6 
Plant-based fibers 0.0 -4.0 Metals nec 6.9 4.2 
Crops nec 4.8 3.6 Metal products 17.8 47.0 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 2.1 -3.3 Motor vehicles and parts 38.7 115.0 
Animal products nec 7.8 8.7 Transport equipment nec 14.6 17.3 
Raw milk 0.0 -5.0 Electronic equipment 9.2 10.1 
Wool, silk-worm cocoons 3.3 -0.8 Machinery and equipment 10.1 11.3 
Forestry 6.1 5.5 Manufactures nec 15.3 39.7 
Fishing 8.8 9.3 Electricity 0.0 -9.0 
Coal 3.3 1.5 Gas manuf / dist 5.0 4.2 
Oil 7.5 8.7 Water 0.0 -2.0 
Gas 0.0 -1.6 Construction 0.0 -10.0 
Minerals nec 6.6 5.8 Trade 0.0 -1.1 
Bovine meat products 6.5 5.3 Transport nec 0.0 -7.9 
Meat products nec 21.8 33.3 Water transport 0.0 -2.8 
Vegetable oils and fats 11.3 151.8 Air transport 0.0 -3.1 
Dairy products 23.1 63.7 Communication 0.0 -2.2 
Processed rice 10.0 17.6 Financial services nec 0.0 -3.2 
Sugar 10.7 17.0 Insurance 0.0 -0.6 
Food products nec 16.4 121.5 Business services nec 0.0 -3.5 
Beverages and tobacco 57.4 390.0 Recreational 0.0 -5.2 
Textiles 16.4 57.1 Public Administration 0.0 -2.5 
Wearing apparel 24.1 66.7 Dwellings 0.0 -2.2 
Leather products 15.7 190.1    
Sources: Author’s calculation.      
88 
Corden, 1971; and Greenaway and Milner, 2003. 
89 
It examines the relationship between tariffs on the final product and on its input-supplying sectors through input- 
output linkages and provides a a sense of the “breathing room” for absorbing reductions in rents from protection. 
90 
ERPm = (VAmj –Vaj YVAj) where VAm j is industry j's value added at domestic prices and VAj*i s value added 
at world prices. VAmajn d VA* are computed as VAmj = VOj- X INTij and VA* = VO/(1 + tj) - I INTj/(1+t,). 
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169.    The results reinforce the potential for resources to be driven towards production for the 
domestic market and away from firms competing for export markets. Firms that produce for export 
market such as wood and electronic products, have relatively low effective protection estimates, and 
are unable to benefit from exemptions of import duties. The effect of tariffs on firms is invariably 
negative, because the cost-increasing effects of higher prices for intermediate goods are not offset by 
benefits on output prices. EDBs use of exemptions and regulatory duty to achieve indigenization 
objectives largely explains the higher effective protection in a number of manufacturing activities, 
particularly the automotive sector. As expected the raw material on textile industry provides negative 
protection, the production increases or exports are less likely to take place under these circumstances. 
 
170.   The pattern of protection is 
correlated against two performance 
indicators: Value added and Export 
Performance (Figures 37 and 38).91 In the 
first case, the effective protection is 
correlated with low value added activities 
by definition, so that low tariff on final 
goods can lead to increased returns to 
value  added.  As  a  result,  sectors  with 
high effective rates of protection tend to 
have low value-added or conversely there 
is  a  higher  incentive  to  produce  low- 
value added which sums up the inherent 
bias against the export competing sectors. 
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Figure 37. ERP and Value Added 
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Similarly, reviewing effective protection 
against industry export performance 
suggest  that  the  sectors  that  have 
achieved strong export performance face 
low levels of effective protection, while 
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Figure 38. RP and Export Performance 
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sectors with high level of effective 
protection have weaker performance. 
 
171.     .A     substantial     resource-pull 
effect towards domestic oriented 
manufacturing is evident from industry 
and   firm   level   ERPs.   Industry   and 
product        level        ERP        measures 
demonstrated  the  resource  pull  toward 
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Processed 
protected sectors, where there are 50 Dairy 
Sugar 
Apparel Textile rice 
incentive  to  produce  domestic  oriented 0 MterFiablre Sugar cane Paddy 
manufacturing—especially  where  EDB 
administers SRO’s and exemptions. Here 
in the sectors which are the most active 
0 
-50 
produ1c0ts 20 30 40 50 
RCA 
use of EDB incentives, such as refrigerators, air-conditioners and deep freezers, rates are between 65 
percent and 150 percent, while cotton yarn has rates about 5 percent (Table 19). 
 
 
91 
Following Balassa's (1965) measure of relative export performance summarized as RCA, defined as a country's 
share of world exports of a good divided by its share of total world exports. The index for country i good j is 
RCAij = 100(Xij /Xwj)/(Xit /Xwt) where Xab is exports by country a (w=world) of good b (t=total for all goods). 
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Table 19. An illustrative sample of firm level ERPs, 2010 
 
 
Produ ct 
Nom i n al 
Prote cti on 
Effe cti ve 
Prote cti on 
VA  % 
O u tpu t 
 
Laundry Soap  50 343  12 
 
Split  t ype AC 1 t on 50 150  26 
 
Refrigerat or 193L  50 109  41 
 
Refrigerat or 323L  50 106  42 
 
Split  t ype AC 1.5 t on 50 101  41 
 
Refrigerat or 343L  50 97 46 
 
Refrigerat or 249L  50 92 49 
 
Soft  Drinks  in 330ml  Cans  50 92 49 
 
Refrigerat or 259L  50 92 49 
 
Refrigerat or 367L  50 92 49 
 
Refrigerat or 224L  50 91 50 
 
Refrigerat or 274L  50 91 50 
 
Refrigerat or 215L  50 91 50 
 
Refrigerat or 292L  50 88 51 
 
Refrigerat or 421L  50 88 52 
 
Split  t ype AC 2 t on 50 83 52 
 
Golden  Sweet  Corn  50 78 64 
 
Garden/Chick P eas  50 77 65 
 
T omat o P uree  50 74 67 
 
Fabrics  25 73 34 
 
Deep  Freezers 8CF  50 68 70 
 
Deep  Freezers 18CF  50 67 71 
 
Deep  Freezers 10CF  50 67 72 
 
Deep  Freezers 12CF  50 65 73 
 
Deep  Freezers 14CF  50 65 74 
 
Jam, Jelly  and Marmalade 50 59 85 
 
P ickle  50 54 92 
 
Mint /Coriander Chut ney  50 54 92 
 
Squash  50 54 92 
 
Sauces  and Ket chup  50 53 95 
 
Mango/P lum Chut ney  50 52 95 
 
Milk  Chocolat e 50 51 98 
 
Guar  Gum  P owder  25 25 24 
 
Canned  food  15 25 61 
 
P unching  bags,  Gear  Bags  20 23 87 
 
Ginger/Garlic P ast e 15 16 93 
 
Yarn  of art ificial st aple fibre  10 11 82 
 
Cot t on Yarn  5 8 62 
 
Blended  Cot t on 12 10 58 
 
Cot t on Yarn  carded  8 4 51 
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F. The Presence of Anti-Export Bias From Exchange Rate Management 
 
172. Overvaluation may be detrimental to achieving the strategic trade policy goals. Since May 
1999,  Pakistan  has  maintained  a  competitive 
exchange rate regime as a key outcome of the 
macroeconomic policy mix. As noted above, the 
1996  -  2003  trade  liberalization  episode  was 
Figure 39. Normal and Real Effective Exchange 
Rates, 1999-2009 
 
Pakistan Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates (1999-2005) 
supported by further real exchange rate 
devaluation of about 20 percent per annum over 
this  period  (Figure  39)  and  was  further 
maintained in line with inflation until 2004. After 
that,  the  rupee  appreciated  in  real  terms  until 
2008. Since July 2008, domestic inflation caused 
an appreciation in the REER index resulting in a 
loss of competitiveness in recent years (and a 
domestic  lobby  for  high  protection).  Looking 
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ahead, the need to maintain exchange rate 
flexibility  and  strengthen  external 
competitiveness  has  become  even  more 
important given a volatile external environment. 
 
173.     An  indicator  of  anti  export  bias  is  the 
ratio of (average) effective exchange rate for 
imports (EERm) to that of exports (EERx). If the 
ratio EERm/EERx is above unity, a bias against 
export  activities  is  suggested. 92  In  Pakistan’s 
case, there has been a significant reduction of 
anti-export bias from 2003-2004 from 1.18 to 
around 1.03 around 2008 (even with the 
appreciation. But as shown in Figure 40 the trade 
regime still retains anti-export bias in effective 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics 
 
 
Figure 40. Anti-Export Bias in Exchange Rate, 
2006 - 2010 
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174.     The need for a competitive real exchange 
rate is not unrelated to the rates of protection. Lowering protection invariably eases the anti-export 
bias in real exchange rates but needs to be compensated with a corresponding devaluation. 93 A 
principal reason is that tariffs appreciate the real exchange rate, which makes exporting less attractive 
to importing. With protection varying between sectors providing relatively high protection on some 
sectors and low on others, the burden of the exchange rate adjustment will be disproportionately 
borne by unprotected sectors especially exports where the effective protection is relatively low. 94 
 
 
92 
EERm indicates the domestic currency cost of one unit of foreign currency (US$1, in this case) worth of imports. 
For exports, EERx represents the exchange rate after adjustment for the existing export promotion schemes, such as 
subsidized export credits and freight subsidy. Thus, EERx represents domestic currency equivalent of proceeds from 
exports worth one unit of foreign currency. (World Bank 2007). 
93 
As “Lerner” symmetry theorem would suggest imposing a tax on imports has an equivalent effect on exports 
Shephan Tokarick (IMF, 2006) exploring the notion finds that for many developing countries, the magnitude of the 
implicit tax is substantial—about 12 percent, on average, for the sample countries studied. 
94 
(see Shatz and Tarr 2000). 
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G.        Other Measures Affecting Trade 
 
175.     While tariffs are the primary trade policy measure in Pakistan, non-tariff barriers and other 
trade policy measures remain important. The section compiles the principal policy measures and 
provides brief description of each. Three broad areas are described: (i) direct restrictions on imports, 
(ii) measures to refund import duties, and (iii) direct export incentives. 
 
176.    Import Bans, Quantitative Restrictions. Specific quantitative restrictions have been almost 
completely phased out, apart from certain ozone-depleting substances, but some potentially negative non- 
tariff measures and processes remain in place. The Government can prohibit or restrict imports by 
notification if deemed in the "public interest," as contained in the Ministry of Commerce’s annual Import 
Policy Order. More specifically, there are prohibitions and restrictions for religious, health, safety, 
environmental and/or national security concerns.95 The Import Policy also identifies a number of goods 
that are subject to testing, certification and/or procedural requirements, most of which are on health and 
safety grounds. However, there are some particular restrictions which do not fall within these categories, 
including the ban of some specific pharmaceutical compounds, and used and retreaded tires. 
 
177.     More importantly, restrictions imposed on import of second-hand machinery and equipment 
as part of the Import Policy is motivated by protection of local industries. The Strategic Trade Policy 
Framework, 2009-12 provides for a standard-based system for the import of previously-used 
specialized machinery, in place of the ban on second-hand imports, which will facilitate greater 
access to capital equipment. The import ban on used machinery and equipment has been relaxed. In 
some cases, imports of raw materials are restricted to manufacturers, such as crude palm oil and 
certain pharmaceutical compounds. Notably, a number of motor vehicle components fall into this 
latter category, as well Imports from Israel (but not exports) remain prohibited but those from India 
are progressively being allowed. 
 
178.     Import Licensing—De jure & De facto: Pakistan continues to apply a number of measures 
which can be argued as contravening the TRIM Agreement that distorts markets and has a cost on both 
the importer and exporter.96 The de jure licensing which does occur are operated for health, safety, 
security, religious, and environmental reasons. The de facto system however, is more important and uses 
the system of import quotas and tariff exemptions/concessions requiring ministerial or other approval 
(e.g. certain chemicals and refrigerated trucks). In particular, the prominence of the Export Development 
Board’s discretionary control over materials and components imported under SRO exemptions is based 
on a list of products maintained under CGO 11/200797 that bars such concessions. EDB had discretionary 
control over new entrants to the industry, since all potential entrants would need to negotiate with EDB 
and agree on an individual indigenization program and how that would be phased-in over time. There are 
 
 
95 
While standards are increasingly following international requirements, they are applied uniformly to imports and 
domestic goods, and are mainly voluntary. Two thirds of its 27,000 national standards are aligned to international 
standards (e.g. ISO). However, SPS administration is complicated by many agencies, overlapping responsibilities 
and duplicate roles. As well, Pakistan has no uniform labeling and marking system. Only specified food coloring can 
be imported. Imported foodstuffs, including ingredients, must have at least 50 percent of the original shelf life left 
on importation. 
96 
These measures eludes conventional measures often NTB incidence of total tariff proposed by Erzan et. al. (1989) 
and Laird and Yeats (1988) or the price wedge measures (Hinkle, 2009). 
97 
As an exemption to the extensive exemption oriented SRO (565, 567 and 575), there are 906 products published 
under CGO 11/2007. There is one local monopoly producer of 91 percent of the listed products under CGO and the 
possibility that for some listed products small scale and informal sector producers are not counted. Purcell, Khan and 
Gulzar (2011). See the list of CGO 11/2007: http://www.fbr.gov.pk/Docs/2010113141132597032007CGO11.pdf. 
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also quotas on imports of certain goods eligible for tariff exemptions/concessions over and above SROs 
discussed above which operate effectively as tariff quotas and help transfer rents to the first in the queue. 
98 On a country basis, there are also some bilateral tariff quotas on tea, betel nuts, and certain clothing 
with  Sri  Lanka, and reportedly on  certain textile  products with  Mauritius under  respective  FTAs. 
Importantly, Pakistan recently granted MFN status to India and abolished the positive list approach, 
following an increasing positive list.99 
 
179.    The key implications of this often competing dual SRO/CGO regime—the former, an 
exemption and the latter, an exception to the exemption—is that it effectively constitutes a de jure 
‘import licensing’ system. As such the negative impact on resource allocation is similar to any import 
licensing scheme: (i) exacerbates rent-seeking behavior, (ii) imposes price distortions through varied 
effective protection rates for different firms, and (iii) loses the opportunity for additional government 
revenue. In addition, the specific EDB indigenization program systematically bias against the small 
industry and the commercial trader, as these are assessed based on existing or proposed industry 
activity with stipulated inputs and their quantities. 
 
180.     Duty Drawback and Suspension Schemes. The CBR administers a duty drawback system to 
refund exporters duties that have been on imported inputs in order to reduce the anti-export bias 
which arises from the tariff regime.100 Drawback rates are set by FBR using input output coefficients. 
CBR also offers the Duty & Tax Remission on Export (DTRE) scheme, designed for regular 
exporters, whereby an exporter is entitled to duty- and GST-free purchases of inputs from the local 
market or abroad through “suspension,” rather than rebate. The program is open to both direct and 
indirect exporters and in doing so, mitigates the anti-export bias present in the tariff structure. 
 
181.     While the systems are said to have a positive impact on exports 101 the efficacy of the duty 
drawback system is increasingly in doubt due to its implementation in Pakistan. Firms encounter 
substantial delays ranging between three to six months as well as high levels of administrative costs 
that prevent the anti-export bias from being fully eliminated. There are reports of misuse of the 
scheme by businesses through export houses, erroneous documentation and product substitutes.102 In 
general, duty suspension schemes are more favorable than drawbacks but require adequate 
administrative capacity and auditing procedures to be successful.103 
 
 
98 
For example, new and used concrete-mixer Lorries eligible for the 5percent concessionary rate are limited to an 
all-up quota of 2,500 units, allocated on a "first come first served" basis. 
99 
1934 eight-digit HS codes (over 600 in mid 2000) including 1,000 tariff items of raw materials not made in 
Pakistan can be imported from India for use in exports contravening WTO rules. At that time, informal trade at a 
transaction premium above the formal channels (informal/smuggled trade between the two countries, either directly, 
through Afghanistan), or re-routed through third country ports, mainly Dubai and Singapore, is estimated at between 
US$ 250 million to US$2 billion annually (ECU 1999, Taneja 2004). 
100 
Under the WTO, duty drawback and/or suspension are not necessarily considered export subsidies unless refunds 
or exemptions are higher than the duties that were actually paid on the imported merchandise that is subsequently 
exported, or if the government exempts the producer from paying duties on inputs that are not used in the 
manufacture of exported goods. 
101 
Research suggests a short-run positive impact of duty drawback rates on exports. Ul-Haq, 2007. 
102 
Nadeem (2009) concluded that prevailing duty drawback rates (DDRs) were in fact higher than the actual 
incidence of custom duty on those items. 
103 
Recent investigation by the Auditor General (AG) of the GoP has focused on the misuse of the DTRE scheme by 
steel importers. The AG office has suggested that the FBR should develop a strong internal control mechanism, and 
exert close monitoring on proper feeding of import/export data in Pakistan Customs Computerized System (PaCCS) 
to ensure remittance of foreign exchange and export of DTRE goods 
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182.     GST Rebates on Inputs. The draft Sales Tax Bill currently under consideration was meant to 
replace the 1990 Sales Tax Act. In addition to unifying sales tax rates to 15 percent, the new bill 
eliminates discrimination between imported and domestic goods. As well, zero rating of selected 
sectors needs to be confronted. The sum is that sales taxes collected on import transactions shows a 
high variation in effective sales and federal excise tax, and within manufacturing, for example, 
reinforcing incentives in favor of textile relative to other manufacturing. Eliminating exemptions and 
zero  rating would  widen the  base,  generate  revenue  and  help  reduce  the anti-export  bias.  The 
effective rate of excise duties applied on import transactions in 2009/2010 shows differentiation 
across sectors with substantial variation in rates (Table 20). As excise duties are small relative to 
other taxes, they do not alter the apparent anti-export bias discussed above. 104 
 
Table 20. Applied Sales and Federal excise tax on Imports, 2009/10 
 
  HS -C ode s 
S al e s Tax Exci s e Tax 
Me an C oe f.Var Me an C oe f.Var 
Live Animals and Animal P roduct s 01 t o 05 2.6 2.3 0.3 1.3 
Veget able P roduct s 06 t o 14 6.9 1.2 0.3 1.3 
Fat s and Oils 15 1.9 3.0 9.3 0.8 
P repared Foodst uffs 16-24 9.3 1.0 0.7 6.5 
Mineral P roduct s 25-27 9.4 0.9 1.8 3.4 
Chemical 28-38 6.3 2.5 2.0 66.0 
Rubber and P last ics 39-40 9.3 1.3 0.5 0.9 
Raw Hides and Skins 41-46 8.0 1.0 0.6 53.4 
W ood P ulp 47-49 8.5 1.1 0.3 1.4 
T ext iles 50-63 3.1 2.0 0.3 1.9 
Foot wear, 64-67 3.3 2.0 0.3 1.4 
St one, P last er, Cement 68-70 10.1 0.8 0.5 0.8 
P earls, P recious Or Semi-P recious 71 10.3 0.7 0.6 0.8 
Base Met als 72-83 10.0 1.2 0.5 1.0 
Machinery and Appliances 84-85 7.9 1.0 0.6 0.7 
Vehicles, Aircraft , Vessels 86-89 13.4 0.5 0.7 0.5 
Opt ical, P hot ographic, Measuring 90-92 6.2 1.3 0.7 0.6 
Arms And Ammunit ion 93 1.9 2.9 0.1 2.9 
Miscellaneous Manufact ures 94-95 10.7 0.7 0.6 2.1 
W orks Of Art 97-98 14.1 0.4 0.8 0.4 
 
 
 
183.     Export Processing Zones. There are five Export Processing Zones (EPZs) 105 presently in 
operation in Gwadar, Karachi, Risalpur, Saindak, and Sialkot with several others planned. Karachi 
and Saindak account for the majority of EPZ production and exports, equivalent to some 97 percent 
of EPZ exports between July 2010 and May 2011.While EPZ enterprises pay the same presumptive 
tax as other exporters—one percent of export value—EPZ enterprises were in the past permitted to 
sell up to 20 percent of their output to the domestic market. This has changed and any sale to the 
domestic market is subject to approval. As exports from EPZs are concentrated in textiles and 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
Full exemptions on excise duty are affected on a relatively limited number of transactions, mostly within one 
product group, palm oil. The 2008 WTO TPR reported that excise tax concessions favor local content in a number of 
products including aerated waters made wholly from indigenous juices of fruits, vegetables, and food grains that 
contain no other local or imported are taxed at 10 percent of the retail price instead of 12 percent. In addition crude 
vegetable oil (excluding cooking oil) obtained from locally grown seeds is exempt from the 15 percent excise tax. 
105 
EPZ enterprises are permitted duty-free import of machinery, equipment and materials used in export production. 
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apparel 106  the concessions have provided little in the way of development goals such as export 
diversification or progress of the less developed regions. 
 
184.     Manufacturing under Bond Scheme. CBR operates a bond scheme for manufacturing which 
allows on-site bonded warehousing of imported inputs. Bonded manufacturers may sell up to 40 
percent of their output in the domestic customs territory subject to the payment of applicable duties 
and taxes. The manufacturing under bond scheme does not provide duty free imports and allows 
manufacturers to locate anywhere in the country, subject to licensing.107 
 
185.     Income Tax Concessions. Sector-based tax concessions have been phased out though income 
from agriculture production remains exempt from income taxation. Exports are also not subject to 
regular corporate income tax (currently 35 percent of net taxable income) and are subject instead to a 
presumptive tax of one percent of export value. In addition, some imports, which are subject to a 
general 5 percent withholding tax, are levied at concessionary rates. The substantial difference in tax 
rates (company tax rate of 35 percent) suggests possible sizeable subsidies for more profitable 
exporters, while low- or non-profitable exporters are still subject to taxation. More importantly, as 
firms are taxed on the value of exports, rather than value-added with no credits or deductions for 
investment,  the  export  tax  system  provides  a  disincentive  to  investment  in  new  capital  or 
technologies. As it turns out, most exporters are actually penalized and not assisted by the income 
withholding tax arrangements.108 
 
186.     Export Finance: The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) provides short and long-term financing to 
exporters on concessionary terms. The short-term Export Finance Scheme (EFC) provides working 
capital through banks for up to 180 days, on a transaction basis, for both direct and indirect exporters, 
or a performance basis, whereby an direct exporter qualifies for a revolving credit. The Long-term 
Financing for Export Oriented Projects (LTF-EOP) scheme allows eligible financial institutions to 
provide  funding  facilities  to  export-oriented  enterprises  for  the  import  of  machinery,  plant, 
equipment and accessories not manufactured locally. 
 
H.        Export Subsidies: An Assessment of Incentive Bias 
 
187.    Exports are accorded a high priority in the Government’s assistance strategy and has 
received assistance in many forms; both through general and sector schemes offering income and 
other tax exemptions/concessions, direct subsidies, such as for freight and research and development 
grants and concessionary credit. 109  The limited analysis which exists examines two concessionary 
finance measures on export performance concluded that the export financing scheme had a negative 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
Export Processing Zones Authority, “Progress Report, July 2010 to May 2011”. 
107 
Notwithstanding the above schemes, the Strategic Trade Policy Framework, 2009-12 indicates that exporters are, 
on average, forced to export indirect taxes, until the drawback mechanisms can eliminate such anomalies. 
108 
While an ex post cost-benefit analysis is required to fully assess the impact of the export subsidy scheme, the 
nature of the regime adds to an already highly distorted incentive regime. 
109 
The genesis of export related policies can be traced to measures such as Export Bonus schemes (1959) allowing 
the import of certain items, not generally importable, up to 10 to 40 percent of the value of export, income tax rebate 
(1972) up to 25 percent of income, EFS (1973) with subsidized interests rates, financing for locally manufactured 
machinery, LMM, (1972), Cash Compensatory Rebate (1978) for exports up to 12.5 percent of value and R&D 
support (2005) ranging from 3 to 6 percent of value added. 
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impact  while  the  rebate/refund  scheme  was  insignificant. 110  Despite  these  efforts,  policies  of 
subsidizing  exports  have  continued  irrespective  of  their  effectiveness  in  generating  declared 
outcomes or opportunity costs of scarce government resources. 111 
 
188.     Current industrial structure is largely a consequence of government’s historical patronage 
aimed at achieving rapid industrialization with export sector receiving high priority. The textile and 
clothing sector by design become pivotal in government support. Public intervention in Textiles and 
Clothing  (T&C)  spans  four  decades,  characterized  by  one  of  three  methods—“direct  control, 
managed domestic prices, and free markets targeting the cotton sector.”112 In addition, Pakistan’s 
Research and Development (R&D) incentive equals 3-6 percent of the free-on-board value of added 
value textiles and garments for export. The 2009 Textile and Clothing: Textile Policy continued these 
various general and sectoral schemes intend to help meet greater competition in developed markets in 
the post MFA era with initiatives for exporters including: 
 
  Drawback of Local Taxes where provincial levies and local taxes collected from processed 
fabrics, home textiles and garments are refunded to exporters at the rate of one, two and three 
percent of their FOB value, respectively. 

 
Technology Up-Gradation Support Order for projects exceeding investment of Rs 10 million 
or more in machinery or technology, government supporting 50 percent of mark-up subject 
and smaller investment receiving 20 percent. 

 
Mark-up Support for Textile providing grants for new plants providing 2.5 percent support in 
mark-up against outstanding loans availed by exporters from commercial banks under Export 
Finance Scheme (EFS) in mark-up against outstanding loans. 
 
I. 
 
 
Compensatory Support to PTA Users 
 
189.     In contrast, for the non textile and clothing sector specific schemes can be summarized (i) 
freight subsidy of 25 percent on air shipments of live seafood, (ii) an R&D subsidy of 6 percent 
exports proceeds of processed foods, (iii) schemes compensating employees of exporters providing 
allopathic medicines at US $500 - $1000 per month for a period of two years, and (iv) 50 percent 
subsidy cost registering pharmaceutical products in foreign countries. 
 
190.     Two financing schemes supported exports; the Export Finance Scheme 1973 (EFS) and the 
Long Term Finance Facility 2008 (LTTF) which provided credit below market rates for export 
oriented units for financing exports and purchasing of new machinery, respectively. Funding under 
for EFS was available to direct and indirect exporters and trading companies apart for exports in raw 
cotton, rice, wools, hides, and wet blue leather.113 Under EFS, concessional rates were available for 
units having annual export greater than US $5 million or at 50 percent of sales (whichever are lower). 
 
 
110 
The export financing (EFS) and rebate/refund schemes were analyzed by Nadeem Ul Haq and Ali Kemal (2007). 
Seminal work by M.H. Khan and M. Ishfaq (2009) suggested that credit under EFS is weakly correlated with overall 
exports and Zia (2006) who indicated that EFS can be termed partially effective at best. 
111 
Under the WTO, export subsidies are defined as: financial contribution by a government or any public body 
within the territory of a member; a government practice involving a direct transfer of funds, potential direct transfers 
of funds or liabilities; government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchase goods; 
government revenue that is otherwise due is forgone or not collected and any form of income or price support. 
112 
Townsend and Gutichounts, 1994. 
113 
See the list of CGO 11/2007: http://www.fbr.gov.pk/Docs/2010113141132597032007CGO11.pdf 
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In 2006-07 exporting firms were allowed to swap loans obtained from financial institutions on 
normal rate of interest with loans under the LTFF. 
 
191.     The export incentive regime not only systemically bias resource allocation against the non- 
textile industry in general, and specifically against new entrants but also between stages of the textile 
and clothing supply chain. Partly a historical precedent, concessionary measures on cotton yarn was 
included in almost every subsidy regime at the outset of the industrialization strategy. At the same 
time, the cotton price support and trade policy measures system ensured a subsistence level of 
industry and discouraging farmers from investing farming methods to upgrade yield and quality. 
Neither yarn spinners nor textile mills utilized this cost advantage of low cotton prices to invest in 
cost-savings or upgraded technology.114 Furthermore, there are different rates of drawbacks of local 
taxes favoring higher value added products at the expense not only of the cotton growers, but also the 
productivity of ginners and yarn producers. Recent episodes of quota and regulatory duty on yarn 
along with the structure of the export incentives and disbursement patterns of EFS and LTTF 
demonstrate that the policy bias toward established and higher value segments of exports continues. 
 
192.     There have been a number of adverse consequences from credit subsidy measures. First, 
large scale exporters have engaged in over-invoicing to benefit from credit subsidy. 115  Further, 
evidence points to subsidies being ‘monopolized’ by influential exporters,116 implying that the credit 
subsidy has secured profits of established firms and discouraged productivity and technology 
improvements that would have otherwise occurred. Finally, the incumbent’s benefits effectively 
raises the barrier to entry by favoring present exporters and stifles resources from productive 
enterprises, as resources are drawn to those sectors with the most favorable incentives. 
 
193.     In spite of, or perhaps because of, government efforts in the textile and clothing sector, export 
unit values have remained low (Figure 41). While market shares for the principal export items were 
either gaining or maintaining world market shares the past few years, unit values have remained 
relatively low. For Pakistan’s top eight exports, accounting for 70 percent of its textile and clothing 
export, the unit values achieved were the lowest amongst its main competitors, with some marginal 
gains from 2002 to 2010.117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114  
Hudson  and  Ethridge,  2007  Ud  Din  and  Ghani,  2004,  and  www.astm.org/SNEWS/JA_2009/perspective_ 
ja09.html. 
115
Khan and M. Ishfaq (2009). Mahmood and Azhar (2001) provided evidence of a significant difference between 
the duty-drawback rate and the premium on foreign exchange in the kerb market. 
116 
The top 100 exporters account for 61 percent of outstanding loans under EFS and the top 18 exporters have 28 
percent of outstanding loans under EFS. Khan M. H. and M. Ishfaq (2009). Evidence of connected lending in 
Pakistan argues that political connections of firms help in reducing their borrowing cost. Khwaja and Main (2005) 
However, evidence also showed that credit subsidies were inefficiently captured by publically firms. Zia (2006). 
117 
Pakistan’s main export destination, the USA, the price of Square Meter Equivalent (SME) of Pakistani T&C 
products US$1.10, is much lower than the average price of US$1.69 (or 34%) of SME of T&C products i mported 
from worldwide sources. 
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Figure 41. Comparative Price Levels for Selected Products 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
194.    Export subsidies, pursued in the name of providing temporary assistance to encourage 
technological  and  other  improvements  to  enhance  competitiveness,  have  not  helped  Pakistan 
diversify or improve the quality of exports—as would be suggested by country and firm level 
evidence on the subject.118 Instead, it has been received by established industries and companies 
within  those  industries,  and  in  doing  so  reinforced  market  power  against  new  entrants.  The 
 
 
118
Helmers Trofimenko (2010), Tybout (1999) and (Hoffmeister (1991) and empirical evidence Pakistan (Ul -Haq, 
2007), Ishfaq (2009) does not refute these assertion. It has been shown that under undistorted market conditions 
most productive firms will engage in trade directly, less productive will do so indirectly, with the least productive 
firms serving the domestic market (Holtzner and Larch (2011). The “success” stories are often based on cases in 
which traders would have carried out the activity un-assisted by government (Panagariya, 1999). 
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incumbents’ successful campaign to sustain government assistance has served to maintain margins at 
or above normal profits, but has done little to raise unit values and value-added production. The 
abnormal profits, however, have drawn investments towards it and perpetuating the sector beyond 
what the market would otherwise bear, and created excess capacity. 
 
195.     Given  the  difficulty  in  tying  assistance  to  increased  efficiency  or  cost  reductions,  as 
envisaged in the EFTs and LTFF, a neutral, incentive regime which is phased out over time but 
which does not discriminate among sectors, firm size, or performance may be preferred.119 The 
appropriate instrument for realizing the positive externality from the expansion of domestic industry 
may not be a tariff or a subsidy, but rather a mechanism that relates a fiscal incentive to knowledge 
or learning as a public good with the following characteristics: 
 
 Linked with capital investment 
 
 Non-discriminatory, available to both exporting and non-exporting enterprises 
 
 Aimed at meeting clear targets 
 
 Has a clear monitoring and evaluation framework to ensure funds are used as intended 
 
 Time-bound. 
 
J.         Institutional Framework for Trade Policy-Making: Lack of Coherence 
 
196.     The current framework for trade policy is fragmented and captured by special interests. 
The National Trade Policy Framework and recent National Industrial Policy recommendations 
recognize the need for a trade policy that promotes greater value-added and export competitiveness 
of Pakistan’s industries. In practice however, the process and ultimate policy lacks the necessary 
cohesiveness to balance competing demands of various interests groups while maintaining focus on 
the overall policy objectives. In part, the outcome is the result of a lack of clear institutional or 
strategic framework for the development of trade policy.120 This lack of policy direction is apparent 
in the outcome of the yearly National Trade Policy, which reflects the competing range of agendas. 
 
197.     Tariff setting, for example, is undertaken through the annual Budget announcement after the 
CBR determines annual tariff rates in close collaboration with key ministries, mainly Finance, 
Commerce,  and  Industry.  The  implementation  of  the  process  is  entrusted  to  the  Ministry  of 
Commerce (MOC) through an Annual Trade Policy (ATP). The sub-agency, National Tariff 
Commission (NTC), “administers trade defense laws with regard to Pakistan’s international treaty”. 
NTC also assumes an extended mandate “to function as a think tank for the government on matters 
relating to competitiveness of the industry”. This includes extra protection, anti-dumping and 
countervailing measure that may occur beyond the budget proceedings. Changes proposed beyond 
the purview of the budget are submitted to NTC which then reviews and changes are issued by FBR 
by way of an SRO, which is approved by the Economic Coordination Committee of Cabinet. 
 
 
 
 
119 
For example, investment credits, allowances, accelerated depreciation, and other similar measures that can be 
provided through the Tax Code (Tanzi and Zee, 2001). 
120 
The GoP’s Rules of Business do not specifically assign Trade Policy to any ministry. In fact, trade policy as such 
is not mentioned at all. 
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198.     The process depicted below provides an overview of the ATP consultation process, which 
engages various government entities and private sector stakeholders (Figure 42). Its complexity 
notwithstanding, notable absences are academia/research organizations, consumer groups, and many 
service sectors that are ultimately impacted by trade policy. While there is not a clear explanation the 
ATP to be an annual feature, the structure of the process provides the business community a good 
opportunity to provide individually tailored measures—particularly after it follows just a couple of 
months after the Finance Bill and can be viewed as a second opportunity to acquire government 
support. 
 
Figure 42. Trade Policy Formulation in Pakistan 
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199.     In practice, however, the process allows trade policy formulation to be deferred to multiple 
actors that directly influence trade policy on behalf of the sectors and/or firms they represent, 
detracting from attempts at trade policy coherence. For example, trade policy related to textiles has 
been handed over to Ministry of Textiles since 2007 which has designed the subsidy programs for the 
sector, and pursues a policy of “cascading” tariffs.121 This policy is evident in the nominal tariffs 
structure where raw cotton carries low and zero tariffs and finished garments 25 percent. The latest 
draft Industrial Policy considers trade policy through a “two-tier export tariff regime” with regard to 
domestic raw material exports to secure needs of downstream export-oriented industry.122 Provincial 
Governments, too, weigh in (for instance when the Sindh Government chose to levy a ‘cess’ on 
imports that amounted to para-tariffs). 
 
200.     Tariff policy for the vast range of engineering goods has been entrusted to the Engineering 
Development Board (EDB)—responsible for the development of the local engineering industry. The 
EDB’s role on trade policy emerges an explicit policy stance of the Ministry of Industries The EDB 
decides the policies from raw material procurement to tariffs of engineering goods. With advice from 
specialized industry-specific committees that have firms and trade associations as members, the EDB 
routinely intervenes to secure concessions on inputs directly through FBR, bypassing the NTC 
effectively asserting the EDB’s role in the tariff setting agenda for the industrial sector.123 While the 
motive is indigenization—with the aim of augmenting the ‘local content’—it also actively propagates 
protection of selected industries, principally consumer durables such as auto industry, motorcycles, 
air  conditioners  and  various  types  of  industrial  machinery  and  equipment  through  bans  and 
restrictions on imports of second-hand products. 
 
201.    Other areas of trade policy have been heavily influenced by sectoral interests. While a 
consultative process is an important pillar of any trade policymaking framework, the current structure 
in Pakistan allows sectoral interests to take decisions without reference to the broader community of 
stakeholders, such as consumers and upstream or downstream sectors. Trade policy formulation has, 
in practice, become a series of subsidies and other protective measures in the name of “export 
promotion”. The Ministry of Textiles and representative private sector associations are heavily 
engaged in driving forward this agenda. Moreover, the specialized ministries often formulate policies 
without taking into consideration the impact on either other economic sectors (upstream and 
downstream industries and service sectors) nor consumers—the general equilibrium aspects are not 
fully understood or appreciated. This is perpetuated by the absence of adequate analysis of trade 
policy reform proposals and/or their impacts on different economic sectors and/or consumers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
121 
The Textiles Policy 2009-2014 publication under the heading “Tariff Rationalisation” (para 7.ld 6) formally 
engrains this policy by stating, “The principle of cascading will be implemented while ensuring adequate protection 
to the local industry and removing anomalies”. 
122 
The draft calls for raw material exports within the quota at zero rates (in quota) export tax, while exports in 
excess of the quota are charged at a higher (out of quota) export tax. Recent evidence of yarn and cotton export 
restrictions in 2009 and 2011 is symptomatic of this policy, giving credence to powerful lobby groups such as All 
Pakistan Textile Mills Association (APTIMA) and Pakistan Tanners Association (PTA). 
123 
The latest National Industrial Policy “Implementation Framework” states, for example, that “policies for 
industrialization cannot be pursued in isolation from trade policies and that the tariff policy and related decisions are 
in conformity with the industrialization strategy of the country.   The decisions on tariff restructuring of items 
relevant to industry should also be taken by the Board Industrial Policy Implementation Framework of the Ministry 
of Industries, pp. 27, http://www.moip.gov.pk/. 
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Box 6. Experience in Trade Reform 
 
 
While the countries of East Asia employed varying trade policy frameworks, a common outcome is that they 
substantially increased exports and are now active participants in the global trading environment. 
 
In South Korea and Taiwan, export incentives coexisted with protection of the domestic market. Success required 
offsetting the bias against exports from the inherent high domestic protection. South Korea in particular, used duty- 
drawback, indirect duty-drawback, and temporary admission to offset duties on imports. While duty drawbacks 
were useful for Korea, their effective operation requires high levels of administrative abilities, preventing many 
developing countries, including Pakistan, from taking full advantage of the system, in the way Korea did. Partly as a 
result, empirical evidence finds that drawback regimes are more likely to be welfare improving if the administrative 
cost of collection is low (Ianchovichina, 2005 pp 12). 
 
China and Mauritius adopted a two-track policy of development: import substitution based on temporary protection 
against imports, combined with an export orientation to open up to the world economy. Both actively promoted 
special economic zones for export development so that zones would allow duty free imported intermediates. Ther e 
has  been  mixed  results.  China’s  success  stands  in  stark  contrast  to  other  regions.  Privately-operated special 
economic zones that allow for export and domestic production have fared better. Zones are also a demonstration 
project from a more liberalized trade and investment regime. 
 
Chile, Hong Kong and Singapore are examples of economies that shed protectionist policies and non-tariff barriers. 
Hong Kong and Singapore, both small markets, established free-trade regimes, linking their domestic prices to 
international prices, with neutral incentives between producing for the domestic or international market. Both 
economies made export credit available, although they did not subsidize them. Chile took an intermediate path, 
adopting a uniform tariff that was gradually reduced over time. Hong Kong and Singapore have since “graduated” 
from manufacturing, moving their economies toward the provision of value-added services and research and 
development. 
 
Under uniform tariffs, exporters have equivalent incentives to those who produce for the home market, eliminating 
the anti-export bias and the need to manage a complicated regulatory regime. Chile, El Salvador, and the Kyrgyz 
Republic have successfully introduced tariff structures with very small dispersion, and Hong Kong, Estonia and 
Singapore have a uniform tariff of zero. Other countries, after pursuing two -track approaches—including Indonesia 
and Malaysia, and, later, Mauritius and Turkey — moved from high and dispersed tariff regimes to more unified 
rates. Export performances were greater following periods which gave their exporters equivalent incentives to those 
that produced for the home markets. What made such system work is an efficient bureaucracy, insulated from 
political pressure, sufficient to withstand rent-seeking and associated corruption. Experience suggests that most 
developing countries lack the kind of deep, efficient, non-corrupt bureaucracies that allow them to manage a 
complicated regulatory regime especially administering either a differentiated tariff system, duty drawback or 
efficient export subsidy system. The South Korean model has not been successfully replicated elsewhere. Such 
strategy in fact had disastrous consequences in those that followed (Weiss, 2002). 
 
The lessons above reflect many of the highlighted principles relevant for Pakistan: high and cascading tariffs raise 
domestic prices relative to export prices, and thereby provide incentives for businessmen or entrepreneurs to 
produce for the  home market and to ignore exports.  Exports are taxed through two channels: first, resource 
allocation channel and the other, protection cause an appreciation of the real exchange rate thereby making exports 
less attractive. Simple, transparent protection regimes with low uniform tariffs are the most effective way of 
stimulating trade and opening up an economy to the international market - through the use of a liberal trade regime, 
rather than through a complex structure of protection and export incentives. 
 
The lessons are that reforming trade, by reducing tariffs and trade distortions, is a prerequisite, but insufficient 
means of fully exploiting trade growth. Complementary policies, structures, and institutions aid trade and export 
growth, including measures to streamline behind-the-border institutions and policies, such as port efficiency and 
customs administration, as well as quality of infrastructure and regulatory environment. The World Bank’s Trade 
Strategy noted that “firm competitiveness and productivity such as access to efficiently-produced backbone services- 
countries where firms have to pay more than their competitors for energy, finance, telecommunications, customs 
services, transport, logistics, and business registration and operations, will find it increasingly hard to compete on 
global markets”. 
76  
CHAPTER IV: DOMESTIC FACTORS AFFECTING EXPORTS 
 
A.        The Overarching Challenges: Shocks, Stability and Scarcity 
 
202.    While many aspects of the country’s current challenge are indeed within the hands of 
policymakers, as describe below, many are not. Certainly, Pakistan’s perfect storm which continues 
to characterize the country’s fortunes, have roots in both types of events—exogenous to policy and 
endogenous.   In this final section, the exogenous factors are noted, followed by three current 
challenges to the goal of industrial and agricultural diversification—macroeconomic stability, power 
and water. 
 
1. The Plague of Recurrent External Shocks 
 
203.    A number of recent shocks have devastated various parts of Pakistani society at various 
times—the reverberations of which are still being felt in the country and will be for some time. These 
forces have been outside the control of the country’s policymakers. 
 
 The transfer of power from the military to the civilian leadership coincided with a large increase 
in the price of oil and also that of a number of other commodities—such a wheat and edible oil— 
that were important components in the import basket. 
 
 A  devastating  earthquake  in  2005  in  several  northeastern  districts  took  85,000  lives  and 
destroyed thousands of houses, hundreds of schools and clinics, scores of bridges and hundreds 
of kilometers of roads. While the military-led government did a credible job of dealing with the 
crisis, much remained to be done when the transfer of power took place. 
 
 Two years into its tenure, a “hundred year” flood took a heavy economic toll. While there were 
relatively few deaths, about one eighth of the population was displaced and lost the sources of 
their livelihood. The asset destruction was estimated at more than 6 percent of GDP. 
 
204.     The estimates of the direct and indirect cost of terrorism borne by Pakistan paints a grim 
picture of the situation. During the four years between 2005 and 2008, 4,818 terrorist acts were 
committed and over 11,000 people killed. These attacks have had both direct and indirect economic 
costs, estimated at a total loss of US$31.3 billion in the five year period between 2004 and 2009 that 
could be attributable to terrorism. GDP would have increased by between 1.25 to 1.5 percent a year 
in this period. The cost has risen steadily; it has increased from 4 percent of GDP in 2004-05 to 5.1 
percent in 2008-09. 
 
205.     Pakistan’s relations with the outside world have always been dictated by its fear of India. 
While India’s preoccupation with Pakistan declined, once its economy began to grow and came to be 
recognized as an emerging power, that was not the case in Pakistan.  The India-centric approach took 
Pakistan in many directions, including seeking alliances  with distant partners, including the US 
which has been deteriorating recently as relationships with India has been warming. 
 
2. Macroeconomic Management 
 
206.     The recent period of 2008-2012 started with the country in crisis. The economy was under 
stress due to the Government’s loosening of the purse strings. After a period of strong economic 
expansion, relative macroeconomic stability, and increased foreign investor confidence over the 
years 2003-2006, the country in 2008 faced a very different and serious set of strains and challenges. 
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The fiscal deficit had grown eightfold over the 2004-2008 period to reach 7.5 percent of GDP while 
the current account deficit shot up to US$14 billion in 2007-08 or 8.4 percent of GDP—financed not 
be foreign investment by a run down in foreign exchange reserves which fell from US$15.4 billion in 
November 2007 to US$6.5 billion a year later—less than two months of foreign exchange payments. 
Pakistan sought assistance from the IMF to avoid the major disruption in economic activity that 
would come from balance of payments crises. 
 
207.     The new government inherited a difficult economic situation.  Recognizing the need for fiscal 
reduction, it started the painful process of energy price adjustments, the scaling back of public 
development  expenditures  and  strengthening  incentives  for  agriculture  by  boldly increasing  the 
wheat support price. However, the situation continued to deteriorate and became grim in 2010. The 
economy stood at the edge of an abyss.  Rather than respond by continuing to foster the deep 
structural change the economy needed, the government chose to rely on large IMF flows to ride out 
the crisis. 
 
208.     Islamabad was not able to put in place the needed but long-postponed economic reforms. It 
dragged its feet on improving the fiscal situation by reforming the tax code—by increasing the tax 
base, bringing into the tax regime the sectors (such as agriculture) that had stayed out mostly for 
political reasons, and by levying some form of value added tax. Lack of progress in this area resulted 
in the suspension of the nearly US$4 billion of undisbursed amount from the IMF and later the 
decision by Islamabad in late 2011 to walk out of the program altogether, leaving the country facing 
a external account pressures which will become serious when the repayments to the Fund begin. 
 
209.     It is unlikely that the country will see its national product growing at much more than the 2.4 
percent increase in 2011. The most palpable result is that the rate of job growth will slow and the 
incidence of poverty will increase. While there are no firm numbers available, probably a third of the 
population—or 60 million people—live in abject poverty. To keep this number from increasing, 
Pakistan will need a growth rate twice as high as the rate of increase in population and three to four 
times as high to reduce it significantly. In other words, the country should be aiming at a rate of GDP 
increase of 6 to 8 percent a year. 
 
210.    To tackle the problem posed by the absence of adequate amounts of domestic resources, 
Pakistan needs to increase its tax to GDP ratio which, at 8.6 percent, is among the lowest in the 
world. To increase this ratio requires a tax system that is broad-based and free of loopholes, an 
effective tax collection agency, and willingness on the part of the well-to-do to pay their share into 
the coffers of the government. The share of sub-national governments in total resource mobilization 
by the state is only 5 percent for taxes and 8 percent for tax and non-tax revenues. 
 
3. Scarcity of Water 
 
211.     Pakistan is one of the world’s most arid countries with annual rainfall of less than 240 mm. 
At the same time agriculture is an important part of the economy, accounting in 2010 for over one- 
fifth of the GDP. Since the time of the British who invested heavily in tapping the Indus River 
system for irrigating the virgin lands of the Punjab and Sindh, irrigated agriculture has become an 
important  part  of  the  sector.  Over  80  percent  of  the  cropland  is  irrigated.  Most  of  Pakistan’s 
important crops—wheat, rice, cotton and sugar cane—rely on surface irrigation. As discussed below 
some of these would not be part of the farming pattern if water was properly priced.  The country 
receives an inflow of 104 million acre feet (MAF) of water from the Indus basin of which 64 MAF is 
used for agriculture, while the rest is lost to the Arabian Sea. 
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212.     The construction of a dam on the Indus at a Kalabagh in Khyber-Pakhtunkawa has met with 
great resistance from two provinces. Most experts regard the dam as an important part of the system 
that would maximize the use of water available in the rivers. The opposition comes from both 
Khyber-Pakhtunkawa province that would not like to lose the land that would come under water and 
Sindh that fears the further loss of the water in the Indus River to Punjab, the province that would 
benefit the most were this dam to be constructed. Pakistan currently lags behind other countries with 
major river systems in terms of water storage capacity. 
 
213.     Inefficient use of water that flows into the vast irrigation system that has been developed over 
time  presents  another  problem  the  country  must  deal  with  in  order  to  lay  the  ground  for  the 
economy’s rapid growth. From the annual flow of 141 MAF into the Indus system, about 106 MAF 
is diverted of which 96 percent is used for agriculture while 4 percent is consumed by industry and 
households. However, a significant part of the water that flows into the irrigation system is wasted – 
perhaps as much as 50 percent—because of antiquated design, poor maintenance, poorly leveled 
fields, and evaporation/seepage into the ground. The water that seeps into the ground is recovered by 
half a million tube wells that have been installed over the last 50 years.124 Ground water pumping has 
increased from 3.34 MAF n 1959 to 55 MAF in 2009. Tapping of this resource is done without 
regulation. The result is that there is “mining” of water with the amount extracted exceeding the 
amount of natural discharge. About 70 percent of the working tube wells are now producing hard or 
brackish water which is exacerbating the salinity problem. 
 
214.     Climate change is also affecting Pakistan’s water situation as glacier retreat is likely to have 
serious consequences for the availability of water as Pakistani rivers receive most of their water from 
melting ice. It is anticipated that Pakistan will be a serious “water constrained country” by 2025. The 
problems can be resolved by the adoption of appropriate public policies focused on the following 
areas: 
 
 A greater fiscal mobilization effort described above to maintain an antiquated irrigation 
system while increasing the storage capacity, including the construction of such large dams 
as the one at Kalabagh. Insufficient public sector investment in maintaining and developing 
water courses is an important contributor to water scarcity in the country. 
 
 Water pricing such that the price for water appropriately reflects the present and future 
scarcity value of this commodity. Farmers will have an incentive to level their fields to 
minimize the waste of water and will move away from cultivating such water-intensive crops 
as sugar cane. 
 
 A regulatory system that would watch over the use of water. For instance, the use of ground 
water for irrigation, manufacturing and domestic use is hardly regulated. The result is mining 
of water which is causing a sharp drop of the water table in many areas. To prevent the 
further deterioration of the situation, Pakistan’s policymakers need to install the right price 
regime which is properly supported by a regulatory system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124  
Tubewells developed as  an  important source  of  water  by  farmers  without support and  knowledge of  the 
government, as noted by Ghulam Muhammad, the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics in the mid 1960s. 
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4. Scarcity of Power 
 
215.     Electric power shortages averaged 4 to 5 hours per day and are contributing to significant 
economic stress. While distribution companies attempt to ration power supply based on the needs of 
the end users, most large firms still invest in self generation despite the high costs - estimated at two 
and a half times the cost of power obtained from the distribution companies. Other firms change 
hours of operation if they can. However, recovery rates are highest in industries which have acquired 
self-generation capabilities (at 85 percent), while other units lose about 73 percent of the output.”125 
One estimate is that load shedding was costing an equivalent of two percent of GDP.126 
 
216.     The share of domestic demand in the last decade doubled from 23 percent of the total in 
1980-81 to 46 percent in 2007-08. However, no significant new investments were made to generate 
additional power and mitigate the widening supply-demand gap.127 In the 1990s, Islamabad turned to 
the private sector—the Independent Power Producers, or IPPs—to invest in the energy sector to 
increase supply. The IPPs were offered rich returns by way of guaranteeing the price at which their 
output would be bought by the Water and Power and Development Authority (WAPDA). 
 
217.    However, the pricing policy for the purchase of output by the IPPs was not balanced by 
appropriate adjustments in tariffs for the consumers. This left a number of generating companies 
operators with unpaid bills by the distribution companies owned by WAPDA.  The IPPs , in turn held 
back payments to the companies that supplied fuel; the fuel suppliers curtailed their sale to the 
generating companies who then cut down on the amount of power produced. This problem came to 
be called the “circular debt problem”. On a number of occasions the government stepped in to write 
off the debt. Each time this was done, electricity generation increased, reducing the gap between 
supply and demand. 
 
B.        Economic Governance, Labor Policy and Access to Finance 
 
218.     The investment climate assessment provides the analytical framework for observing, first 
hand, at the firm level, constraints to the type of dynamics and flexibility which is needed for export 
diversification. Surveys and market information triangulate specific areas from three directions: (i) 
firm managers rankings regarding the severity of specific obstacles, (ii) empirically tested hypotheses 
relating investment climate variables to firm performance to uncover statistically significant 
relationships, and (iii) investment climate benchmarks compared across countries, against itself over 
time, and across provinces, sizes and industries. 
 
219.     The analysis reveals significant improvements in “first generation” reforms during the first 
part of the 2000s, such that those obstacles, which were significant at the beginning of the decade are 
now viewed as secondary.  The reported improvements in the business climate during the first half of 
the decade was based on lower concerns for the hassles associated with tax administration, labor 
regulations as well as customs and trade regulation and strong network benefits stemming from 
privatizing telecommunications and financial services.    Infrastructure (other than power), skilled 
labor, and business regulation were also not considered as constraints to business, but in these cases it is 
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Institute of Public Policy, State of the Economy: Emerging from the crises, Lahore, 2009, p. 69. 
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Ibid, p. 70. 
127 
The share of public sector expenditure on the power sector which averaged about 28 percent of the total in the 
two decades before the Musharraf period declined to less than 3 percent while he was in office. 
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more due to the low level equilibrium firms find themselves in, which prevents the sector from 
advancing and viewing the areas as constraints. 
 
220.     On the other hand, the removal of binding constraints from first generation reforms may have 
also raise more fundamental issues, such as electricity, water, corruption along with considerable 
concern for the macroeconomic and political uncertainty plaguing the business sector. Deteriorating 
conditions in macroeconomic stability, governance and the power sector have overwhelmingly been 
the most serious obstacles facing firms.128 Yet as discussed below, for trade and export diversification, 
the empirical analysis of firm productivity raises the possibility of a deeper duality in the transmission 
of  investment  climate  impacts  to  a  firm’s  productivity  and  export  competitiveness, 129  having 
important implications for new entry, deepening of the extensive margin and health export 
diversification. 
 
221.    While comparative productivity distributions over time show a promising decrease in the 
concentration of firms around low productivity levels, the productivity increases that were associated with 
investment climate improvements were transmitted through larger market share, formalized firms 
which are most likely to be the exporters of the country—as compared with the more informal 
smaller firms making up the bulk of Pakistan’s enterprise sector. In other words, aggregate productivity 
gains have been coming through the few firms with a high weight in the enterprise sector, as opposed to 
productivity gains across a large number of firms with low productivity exiting from the market, as is observed 
in countries such as Chile, Mexico and South Africa.130 
 
222.    Consistent with the firm level analysis of trade outcomes in Chapter II, market frictions exist, 
preventing convergence of productivity and firm level growth within the enterprise sector that is normally seen 
in dynamic economies. In Pakistan, large market share firms co-exist with smaller, less formal and lower 
productivity firms, producing at low level equilibriums, signally barriers to entry and exit as well as 
hindrances to firm level growth possibilities by smaller firms. 
 
223.     Though the production function approach makes it difficult to untangle competitiveness 
based on efficiency from market power and profits based on tax, pricing or concessions, certainly 
growth limiting market frictions exist from poor contract enforcement, limited domestic markets, 
entry and exit barriers, and regulatory aspects of firm level governance.  Global evidence supported 
here is that improvements in these areas would help the small and medium firms the most. 
 
224.     The  analysis  also  highlights  the  transmission  of  the  investment  climate  to  improved 
productivity and export competitiveness. While infrastructure, economic governance, finance, labor and 
innovation all play an important role in firm level performance, various aspects of these investment 
climate dimensions affect different firm groups in different ways depending in part, on the specific 
nature of the firm. Variables which reflect more formality (sales reported to taxes, court usage, 
having a bank account and working capital finance from banks) are positively associated with export 
competitiveness, regardless of the size. 
 
 
 
 
128 
Between 2002 and 2007 the share of firms considering power as a major constraint rose from less than 40 percent 
to 80 percent. Similarly, despite spending less time on regulation compliance, managers considered that the 
prevalence of corruption was high and rising. 
129 
In this discussion, firm level productivity is taken as the key to trade competitiveness and a firm’s ability to 
introduce new products, processes, and other innovations – the underpinning to health export diversification. 
130 
Pakistan eenterprise surveys, 2002, 2007 and 2010 were analyzed for this section. 
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225.     Specifically, positive aspects of the investment climate such as access to finance, innovation, 
and skills training were transmitted through large market share firms to export competitiveness. The 
enterprise sector as a whole, does not identify constraints in these areas as high priority, reflecting the 
low level demand for these services by the bulk of firms. However, the larger export oriented firms 
which do need these inputs, claim a significant deficiency in access to them. 
 
226.     Conversely,  variables  with  a  negative  impact  on  firm’s  competitiveness  such  as  power 
outages, internal or informal finance and concentrated shareholding, are transmitted principally 
through smaller market share firms.  Similarly, the variables which relate to firms’ ability to cope 
with these negative impacts on business (own power generation, security expenses, location in 
industrial zone, large inventory) are associated with productivity and employment with the positive 
impact dominated by large firms. As the analysis underscores concerns regarding deeper areas of 
governance reform, the deficiencies in predictable, transparent and effective systems to protect 
property rights and enforce contracts suppress arm’s length business relationships, risk taking, and 
innovation, while constraining firm entry, exit, formality and growth. 
 
227.     While the impact of various investment climate variables on productivity is relatively robust 
across provinces and firm size, firms’ perceptions across provinces show notable differences, which 
have much to do with governance, land availability and power sector issues.  The service sector, in 
the area of domestic trade is smaller and more informal, is markedly different as compared with 
manufacturing. As compared with manufacturing, there is more emphasis on economic governance 
than infrastructure and finance—particularly in those areas which represent business-government 
interface and manager’s time on regulation. 
 
228.     The policy analysis is based on an analytical framework for prioritizing areas of investment 
climate constraints for devoting various types of attention. In some key areas, such as power, labor, 
tax, business entry, licensing and financial sector a considerable number of reforms are ongoing and 
require deepening, but in others, deep seeded and entrenched areas of governance reform require 
attention to unleash constraints to firm level growth. Such governance issues include rising concerns 
about corruption, the need to better define and protect property rights, speedier and more certain 
contract enforcement, better regulation of markets, and the elimination of biases in the system against 
large, formal industrial firms in terms of tax, energy pricing, credit allocation, etc. 
 
229.     The  analytical  framework  underscores  the  priority  of  having  good  macro,  trade  and 
competition policy in place while focusing attention on critical investment climate areas. As the 
economy undergoes a strenuous adjustment to past policy conflicts and current market turmoil, the 
authorities place macroeconomic management and a strong safety net at the top of the policy agenda 
while maintaining a commitment to an open, competitive trade and foreign investment regime. To 
sustain these goals over the medium term, a strong investment climate is needed and return to a 
strong growth path, deeper analysis and policy recommendations are made along the following four 
areas: 
 
 Removal of infrastructure constraints particularly in the energy sector. The power sector’s 
inadequacies have damaged manufacturing growth with supply constraints reaching a critical 
point. Unlike other areas where differences exist across size groups, sectors and geographic 
areas, there is universal agreement regarding the primacy of the power sector issues as an 
investment  climate  constraint.  In  addition,  the  notable  improvements  in  telecoms  and 
logistics remain undervalued by an aging and inefficient transport system. 
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 Strengthened  governance  of  market  mechanisms.  Though  improving  in  recent  years, 
antiquated laws, regulatory compliance and red tape at various levels of government are still 
problematic, burdensome and costly. More importantly are areas related to corruption in 
business-government interface, property right protection and contract enforcement, speedier 
and  more  certain  mechanism  for  corporate  exit and elimination  of biases in  tax,  labor, 
financial and energy pricing which hinder the incentive to grow and formalize. 
 
 Increased depth and improved functioning in labor, land and financial markets. Though 
firms consider access to these factors less of an issue than other constraints such as electricity 
or governance, the analysis points to a low level equilibrium in these areas. In the case of 
labor markets, low skills are only a problem for the few firms which have an educated labor 
force. In finance, large established firms have access to standard relationship banking, but 
new entrants are shut out. Risk based or capital market products are non-existent. 
 
 Attention to firm level technology adaptation and the role of public private partnerships 
(PPPs) in spearheading progress. The low level of technology used by Pakistan firms has at 
its core both demand and supply side issues. In addition to infrastructure, PPPs should be 
investigated, as applied to public goods in cluster development, environmental and social 
standards, technology upgrading and quality assurance. New, risk based financial products 
are also required to support entrepreneurship and innovation. 
 
C.        Providing Basic Infrastructure for Commerce 
 
230.     High  quality  and  reliable  infrastructure  access  to  electricity,  water,  transport  and  trade 
facilities is a key component of economic competitiveness, and a central pillar of a conducive 
investment climate, requiring attention at all levels of government and the private sector as important 
infrastructure dimensions of competitiveness. Business losses due to power failures, insufficient 
water supply, inefficient transport services, and delays at ports significantly impact costs and risks 
for firms, create impediments for opportunities and compromise investment interest.  The  recent 
Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 20011-12 ranks Pakistan at a modest 87 out of 133 in terms 
of Quality of Infrastructure – after Sri Lanka (63), higher than other South Asian countries including 
India (89) and Bangladesh (125).  It also masks higher rankings in rail (51), roads (65), ports (73) and 
air (76).  More than these needed improvements, power is the immediate issue. 
 
231.     The power sector in particular, has proved to be a major bottleneck for the economy and a serious 
threat to overall competitiveness. The GCR ranked Pakistan 124 in terms of the overall quality of 
electricity supply in 2009-10, far below the overall infrastructure rank of 87 cited above. Inordinate delays 
in obtaining new power connections significantly impede the ease of entry for new businesses while 
seriously constraining existing firms in planning business expansions. Even firms with access to 
electricity face high costs and highly unreliable supply of power with frequent outages, disproportionately 
affecting firms in different regions. Relative to comparators, firms in Pakistan suffer the most severe 
financial losses due to power interruptions, with small firms and the textiles sector bearing the highest 
losses. It is difficult to generalize about prices of electricity relative to other South Asian countries given 
the amount of technical, collection and efficiency losses in the system. Cross subsidization by industry to 
households also complicates pricing calculations and imposes a strain on the sector’s sustainability. 
 
232.     Growth in electricity consumption in recent years has exceeded earlier projections with this 
demand pattern expected to continue with high growth for next few years. Currently planned 
investments are unlikely to suffice. New investments will be required to enhance generation capacity. 
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Increasing energy efficiency and diversifying the available energy mix will help. The power sector 
will have to be made financially sustainable to enable better maintenance and future expansion. 
There is also need to make structural reforms and adjust the regulatory framework to enhance 
effective corporate governance in the sector. The GOP has also been wrestling with how best to 
encourage more private sector participation and investment to meet the generation gaps in this sector. 
 
233.     Pakistan’s transport sector is operational but inefficient with expensive ports, unreliable rail, 
poorly maintained roads, stagnant aviation, and under-developed logistics. The relatively high costs, 
slow turnaround and low reliability of transport constitutes a drag on Pakistan's economic growth, 
reducing the competitiveness of the country's exports, and constraining the ability of the country to 
integrate into global supply chains. Policies that reduce transport costs, ensure safety in mobility, and 
enhance regional connectivity by creating greater synergy between the rural, provincial and federal 
transport infrastructure will help to increase Pakistan’s competitiveness, raise its share of world trade 
and foster regional integration.   A better transport and facilitation sector will also bring about 
structural changes in the industrial and services base through better economic mix, value addition and 
job creation. 
 
234.     Pakistan has devoted considerable resources and effort to improving trade logistics which 
have borne fruit, both in terms of concrete outcomes and firm perceptions. As a compliment to the 
significant reduction in tariffs and border taxes that have led to a significant increase in trade volume, 
the GOP has taken important steps to improve the time and cost for clearing trade shipments, 
particularly  at  the  Karachi  Port,  through  simplified  procedures,  paperless,  electronic  clearance 
systems and linkages with banks. The result has been a model of reform that has reduced the time 
between clearance and exit from the port from about 7-1/2 days to 1 day or less. Now, with the 
exception of firms in NWFP where the issue is more domestic transport to ports and airports, rather 
than trade logistics per se, managers no longer consider customs and trade to be a significant 
obstacle. 
 
235.     The infrastructure challenge is particularly acute with respect to water. Competition for water is 
growing among the provinces and across the varied needs for irrigation, industrial and domestic use, and 
the environment. Due to the nature of its production process, the food sector is the most water- 
constrained. Quality and reliability of water supply are bigger issues for firms in Pakistan compared to 
access and the GOP needs a sustainable and long term strategy to address maintenance and development 
of assets in this sector. As investment is severely constrained in the water sector despite high returns, 
nontraditional methods for financing infrastructure involving the domestic and foreign private sector, 
securitization and privatization of existing assets, and PPPs can be explored. 
 
236.     The GOP’s reforms in telecommunications have resulted in impressive growth for the sector 
and made it the least constraining infrastructure obstacle for firms in the country. Both line and 
mobile  penetration  have  increased  nationwide,  particularly  in  rural  areas.  The  increasingly 
competitive environment has driven down tariff rates that are now among the lowest in the world. 
However, in contrast to the very high level of voice penetration, internet adoption in the country is 
very low by international standards.  One reason is that the telecommunication policy and ICT policy 
have been driven separately and thus are headed in different directions – a looming problem as the 
country prepares for 4G and rural role outs. 
 
237.     The private sector’s involvement in provision of infrastructure services is sporadic and far 
behind  the  neighboring  countries.  Pakistan  has  had  significant  success  in  attracting  private 
investments in the telecommunications sector in the 1980s and the power sector in the 1990s and 
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aims to deepen that success while broadening to other infrastructure areas such as transport & 
logistics, water supply, effluent treatment, and irrigation. Progress to date includes a legal framework 
for PPP, the establishment of the Infrastructure Projects Development Facility (IPDF) and the recent 
adoption of a PPP policy.  The next steps, on the public side, would be a more specific institutional, 
set up with clarity on public management at the IPDF and related agencies, of the (i) deal making 
process, (ii) legal and operational risks, and (iii) financial obligations and contingencies. The 
provincial governments, specifically the Government of Punjab is also working toward developing a 
comprehensive PPP framework, and plans model transactions in power, waste management, toll 
roads, and others. On the private side, the mobilizing of domestic resources to invest in such new 
PPP type of vehicles will create major demands for financial sector deepening and corporate sector 
transparency. 
 
238.    With regard to the way forward, an urgent and aggressive redoubling of reform efforts 
throughout the infrastructure is required. Higher rates of investment, for example through a fully 
developed and tested PPP system, as described above are needed to generate additional electricity, 
relieve power shortages and prevent load-shedding. On the demand side, power efficiency needs to 
be encouraged through price and non-price means. The sector needs to continue to strive for financial 
sustainability to enable better maintenance and future expansion while the tariff structure needs to 
create as much as a level playing field as possible for all users to make the right decisions.   In the 
long run, energy mix diversification should be a key strategic element. 
 
239.     In terms of non-power infrastructure, the urgency is lower but no less needed to ensure that 
Pakistan can compete in a global environment. The National Trade Corridor Investment Project 
(NTCIP), as the medium-term policy framework for the transport sector, has recorded some early 
gains but progress is needed to address the transport sector’s main beneficiaries. A small success, 
such as scaling up the customs pilot, is an urgent, straightforward and achievable goal to get started. 
In the water sector, the Government needs a sustainable and long-term strategy to address 
maintenance and development of assets. In telecommunications, the regulatory framework and 
telecom policy need to keep pace with the fast-changing dynamics of market evolution. 
 
D.        Strengthening Economic Governance through Better Regulation 
 
240.     Business  regulation  has  become  less  intrusive  over  the  past  decade,  but  deep  seeded 
institutional  factors  remain  a  hindrance  to  a  more  conducive  business  environment.  While  the 
country  has  done  reasonably  well  by  international  standards  in  achieving  a  less  burdensome 
regulatory environment, it has lagged behind with respect to protection of private property rights, 
corruption, quality of judiciary, and the law and order situation. These factors affect the economic 
governance of markets, business relationships and are important determinants of productivity.  In the 
productivity analysis, for instance, statistically relevant governance variables affecting both average 
and aggregate productivity include “sales reported for taxes”, “gifts to tax inspectors,” “payments to 
obtain government contracts,” “losses associated with crime and expenses on security,” as well as 
“the use of courts for conflict settlement.” 
 
241.     On the regulatory front, the GOP’s efforts at lowering hurdles for business have had a positive 
impact on firm productivity and enterprise perceptions of the investment climate. In the 2009 Doing 
Business rankings, Pakistan ranked 77th in the world in the composite index of 10 indicators—the best 
for South Asia, apart from the Maldives.  At the same time, firm managers report much less time dealing 
with regulations as compared to other countries and indeed compared to Pakistani managers only five 
years ago.  Notably, tax administration which was the second ranked obstacle in 2002 when half of firms 
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consider it a major obstacle, was in 2007 the eighth most important. Similarly, the various efforts to 
improve interface with labor inspectors at the provincial level and better customs administration at the 
ports has also had a positive impact. The challenge now is to deepen the effort on the business regulation 
front at the federal level and involve more directly provincial and district level government to streamline 
and unify systems nationwide. 
 
242.     On  the  institutional  front,  difficult  challenges  remain  as  notable  improvement  requires 
sustained, long term efforts across a number of fronts. The perception that the quality of courts are an 
obstacle is expressed by over 36 percent of Pakistani firms compared with approximately 20 percent 
in comparator countries. This is especially so for sectors such as chemicals which require long-term 
investments. Firm-perceptions about court speed are reasonably good in Pakistan but lag far behind 
other countries in impartiality and affordability of courts and especially in the enforcement of court 
decisions. 
 
243.     Crime and security is not as big a problem as corruption in Pakistan but a third of firms 
perceive it to be a serious obstacle. Expenses on security far exceed losses due to crime in Pakistan, 
and there is a wide variation among firms—based on size, location and sector of operation—on 
crime-related expenses and losses. Industrial zones solve many of the infrastructure, agglomeration 
and indeed law and order type of problems but have failed to provide a corruption-free environment. 
The number of firms reporting corruption as a major obstacle to business rose from 40 percent in 
2002 to 57 percent in 2007 and was even higher for firms which had interface with tax and labor 
officials, applied for utility connections or licenses, or received financial support from the 
government. 
 
244.     Though  Pakistani  firms do  not  express serious concern about the competition  from  the 
informal sector, informality is nonetheless a challenge to global competitiveness. Informality is often 
defined as avoiding regulations, using informal factor markets – land, labor and finance and/or just 
being small since business laws cover only firms with more than 10 employees. In Pakistan, the 
incentives to be informal in some way are enormous, given the difficulty in enforcement and the high 
burden on formal firms. The result is that firm size remains small, outlook stays local – avoiding 
arms  length  transactions  with  suppliers,  banks  and  customers,  and  managers  lack  incentive  to 
augment quality or train labor.  As global experience suggests that imposing major constraints creates 
incentives for businesses to remain informal, good regulatory administration can positively influence 
the degree of informality in Pakistan. 
 
245.     Applying a sound regulatory system and non-distorting product and factor market policies 
will eventually reduce the incentive for and degree of informality in the system. In the short run, 
progress in the area of business regulation has had demonstrated effects on the perceptions and 
efficiency of the business community. However, the performance – for example in business taxation 
– has not reflected improved administration and collection performance, just less hassle on business. 
Therefore, more effective administration also requires improved policies – in this case, biases which 
prevent more neutral application of the tax code across activities. 
 
246.    In the end, free entry, good resource allocation and buoyant firm level growth requires 
strengthened property rights, enforced contracts and speedy dispute resolution. To ease corporate 
entry,  further streamlining of business licensing and property registration areas can be pursued 
through automation and business process engineering. Reform of some key business regulations 
requires an effort to encourage provincial authorities to engage in process analysis and re- 
engineering. The legal framework for companies requires a comprehensive revision, particularly of 
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those aspects dealing with insolvency and liquidation. Finally, a good investment climate requires 
more  than  the  removal  of  immediate  constraints—it  also  needs  to  improve  public-private 
cooperation. With the exception of firms in the textiles and sports goods, few others in Pakistan 
participate in a public-private dialogue. 
 
E.        Achieving Flexible Labor Markets and Enhancing Skills 
 
247.     A key challenge to the investment climate is how to enhance skills levels and capture the 
returns to education. A more flexible legislative framework for labor markets is needed to increase 
autonomy  of  firm  decisions  about  hiring  and  firing  while  providing  adequate  levels  of  labor 
protection and safety. The Pakistani labor market contains a large informal sector while another large 
share of the workforce, particularly in manufacturing, holds temporary jobs and works on short contracts. 
In contrast with the large proportion of service sector firms, few manufacturing businesses in the country 
provide formal training to their employees.  This is on top of the fact that more than half of the country’s 
workers have less than three years of education. 
 
248.    Despite low levels of education and a rigid labor code, firm managers in Pakistan do not 
perceive skills, quality of workforce or labor laws to constrain business. This perception does not 
correlate with actual data and analysis which shows that returns to business increase with 
progressively higher levels of education. In addition, according to Doing Business indicators on labor 
market rigidity, Pakistan ranks poorly – worse than Bangladesh, Chile, the Philippines, South Africa, 
Thailand and Turkey. The primary reason for the distinction is weak enforcement, as firms are able 
to find ways to circumvent strict regulations, such as hiring temporary workers or participating in 
informal labor markets (e.g., hiring through third parties). 
 
249.     Strict labor legislation combined with weak enforcement has many adverse implications for the 
fluidity of labor market and the incentives to invest in training. These practices may hamper employment 
growth in the long run as they increase labor market inefficiency and limit the mobility of workers. For 
example, when term contracts are limited in scope and duration and constrained autonomy is granted to 
firms with regard to hiring and firing decisions, the working of the formal labor market is severely 
restricted, as it is in Pakistan. In addition, the adjudication mechanism for firing or retrenching involving 
provincial Labor Tribunals is complex, making outcomes uncertain. Finally, despite mandated benefit 
packages for workers, the high taxes are avoided by hiring labor through informal channels.  Since the 
benefits do not effectively accrue to workers, they are not demanded.  Therefore due to legislated 
restrictions on hiring, judicial challenges to firing, and expensive mandated benefits, many firms in 
Pakistan hire temporary workers to increase autonomy and flexibility while reducing costs. 
 
250.     In terms of the way forward, these study’s findings point to a need for strengthened education 
and  improved  legislative  underpinnings  for  labor  market  fluidity.  Strengthening  the  public  and 
private provision of the education system is a fundamental necessity for promoting innovation and 
improving productivity. Providing incentives to increase firm training and foster transferable skills 
among workers is important to promote innovations and enhance firm productivity and requires a 
major labor code reform which is now underway. The first major steps have been taken in terms of 
the legislative process, with a pipeline of major activities about to be launched. In addition, the 
enforcement of these combined federal laws will require reforms of the inspection regime which 
ensures minimized red-tape, bureaucratic hassles and extra costs on businesses. Developing a labor 
inspection policy framework to reorganize and streamline labor inspection services, and eliminating 
corruption during inspection, should go a long way towards encouraging more employment in the 
country’s formal sector. 
87  
F.         Expanding Corporate Access to Finance 
 
251.     The financial sector in Pakistan is dominated by banking activity which was bolstered by 
deep and fundamental reforms in banking initiated over the past decade.  In addition to the banking 
sector being one of the fastest growing and most profitable in the region, it remains relatively sound 
and appears to have been surprisingly resilient in the face of macroeconomic challenges faced by the 
economy over the past two years.  Stress testing in the summer of 2008 showed pockets of weakness, 
but generally revealed resiliency in the financial structures. In examining the impact of terms and 
conditions associated with credit products on credit usage, it is seen that lending rates have been low in 
real terms as are processing fees. However, the terms of loans are much shorter and loan sizes larger in 
comparison with other countries. Bank requirements for collaterals against loans are higher compared 
to global competitors. 
 
252.     In addition to its safety and soundness concerns, efforts to encourage more diversity in bank 
lending have been a policy goal of the State Bank for some time. Corporate lending has remained the 
primary business at almost two thirds of the banks’ lending portfolio but access to financial services 
and products by non-corporate clients remains low compared to countries with similar income levels. 
Beginning with efforts to expand into consumer lending in the early part of the decade and to 
encourage SME lending in the form of specialized prudential and regulatory norms, SBPs efforts 
have had a positive result in terms of the stated goals. Such efforts have helped in this respect but, as 
a percentage of total lending, the share of SME finance has decreased from 2004 through 2007 as 
firms have remained focused on large groups and consumer lending.  The State Bank is also look for 
increased activity in longer term activities by bans, such as in the area of housing and infrastructure 
finance. 
 
253.     Financial sector reforms have had a significant positive impact at the firm level but have a 
long way to go to increase the financial deepening needed to support growth. The domestic firms’ 
perception that access to finance as a major obstacle to the investment climate has reduced 
considerably between 2002 and 2007 and what was the 5th ranked obstacle is now ranked 9th. At the 
same time, the productivity analysis shows that access to bank financing is associated with higher 
productivity with the line of causation likely going in both directions. However, non- “blue chip” 
companies still find it challenging to secure finance and rely instead on retained earnings to finance 
working capital and investment needs. As a result, trade credit plays a smaller role in working capital 
financing as compared to other countries. The predominant reason cited by firms of all sizes is lack 
of access of own decisions to opt out of the formal credit market for a number of reasons.   As a 
result, the financial outreach to businesses in Pakistan is limited, with small and medium firms 
showing significantly lower rates of credit usage as compared to large firms. 
 
254.     Gaps and deficiencies in the institutional framework limit the propensity to lend and borrow. 
Such gaps include the enforceability of legal and contractual rights of lenders and borrowers, 
prudential regulations and supervision which encourages banks to diversify their lending while 
maintaining sound and prudent lending practices and more extensive use of credit information. 
Therefore, burdensome requirements for risk management, lack of transparency for credit decisions and 
prudential regulations that allow banks to focus on large, known groups, may be among the factors 
driving low credit use by firms other than the known big players. Improvements in these institutional 
areas will enable greater outreach, more tailored products and better terms of lending. 
 
255.     In terms of the way forward, a range of reforms is needed to increase the depth and outreach 
of finance. Prudential regulations allowing high concentration on single party and single group 
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exposure should be made consistent with international norms. Reconciliation and strengthening of 
the  supervisory  role  of  the  State  Bank  of  Pakistan  (SBP)  and  the  Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan (SECP), including jurisdictional clarity in some cases is needed to ensure 
the sector’s safety and soundness and encourage financial deepening. Strengthening the enforcement 
of  contracts  is  paramount  to  increasing  financial  access  by  fostering  arms-length  transactions 
between firms and between lenders and firms. In particular, reforming collateral systems and 
establishing a national internet-based filing archive of security interests in movable collaterals would 
allow firms of all sizes to better exploit their productive assets to secure credit. In addition to 
moveable collateral, better enforcement of ownership rights when it comes to land titling is an urgent 
but difficult area.  While greater access and outreach to individuals could have a multiplier effect on 
enterprise finance, outreach would also be fostered by improving and deepening credit information 
systems in order to lower perceived risk. 
 
G.        Absorbing Technology and Fostering Corporate Innovation 
 
256.     In the present global environment, higher rates of technological absorption, better organizational 
methods and faster innovation are essential for firms to compete. The current competitive environment 
for products in Pakistan’s specialization consists of access to global value chains, shortened product life 
cycles, and for more differentiation in product design and development.  Yet in spite of significant 
deregulation and privatization initiated in the 1980s, the Pakistan economy remains burdened by 
many inefficiently run enterprises and an industrial structure dominated by low technology products. 
Despite ample opportunities to develop local information technology (IT) and IT enabled services 
(ITES) industries, the indications are that most Pakistani firms have not yet embraced IT for use in 
their own daily business activities. 
 
257.     Innovation can be obtained through absorption of own produced technological advance and 
by acquiring already produced technology and adapting it to local conditions. In terms of own 
produced technology, research and development (R&D) activity in Pakistan is dominated by the 
Government without the complementary private sector R&D investments needed to foster 
commercially viable innovations. The number of firms applying for patents, innovating via the 
introduction of new products, or upgrading existing product lines is very low in Pakistan. The U.S., 
among others, has demonstrated how technology often geared for military uses, has found its way to 
commercial applications, but there was a heavy need for private R&D in the process of conversion. 
Pakistan has also been unable to attract off shoring R&D activities by multinational firms, primarily 
due to a poor investment climate for protection of investor rights and a lack of relevant educational 
attainments in its workforce. 
 
258.     On the other hand, of greater concern is the fact that Pakistan does not seem to access existing, 
readily available technology through trade, FDI and licensing. High-technology represents an increasing 
but very low share of Pakistan’s total manufacturing exports and imports. Low technology goods, mostly 
textiles, make the bulk (more than 75 percent) of the exports while nearly all segments of the textile 
sector, from cotton cultivation to manufacturing of garments, lack modern technology—compared to 
competitors such as Indonesia, Korea and Turkey which have used the latest technologies to help capture 
and sustain global export market shares. At the same time, net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP in 
Pakistan have been increasing steadily but are lower than those in other comparator countries with 
recent events in the country causing the bottom to fall out of foreign investment market. 
 
259.     Traditional forms of technology transfer are not being used to the extent possible and could 
be more aggressively pursued by all parties. Alliances and joint ventures could be used more to 
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transfer technology as is licensing as a traditional technology transfer mechanism for firms in 
developing countries.  As Pakistani firms are far behind in obtaining quality certification of the type 
attractive to international partners, one approach would be for the Government to encourage the 
adoption of industrial standards to promote quality upgrading, enhancing competition, and diffuse 
technology. 
 
260.     Governments at all levels can play a vital role in creating incentives for firms to invest in 
riskier technologies as well as crowding in investments that serve a public role. As Pakistan pursues 
technology transfer and absorption, it is critical for policymakers to keep in mind the importance of the 
sequence of efforts.  Such a sequencing approach should be integral to the overarching science and 
technology policy in order to provide clear strategic focus for strengthening the incentive regime to 
better foster innovations and encourage firms to internalize productivity gains from local and global 
innovation spillovers.  This will require first, a conducive investment climate based on appropriate 
returns to risk, availability of corporate and risk based finance, such as venture capital, a competitive 
environment and the provision of quality infrastructure, including power, transportation and 
communications. Second, an enabling environment for risk taking may require focus on creating 
stronger regulatory and enforcement framework for electronic data protection, intellectual property 
rights (IPR), and cyber crime as well as a sound judicial system to enforce them. Finally, necessary 
public goods should be developed such as skills development, quality certification by a recognized 
accreditation agency and standard upgrading to promote exports. 
 
261.     More  directed  actions  may  also  be  appropriate  to  strengthen  Pakistan’s  stance  as  a 
knowledge-based economy. For example, as noted above, adopting new technologies will require 
investment in new skill development, which due to the lead time involved and the spillover impact, 
may be subsidized by the public sector, facilitated through directed programs at Diaspora and 
supported by investment in polytechnic institutions. Narrowing the technology gap also requires that 
considerable resources be directed towards specific infrastructure development in order to raise the 
currently low penetration of the broadband network. Bridging institutions like incubators, science and 
technology parks and technology transfer centers can be focal points for PPPs to directly facilitate local 
innovation.  Finally  as  the  development  of  knowledge  transfer  linkages  between  industry  and 
academia remains a major challenge for Pakistan, technology adoption schemes financed through 
matching grants could be powerful tools to kick-starting innovation. 
 
H.        Trade Facilitation and Logistics for Exports 
 
262.     The GOP has long identified transport and trade logistics as bottlenecks to sustained export 
performance and diversification. As trade logistics involves the working of various pieces of a 
system, this chapter looks at measures of performance, quality of services and degree of integration 
of the logistics system as a whole to identify the main areas of concern. Generally, the South Asia 
neighborhood as a region lagged behind most regions, only surpassing Sub-Saharan Africa. South 
Asia fared in line with its per capita income, performing marginally better than the low income 
country group. Based on the 2010 Logistics Performance data, Pakistan’s logistics performance 
trailed Bangladesh and India and the global average (Figure 43). 
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Figure 43. Logistics Performance, 2010 
 
Regional Comparisons Country Comparisons 
 
 
 
Source: PRMTR, 2011 
 
 
263.     Pakistan’s core  transport and  logistics system  supports trade  in  various commodities of 
varying cost, time and reliability sensitivities, ranging from agricultural products to electrical and 
other manufactured products, but services are of low quality when compared to countries of similar 
levels of income. In the main, the LPI data point to weaknesses in Pakistan’s performance in 
infrastructure, customs and logistics competence (Figures 44 and 45). 
 
Figure 44. Pakistan’s Comparative Figure 45. Logistics Performance Index, 2010 
 
Compared to India Compared to Global Average 
 
 
 
Source: Text 
 
 
 
1. Road Transport and the National Transport Corridor Improvement Program 
 
264.     Road transport is the dominant mode of overland transport in Pakistan, accounting for more 
than 80 percent of cargo volumes shipped, most of which is over a National Trade Corridor. 131 The 
core network of highways, now some 1930 km, is being extended under the NTCIP with new 
restricted access motorways being constructed. The main artery, connecting Karachi to Lahore and 
 
 
131 
The NTC network is the north-south corridor through the center of the country and is comprised of the two ports 
in Karachi, the highways and railways linking them to Islamabad, Lahore and Peshawar, the four major airports 
serving in the main centers, the various dry ports and the Pakistan/Afghanistan border post at Torkham. 
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other centers to the north is 1760 km long and carries over 55 percent of the country's inter-city 
traffic. The other national highways include the Indus Highway, the RCD Highway and the 
Karakoram Highway. Nearly two-thirds of the network is in poor condition. This is primarily due to 
inadequate maintenance made worse by overloading and the shift of traffic from rail to road. 
 
265.     The NTC is the single most important trade and transport system in the country, handling 
more than 95 percent of Pakistan’s external trade, 65 percent of total land freight and serves regions 
of the country that contribute 80 to 85 percent of GDP. The NTC connects Pakistan’s major gateways 
for trade which are in the south and the key economic centers in the center and northern parts of the 
country. The greatest concentration of economic activity takes place along the corridor, along the 
Peshawar-Islamabad-Rawalpindi-Lahore road and a portion of Lahore—Karachi road. The Pakistan 
National Trade and Transport Facilitation Committee (NTTFC) was created in 2001 initially to 
implement a trade facilitation program financed by the World Bank. It was established under the 
Ministry  of  Commerce  with   the   Pakistan   Shippers  Council   providing  secretariat   services. 
Membership of the NTTFC is made up of both public and private sector representatives and includes 
various government ministries, industry associations and the main modes of transport (road, sea, air, 
railways). The NTTFC seeks primarily to promote reforms to improve trade facilitation environment 
in the country. Its terms of reference are: 
 
 Continuous review of trade and transport procedures and systems with a view to update their 
simplification and harmonization. 
 
 Undertake coordination of efforts of concerned organizations in the field of facilitation of 
international trade and transport. 
 
 Collect  and  disseminate  information  on  international  trade  and  transport  formalities, 
procedures, documentation and related mailers. 
 
 Pursue the simplification and alignment of trade and transport documents on the basis of 
United Nations layout key, including documents designed for use in computer and other 
automated systems. 
 
 Promote  the  adoption  of  the  standard  trade  and  transport  standard  terminology  and 
international codes for trade and transport information. 
 
266.     The NTTFC has invested considerable energy on trying to improve the legal framework for 
trade facilitation and logistics in Pakistan. Though some progress has been made in this regard, it is 
also apparent that the body lacks the power to bring its initiatives to fruition. This is despite the fact 
that it is dominated by public sector borders, which would have been expected to more easily 
influence  policy.  Perhaps  this  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  NTTFC  activities  lack  the  practical 
orientation that a more focused body would bring. As discussed below, there are prospects that a 
regulatory authority proposed for the logistics services sector may help overcome this constraint. The 
NTTFC would then be a stakeholder consultation forum and a performance monitoring body, relying 
on data from both the public and private sectors. 
 
267.     A National Transport Corridor Improvement Program (NTCIP) was launched in 2005 as a 
major initiative to reduce the costs of trade by reduce or eliminate bottlenecks and improving the 
performance of the national system for transport and logistics services.132 The NTCIP was conceived 
 
132 
Analysis estimated the cost of inadequate transport at 4 to 6 percent of GDP per year. (SASD, 2008). 
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as a comprehensive multi-sector reform and investment effort covering the streamlining of transport 
and logistics procedures, improving services and upgrading physical infrastructure in railways, roads, 
ports, airports and logistics (Table 21). 
 
Table 21. Key Components of the National Trade Corridor in Pakistan 
Component of the NTCIP Description 
Roads 955 km of highways linking Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar 
Railways Main line railway from Karachi to Peshawar via Lahore 
Ports Karachi and Qasim 
Airports All major airports 
Dry Ports Lahore, Faisalabad, Lahore, Islamabad, etc 
Border Posts Torkham with Afghanistan 
 
268.     Karachi sits at the core of the NTCIP as it is the transport and logistics node, handling more 
than 90 percent of trade. Though Karachi is already well established as the gateway for national 
trade, its success as a regional gateway would depend on improving the performance of its seaports 
and air transport services. One objective of the NTCIP is to develop Pakistan as a regional logistics 
hub, serving neighboring countries as well as transit traffic along the major east-west international 
maritime  transport  lane.  Some  of  the  proposals  in  the  NTCIP  are  clearly  aimed  at  such 
improvements. Among others, the key policy areas targeted by NTCIP include policies that would: 
(i) lead to modern and streamlined trade and transport logistics practices; and (ii) improve port 
efficiency, reduce the costs for port users and enhance port management accountability. Still, for 
Karachi to emerge as a hub its performance and efficiency would have to surpass that of established 
hubs in its immediate neighborhood. 
 
2. Karachi in a Multi-Hub Neighborhood Figure 46. Container Throughput, 2000-2010 
 
269.     More than 90 percent of Pakistan’s international            45 
trade  is  transported  by  sea.  The  trade  traffic  passes            40 
through Karachi where there are two container terminals,            35 
the Karachi International Container Terminal and Port            30 
Qasim. Of the two, the Karachi International Container            25 
Terminal (KICT) handles the most volumes (Figure 46).            20 
All  major  shipping  lines  provide  services  to  either            15 
Karachi or Qasim. However, connections to Europe are            10 
indirect,  with  hubbing  mostly  through  Salalah  in  the             5 
Middle East.                                                                                   0 
 
Karachi 
Qasim 
 
270. Based on traffic volumes, Karachi is ranked 75 
worldwide, exceeded by eight ports in its immediate 
neighborhood  (Table  22).  It  is  therefore  important  to  acknowledge  that  success  in  developing 
Karachi in particular as a regional logistics hub would depend on operational efficiency and cost, or 
the development of a nice port, in order to compete with the seaports in the Middle East. 
 
271.     In the past seaport operations in Pakistan were characterized by high cargo dwell times in the 
ports, resulting in higher charges to users than might be considered as desirable in terms of overall 
economic policy, increasing openness to the world economy and stimulating trade. In an effort to 
encourage fast removal of cargo, both ports reduced their free storage periods from seven days to five 
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days in 2006 while port tariffs and performance 
are   now   monitored   and   measured   against 
similar indicators in other regional ports. 
 
272.   A second issue facing Karachi Port 
Terminal  is  the  presence  of  Karachi  Dock 
Labor Board (KDLB) which perpetuates a 
system of labor practices that is not conducive 
to high productivity at low costs. Work to 
terminate  the  KDLB  has  stalled  since  2007 
while  reduction  of  its  influence  is  now 
occurring via natural attrition. 
 
273.       The  Pakistani  ports  of  Karachi  and 
Qasim are feeder ports while the most of the 
ports in the region are hub ports (Table 23). 
They handle mostly domestic and Afghanistan 
 
Table 22. Comparative Cargo Volumes 
 
 
 
  Dubai  UAE  11,600,000  10   
Jawaharlal 
  Nehru  India  4,270,000  26   
  Colombo  Sri Lanka  4,000,000  29   
  Salalah  Oman  3,485,395  33   
  Combined  UAE  3,022,524  39   
  Shahid Rajaee  Iran  2,592,522  45   
  Ambarli  Turkey  2,540,353  48   
Karachi Pakistan 1,370,000 75 
  Chittagong  Bangladesh    1,328,976  79   
  Mersin  Turkey  1,024,171  91   
  Djibouti  Djibouti  600,000  124   
Source: Author estimates and data from Containerization International 
transit cargo. Logistics hubs emerge and prosper based on their ability to reduce costs. Cost and time 
in logistics are in part functions of geography and as such in most cases the development of logistics 
hubs depends on the location of the hub relative to the major flows of traffic. A port is strategically 
located if it has at least one of the following three characteristics: location on the majo r maritime 
routes, situated in or near large center of production or consumption and has a deep natural harbor 
with significant landside development potential.133 But determinants of logistics costs extend beyond 
geography and include the quality of infrastructure, the efficiency of business logistics, and effective 
trade facilitation institutions. 
 
Table 23. Transhipment Hubs for Pakistan Ports 
 
Shipping Line Pakistan Port Transshipment Hub 
Maersk Qasim Jebel Ali, Salalah 
CMA-CGM Qasim Jebel Ali, Singapore 
MSC Qasim, PICT Jebel Ali, Muscat 
Hapag Lloyd Qasim Salalah, Jebel Ali, Colombo, 
APL KICT Salalah, Colombo, Singapore 
Source: Arnold, J. 2011   
 
274.     The time cargo stays in ports is at the forefront to improve the overall performance of trade 
corridors and supply chains. In Pakistan ports, the port authorities allow for up to 5 days of free 
storage time in the port. Recent statistics suggest that time spent on dwell time in Karachi is 7 days, 
demonstrating that Karachi’s performance has been improving remarkably. 
 
3. Air Connectivity 
 
275.     Air  transport  is the  second  most  important  mode  of  transport  for  international  trade  in 
Pakistan, handling more than 250,000 tons per year and passing through the main airports of 
Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi (Figure 47). 
 
 
 
 
133 
UNCTAD (1992). 
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276.     As it is in sea transport, Karachi is the main air transport node in Pakistan. The Pakistani 
combined passenger and cargo network is basically structured around the air links between Lahore 
and Islamabad and Karachi; and between Karachi-Dubai, the main destination outside Pakistan. The 
Karachi-Islamabad and Karachi-Lahore pairs dominate the domestic air transport services. When 
comparing the relative importance of cities within the Pakistani air services network, Karachi stands 
out as the most central. 
 
277.     There are approximately 1,000 
weekly domestic flights in the country, 
of which almost 30 percent are 
accounted by the routes Karachi- 
Lahore  and  Karachi-Islamabad. 
Almost  25  cities  have  scheduled 
flights, of which 18 have regular 
services to Karachi. On the other hand, 
230  international  weekly  flights 
connect  Karachi  with  over  30  cities 
abroad, where almost a third are non- 
stop services to Dubai (Figure 48). 
Other destinations of importance from 
Karachi are Bangkok and Jeddah. In 
addition, only 4 or 5 weekly flights are 
available to most international 
destinations outside the Middle East. 
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Figure 47 . Air Cargo Volumes, 2000-2009 
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Figure 48. Pakistan Passenger/Cargo Network Structure, 2011 
 
 
Source: Own estimations based on DIIO data 
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278.    Pakistan sits astride main air traffic routes connecting Europe and the Middle East with 
Southeast Asia and Australasia.  However, Pakistan’s role in the worldwide airline network structure 
is far from central, and might present only limited opportunities for transit traffic. Given the 
preeminence of other hubs like Dubai and Bangkok that compete in the same through markets, it 
seems unlikely for Pakistan to become a credible connecting hub in the short run, especially for 
directional long haul connections between Europe and Asia. On the other hand, its geographical 
location might favor short and medium haul connections in South Asia and the Middle East. 
 
279.     Of  the  almost  30  air  carriers  serving  the  country,  only  three  are  from  Pakistan.  Five 
international carriers provide 40 weekly scheduled all-cargo services in and out of Pakistan; most 
notably the Emirati Etihad and Midex Airlines, as well as Qatar Airlines. The most frequently used 
aircraft in these routes to Pakistan is the A300 freighter version, with a maximum payload weight of 
almost 48 tons. Karachi, Lahore and Sialkot are the only cities with access to scheduled dedicated 
cargo services. Using the total turnaround cost methodology, Pakistani airports strike as one of the 
most expensive in terms of landing charges. 
 
280.     Key bilateral air service agreements govern the main traffic flows between Pakistan and its 
main destination countries—one of the most important ones being with the UAE. According to this 
agreement, Pakistani carriers can freely determine the frequency and aircraft type from any point of 
Pakistan to any point in UAE. On the other hand, Emirati carriers can only access Karachi under 
identical conditions, whereas the cities in North Pakistan are heavily restricted in the number of 
frequencies for Emirates’ carriers. 
 
281.     Multiple designations have also helped to increase competition. The bilateral agreement with 
UK - one of the main destinations outside the Middle East - has free determination in frequency and 
capacity, and even grants full 5th freedoms to Pakistani airlines (although restricted to 6 weekly 
frequencies from any UK airports other than Heathrow and Gatwick). However, British carriers 
suspended operations in Pakistan a few years ago. 
 
4. Developing Logistics Clusters for National Connectivity 
 
282.    Given that the national logistics hub in Pakistan is located in the south of the country, 
geographical disparities in connectivity are inevitable. When moving to the north and west of the 
country and away from the core national corridor, there is reduced access to minimum quality 
infrastructure and services as the core region is better connected than centers to the west and north - 
west part of the country. Exporting from lagging regions therefore, would require better connections 
to the main export gateway. 
 
283.     Given the nature of some of the prospective export commodities, which have high volume to 
weight ratios and the distances involved, it would appear the key to improving domestic connectivity 
lies in developing multi-modal systems based on rail and road interconnectivity and consolidation of 
trade volumes. Consolidation could be facilitated through logistics clusters, inland container depots 
and dry ports. 
 
284.     For example, in the horticulture sector, mango exports have grown rapidly in recent years 
(Figure 49), due in large part to a shift from air freight to sea transport. However, there are two 
factors that reduce the likelihood of success in the transport of these types of products. First, 
production is dominated by small scale production, which when spread over large areas increases 
logistics costs as there are limited opportunities to exploit economies of scale. There is therefore a 
need for strategically located infrastructure for consolidation, grading, processing, packing, cold 
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stores to facilitate such trade by reducing cost.  Secondly, these products though time sensitive, have 
large volumes and low values. This makes the more readily available mode of transport, which is air, 
unsuited  to  expanding  their  trade.  Air  transport  is  suited  to  high  value  products  that  are  time 
sensitive. The challenge is how to develop an efficient land transport system that can connect 
producers in the northern part of Pakistan to the export gateways in the south so as to minimize time 
and cost. Prospects for this in the Pakistani context lie in efficient road and rail services and 
strategically located cargo consolidation facilities. 
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Figure 49. Pakistan Mango Exports,1980 - 2008  
 
35000 
 
 
100000 
 
 
80000 
 
 
Quantity Values 
30000 
 
25000 
 
 
60000 
 
20000 
 
15000 
 
40000  
10000 
 
20000 
 
5000 
 
0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Railways 
 
285.     The immediate challenge is that presently Pakistan Railways plays a relatively limited role in 
the country’s freight transport despite having a network that extends over much of the country. 
Pakistan Railways has almost 8,000 kilometers of broad gauge routes linking all the major centers, 
and  also  interconnects to the Iranian network.  Although  the railway market  share continues to 
decline, there has been a leveling off in the volume of freight traffic. Because of commercial 
constraints, the railways move only fully loaded trains, meaning there are usually long gaps between 
train departures while waiting for sufficient volumes to accumulate. Presently, it has reached enough 
cargo volumes to justify daily movement between Karachi and Lahore and multiple movements per 
week for the other centers. Once loaded, railway offers a comparable transit time but lower cost as 
compared with road transport (Figure 50). 
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Figure 50. Pakistan Railways, 1955 -2010 
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286.     Despite the downward trend in traffic carried by rail, there is evidence that Pakistan railways 
has been increasing the average length of haul meaning it has been moving towards distances where 
rail has a comparative advantage over road transport. The pricing policy of Railways is designed to 
make it attractive to different types of commodities, officially depending on their ability to bear the 
cost since Pakistan Railway rates are based on the principle of "what each type of traffic can bear". 
However, the downside of this approach is that the railways are perennially making losses and have 
to be subsidized by the government. As a result, the availability of rolling stock and general 
maintenance of the system has been deteriorating in recent years. The railways are therefore caught 
in a downward spiral of poor performance leading to low demand for services which exacerbates the 
problem. 
 
287.     However, even with the above problems, there are good prospects that the railways can play 
a growing role in the movement of containerized traffic. A Cargo Express Service introduced in 1974 
is now running a daily service transporting general cargo from Karachi Bandar to Lahore and vice 
versa. This cargo express has been restructured with high capacity, high speed wagons along with 
terminal facilities to allow it to handle loads of up to 1,600 tons. A similar cargo express has been 
initiated between Faisalabad-Multan and Karachi Bandar and vice versa. 
 
288.     There are two areas which impact negatively on the railway’s ability to grow traffic volumes. 
The first are delays in the ports of Karachi where a significant proportion of turnaround time is 
incurred. This will require that customs issue transit permits with minimal delays and only physically 
inspect cargo on rare occasions. Consignees and shipping lines would also have to provide early 
notification to the port and customs regarding the inland destination of the containers. The second 
area,  and  perhaps  the  most  important  for  extending  trade  opportunities  to  new  products,  is  in 
measures to consolidate the low volumes of traffic to justify regular services that are at the same time 
reliable. The railway strategy in this regard has been to establish a network of dry ports across the 
country. 
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Lahore 1973 1,268 7,589 5,609 9,819 4,541 
Karachi 1974  8,120 6 17,089 6,112 
Peshawar 1986 1,706 5,664 202 2,067 157 
Faisalabad  1,179  1,827  158 
KRK    2,429  2,056 
Islamabad   5,100 126 4,724 159 
Hyderabad  164  
Quetta 1984 675 
Multan 1988 934 
Rawalpindi 1990 1,546 
Sialkot 1986 1,406 
 
6. Dry Ports 
 
289.    As part of railway strategy, Pakistan Railways has tried to increase its market share in 
containerized freight by utilizing railway lands and rail head facilities to establish dry ports (Table 
24). Dry ports are valuable for consolidating and deconsolidating traffic and also for facilitating 
customs and other regulatory controls inland, away from sea ports. Pakistan Railways has already 
established a network of such facilities some on its own, others as joint ventures with private sector 
partners while others are purely by the private sector on its own. There is a renewed recognition in 
Pakistan and elsewhere that dry ports are critical to improving performance of logistics services. 
 
Table 24. Dry Ports in Pakistan 
 
 
Dry Port 
Year of 
established 
Distance to 
Karachi 
Container Volume 2007/08 Container Volume, 2009/10 
Import Export Import Export 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: NLC = National Logistics Cell. 
 
290.     Some of the above dry ports were developed by the private sector which has shown that that 
through innovation, manufacturing firms with common interests can invest in common facilities. For 
example, a dry port in Faisalabad which was developed by textile exporters or the airport and dry 
port in Sialkot, developed by sports goods and surgical equipment manufacturers. However, the key 
concern in industry is the cost and reliability of land transport connection to the air and sea transport 
services in Karachi. This has important implications on the success of the whole dry port initiative. 
There are few successful dry ports, due to poor services and limited local coordination, and for 
several, little or no traffic passes through. 
 
291.     Probably the most successful dry port initiative in Pakistan is the one in Sialkot. The dry port 
was established in the private sector in 1984 by 52 reputed exporters/businessmen of Sialkot. Each of 
them contributed a non returnable amount towards the cost of its establishment. The main aim of the 
facility is to provide the facility of Customs Clearance to the exporters and importers of this region at 
their door step. It has since developed its own fleet of customs bonded vehicles, with more than 70 
vehicles providing services guaranteed in terms of transit time, safety and reliability. The dry port 
operation provides online tracking of consignments. Sialkot is therefore an example of the most 
sophisticated and efficient logistics operation in the country. 
99  
W
ei
gh
t, 
to
nn
es
 
S
ep
 
O
ct
 
N
ov
 
D
ec
 
Ja
n 
F
eb
 
M
ar
 
A
pr
 
M
ay
 
Ju
n 
Ju
l 
A
ug
 
N
um
be
r 
of
 c
on
si
gn
m
en
ts
 
T
E
U
s 
9
3
/9
4
 
9
4
/9
5
 
9
5
/9
6
 
9
6
/9
7
 
9
7
/9
8
 
9
8
/9
9
 
9
9
/0
0
 
0
0
/0
1
 
0
1
/0
2
 
0
2
/0
3
 
0
3
/0
4
 
0
4
/0
5
 
0
5
/0
6
 
0
6
/0
7
 
0
7
/0
8
 
0
8
/0
9
 
0
9
/1
0
 
1
0
/1
1
 
Figure 51. Cargo Volume Through Dry Ports, 1993 -2010 
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292.     More than half of exports from Sialkot in August 2011 were by sea (meaning the cargo is 
moved to Karachi), while the remaining 43 percent was by air, in terms of number of consignments. 
In fact, in terms of weight 92 percent was by sea and 8 percent was by air transport. It means 
therefore that the cargo by sea is first transported to Karachi by land transport, typically road. Most 
shipments by air are transported by truck to Lahore and Islamabad while those by sea are transported 
by truck to Karachi and Port Qasim. Close to three quarters of air exports are through Islamabad, 
followed by Lahore airports, then Karachi and Peshawar. Peshawar is the fourth major airport. Most 
of the air consignments from Sialkot were transported by British Airways and Etihad. Therefore, 
even though PIA is the largest airline and has an extensive domestic air network, it is not widely used 
for international trade. 
 
293.    The above examples show the prospects of creating new opportunities for Pakistani trade 
through the strategic development of a network of dry ports. However, the dry ports have to be 
developed as multimodal facilities designed to handle specific trade traffic. A holistic total supply 
chain approach has to be adopted which combines value addition and logistics as part of a 
synchronized system. A contrast to Sialkot is the experience of another private sector dry port at 
Faisalabad (Figure 51). The latter has experienced a dramatic fall in traffic volumes due to the global 
financial crisis and due to concerns over security and reliability of Pakistani suppliers. As a result, 
there is more cargo handled through the Sialkot Dry Port in two months than at Faisalabad in a year. 
 
7. Upgrading Quality of Logistics Services 
 
294.     As a country moves up the value chain, integrated logistics services become a key factor of 
competitiveness. They enable suppliers, and their customers  to better integrate their systems to 
exploit market opportunities. Logistics services are a derived demand which in turn also open new 
opportunities to trade. Logistics services have to adapt to technological and economic changes. 
Technological changes that reduce the need for proximity between the producer and the consumer 
are also allowing the fragmentation of production into tasks performed in vertically connected way 
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across different locations. The connection amongst tasks is enabled by advances in communication, 
logistics, and financial services among others (Figure 52). 134 
 
Figure 52. Evolution of Logistics Systems 
 
Source: Ron Kopicki, 2009 
 
295.    In addition there are several operational imperatives to be considered in the pursuit of an 
improved global framework for logistics services. These forces are evident in Pakistan and add to the 
growing demands on the performance of the country’ logistics system. 
 
 Shared production networks 
 
 Moving up value chains 
 
 Greater competition in services to drive down costs 
 
 Emerging demands, e.g. trade in new products, minimizing environmental impacts. 
 
296.    The coordination of trade facilitation and logistics in Pakistan is not easy, mainly due to 
institutional fragmentation and small scale enterprises participating in the profession. On the 
institutional side, each mode of transport falls under a different ministry: roads are under the Ministry 
of Communications, while there is also a Ministry of Railways, Ministry of Ports and Shipping and 
under Ministry of Defense which has a say on civil aviation matters. This multiplicity of public 
agencies makes it a challenge to coordinate actions and engender an integrated core logistics system. 
 
297.     At the same time, the majority of Pakistan’s logistics providers are small-scale enterprises 
offering a limited range of services and competing on cost with relatively little consideration for 
reliability or value. This has two significant consequences: services are generally of a poor quality 
and there is fragmentation in service delivery, involving numerous parties in the supply chain. The 
multiplicity of parties involved in transport and logistics services derives from, and is reflected in, 
disparate policy, institutional, and operational arrangements. Each mode of transport falls under a 
 
134 
Feenstra, 1998 and Jones, 2000. 
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spate ministry while third party logistics services provision and ability to manage entire supply 
chains is still at a nascent stage, driven by a few local and international firms. 
 
298.     As a result, intermodal transport possibilities are not fully exploited, there is little investment 
in core facilities, and logistics services are generally unsuitable for open trade opportunities in new 
products  and  processes.  The  most  important  weaknesses  in  the  quality  of  logistics  services  in 
Pakistan are faced in the trucking, freight forwarding and customs areas. 
 
Figure 53. Transport Prices 
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8. Trucking Industry 
 
299.     Pakistan has the one of the lowest road freight transport rates in the world partly due to the 
structure of the industry. The majority of trucks on the roads are operated informally as small fleets. 
In 2007 there were as many as 209,000 registered trucks, more than two thirds of them rigid trucks, 
and most of them old and fuel inefficient. Until 2006, high import duties on imported trucks and 
requirements that only new trucks be imported was discouraging the renewal of the fleet.135 As a 
result and as mentioned above, the trucking fleet is primarily older vehicles with inefficient engines 
and low power-to-weight ratios. As a result, the low rates are obtained by maintaining old fleets and 
by overloading the vehicles. Competition and high operating costs significantly reduce margins for 
the industry and hamper efforts to modernize the fleet. 
 
300.     Of the larger formal operations have recently started, the largest fleet operator is the state 
controlled National Logistics Cell (NLC) which owns more than 1,500 trucks. The NLC has 
previously had a monopoly on Afghanistan transit traffic. In addition to the NLC, the other large fleet 
operators are the petroleum companies such as Shell and the dry port operators especially Sialkot and 
Faisalabad. Sialkot operates more than 70 trucks. These larger operators all provide modern services 
including tracking of vehicles and shipments. 
 
 
135 
In 2006, the GOP reduced and rationalized duties on prime movers. Also trucking was recognized as an industry 
allowing better access to finance. This allowed the importation of used trucks up to four years old that were 
compliant with EURO III standards. 
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301.     At the same time, there has been some improved organization of independent truckers due in 
part  to  the  demand  of  the  military  for  increased  services  along  with  demand  from  larger 
multinationals for better quality road transport. Previously, individual shipments were contracted 
with rates negotiated directly with the shippers or their brokers while backhaul shipments were 
obtained from the large number of brokers located in the major cities. Now, some larger road haulage 
companies have supplemented their own fleet through regular contracting relationships with 
independent truck operators. Through this arrangement, performance criteria in the service, quality 
and reliability of the vehicles, and the skills of the drivers and route are being improved. Demand of 
this type is growing and is being extended to the larger domestic shippers, while in parallel, there has 
been an increase in the number of transport companies providing specialized services such as haulage 
of liquid bulk and refrigerated cargo. 
 
302.     Vehicle overloading has been a perennial characteristic of trucking in Pakistan for several 
decades. It is estimated that as many as 40 percent of trucks on Pakistan’s roads are overloaded 
which has contributed to the rapid deterioration of the roads. In response, consideration is underway 
for a strict vehicle overload control regime especially on the national highway network which carries 
most of the heavy traffic and where recently weighbridges have been introduced. 
 
303.     The 2007 Trucking Policy was designed to complement the NCTIP and serve as the basis for 
modernizing the trucking sector. It contains several progressive provisions which, if realized would 
contribute to a higher quality of service from the trucking sector. Some of the key provisions of the 
policy are: 
 
 Access to Finance: The policy seeks to designate the sector as an “industry” which allows for 
borrowing from banks at less than commercial rates. 
 
 Motor vehicle registration: As motor vehicles registration is a provincial matter, it is difficult 
to obtain current information on the vehicle fleet. A central depository for motor vehicles for 
nationwide maintenance of data is proposed. 
 
 Vehicle worthiness testing and certification: the policy provides regular  certification for 
vehicle fitness and road worthiness. This will be accompanied by training and capacity 
building of staff involved in the tests. 
 
 Other measures: Driver licensing, provision of rest areas and stops for trucks, improved 
standards for the manufacture and registration of trucks. 
 
9. Freight Forwarding Services 
 
304.     Given the presence of numerous small players in the logistics market in Pakistan, a solid 
legal framework for the responsibilities and liabilities, including those of truckers, is paramount. 
However, this has been a significant gap in the legal framework in the country especially where it 
concerns liability for the goods as they move along the chain. Truck operators for instance only carry 
third-party liability. This is one of the reasons why the quality of freight forwarding is critical. 
Freight forwarders, most of who also serve as clearing agents, are the most important intermediary in 
trade logistics in any country. 
 
305.     There are reportedly more than 450 registered clearing and forwarding agents in Pakistan, 
employing about 12,000 people. The majority of the agents are not surprisingly based in the major 
logistics centers of Karachi, Lahore and Sialkot (Table 25). Most offer only limited services, such 
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that several role players have to be engaged to complete a whole import or export process. There are 
a few large and some international companies that also operate in the market and who offer more 
comprehensive services (these number about 50 out of the total). The large players account for most 
of the revenue in the sector. The majority of the agents are members of the Pakistan International 
Freight Forwarders Association (PIFFA). 
 
Table 25. Distribution of Forwarding Agents in Pakistan, 2011 
 
 Karachi Lahore Sialkot Other 
Small (primary only) 253 18 1.0 None 
Medium 153 35 2.5 Moderate 
Total Service 50 47 4.0 High 
TOTAL 456  2.9  
Source: International Asset Management Company Limited, 2005. 
 
306.     The freight forwarding industry in Pakistan experienced strong growth in the 1990s. Much of 
this growth reflected the growing importance of the role of ‘Integrated Logistics’ service providers in 
international  trade,  increased  use  of  containerization  and  the  overall  growth  in  Pakistan’s 
international trade during that period. However, more recently this growth has slowed as trade has 
also slowed. Still, given the numbers involved, and similar to the trucking sector, the industry has a 
competitive market structure (Table 26). The intensity of competition is fierce at the primary services 
level and moderate for firms positioned higher upon the value chain. 
 
Table 26. Market Share of Forwarding Agents, by Size 
 
 
 
Small (primary only) 253 18 1.0 None High 
Medium 153 35 2.5 Moderate High 
Total Service 50 47 4.0 High Moderate 
TOTAL 456  2.9   
Source: International Asset Management Company Limited, 2005. 
 
 
307.     The forwarding industry has therefore undergone significant changes in terms of increases in 
scale and scope. Part of this is due to the increased presence of foreign third part logistics services 
providers who have extended their involvement in the sector from acting as nominated forwarders to 
providers of warehousing, inventory management and distribution services. This, in turn, has allowed 
large-scale retailers to enter the market. The evolution of agents from customs brokers to providers of 
warehousing and transport services is continuing as larger manufactures and shippers seek out 
integrated service providers. Increasingly, there is a degree of specialization that is going on as the 
large forwarders are avoiding taking on responsibility for owning and managing large truck fleets, 
but increasingly work with established road transport companies to provide services to their clients. 
In fact in some cases, they offer transport brokerage services. 
 
308.     One of the aspects often mentioned as a source of concern in the sector is the issuing of house 
bills  of  lading.  These  are  based  on  archaic  legislation  especially,  a  maritime  shipping  act 
promulgated in the late 1800s (The Carriers Act, 1865). While many of the larger freight forwarders 
are able to issue House Bills of Lading for international movements of freight, there continue to be 
problems with regards to the allocation of liabilities among the parties involved in international 
shipments, especially the small scale players. Pakistan presently does not have legislation covering 
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multimodal transport, making for a weak framework for the enforcement of arbitration related to 
international shipments. There have been efforts over the past several years to upgrade legislation to 
clarify these liabilities but it is taking a long time to bring to fruition. 
 
309.     As some of the larger players attempt to offer superior services, they find the image of the 
industry as a whole is tarnished by the more informal small scale agents. Many of the issues which 
impact on the effectiveness of the freight forwarding industry are the same as those faced elsewhere 
in international trade: 
 
 Unregulated market entry - easy access to the industry has resulted in many new entrants 
with increasing pressure on operators to be more competitive, perhaps at the expense of 
quality of service. 
 
 A lack of technical expertise - there is minimal access to accredited training for industry 
participants and no minimum technical experience requirements. 
 
 No  nationally  endorsed  standard  trading  conditions  and  minimum  standards  which  has 
resulted in disputes and a lack of confidence by some traders. 
 
 Lack   of  access  to   commercial   finance   which  has  restricted   development/expansion 
opportunities for industry participants (to help cover overheads and growth of trade 
receivables which result in cash flow issues). 
 
 Legislative  framework  -  Pakistan  needs  an  updated  legal  framework  to  reflect  the 
requirements of the contemporary international trade environment. Several of the laws date 
back several decades. 
 
310.     These challenges are very similar to those faced in other developing regions of the world. 
Elsewhere, the response has been to pursue skills development in the sector, typically with support 
from international associations such as FIATA. Other measures include also defining minimum 
requirements to be recognized as a service provider. However, solutions need always to be shaped by 
local circumstances. 
 
311.     The large freight forwarding firms in particular, are pushing for a regulatory approach to 
setting minimum service obligations. Evidence from elsewhere suggests that logistics is a bundle of 
services industries. This implies that in contrast to other services, logistics services providers are 
subject to multiple regulations and must deal with a larger numbers of regulators with different 
regulatory objectives and cultures. Moreover, regulating on a component basis makes it difficult to 
develop an optimal regulatory regime. In an ideal world, logistics services providers would be 
subject to a single authorization requirement and a single regulator, but this may prove not to be 
feasible or even desirable. There are a number of complex issues that justify regulations in this area 
such as competition, administration of port and airport physical space, safety, smuggling, and last but 
not least national security considerations, including terrorism threat. A way to address these 
complexities is to create a high level unit with the required political support to coordinate these 
agencies as was done recently by Indonesia and Uruguay, and other countries. This is what has been 
proposed in Pakistan through a draft Logistics Services Providers Regulatory Bill that is being 
discussed. 
 
312.     However as expected, there is no consensus as some industry players feel this will increase 
the regulatory burden while others feel the effort seeks to impose entry barriers to the sector. The 
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draft bill proposes the establishment of a Logistics Service Providers Regulatory Authority which is 
mandated to promote a modern system of logistics services in Pakistan. Among things the authority 
shall: 
 
 advise the Government on policy relating to logistics services 
 
 coordinate with all government systems for efficient functioning of logistics services 
 
 prescribe, regulate or implement measures and standards for licensing or any matter related to 
logistics services 
 
 ensure that all logistics service providers take suitable insurance cover for the cargo handled 
and transported by them 
 
 evolve a mechanism for payment of compensation to aggrieved party for the cargo damaged 
or lost by it 
 
 resolve disputes between service providers and service receivers 
 
 promote education and research in the field of logistics services 
 
 liaise and interact with counterpart logistics services related organizations in other countries 
for capacity building and exchange of information. 
 
313.     The powers of the authority would be such that it would assist in the development of the 
industry  and  help  facilitate  the  growth  of  international  trade.  The  proposed  regulation  would 
therefore  be  fairly  comprehensive  when  compared  to  systems  in  other  countries.  Clearly  the 
regulatory approach proposed could help provide a predictable and reliable logistics services 
framework for the industry in Pakistan as it appears from vigorous debate in the country even on the 
content of the draft that an environment does not exist yet for self-regulation as adopted in other 
countries, e.g. Canada, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, and the UK. 
 
314.     While it is not uncommon for governments to regulate such activities in some form or 
another, it is usually in the context of licensing or certification to ensure technical competence and 
business registration to ensure compliance with the civil or commercial codes (UNCTAD, 2011). The 
most common form of regulation in relation to freight forwarders focuses on defining contractual 
liability, generally based on FIATA and ICC rules to provide certainty for the banking sector. Such 
regulations are partially addressed in Pakistan through SBP circulars. In many instances governments 
have also tried to regulate the issuing of shipping documents (terms and conditions for the contract of 
carriage of goods). The intention of such amendments would be to try to bring Pakistan’s COGSA 
more in-line with the international transport law framework provided under the Hague-Visby or 
Hamburg Rules. 
 
315.     At a broader level, given the high level of fragmentation in international supply chains in 
Pakistan, a lot of attention has been paid to strengthening the foundations for the use of contracts in 
organizing logistics services. For individual movements, the cargo documents used as the basis of 
agreement between the shippers or buyers and third party service providers largely depends on the 
mode  of  transport.  For  international  trade  there  are  a  variety  of  conventions  that  specify  the 
allocation of responsibilities and liabilities. These have been used for the past 10 years in Pakistan to 
try and modernize the legal frameworks for core transport services. The efforts have been promoted 
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by the NTTFC. They follow a realization that the core legislation on transport services are all dated, 
some time going back to the late nineteenth century. 
 
10. Customs System 
 
316.     Clearly the practices and levels of skill of freight forwarders and other logistics players need 
upgrading. The draft bill seeks to address the former but it has to be complemented by capacity 
building measures if it is to have a meaningful impact. The main program on capacity building is the 
one offered by UNCTAD and FIATA. The two have been working with PIFFA to offer a validated 
course conducted by the National Industry Association. This is an important component to raise skills 
and the quality of services offered. In fact, PIFFA has established a significant training course to 
increase the skills of logistics service providers in general while other efforts are underway to 
establish a procedure for certification of freight forwarders. 
 
317.    However, there are also some clear operational issues that can also impact the overall 
performance of the trade logistics system in Pakistan. One of these is with respect to how agents 
interface with ports and customs. In particular, the electronic submission and processing of customs 
documents is critical to improved performance. 
 
318.     Pakistan Customs has been implementing a modernization program for the past several years. 
Reforms already introduced include the use of the Harmonized Code, creation of a Single 
Administrative Document (Goods Declaration (GD), and electronic submission and processing of 
declarations at the seaports and the major land borders. These improvements have allowed a 
significant  reduction  in  clearance  times  and  an  increase  in  the  collection  of  duties  and  taxes. 
However, at present there are two different IT systems for submitting the goods declaration, Pakistan 
Customs Computerized System (PaCCS) and Web Based One Customs. 136  The rate of physical 
inspections has been reduced but remains higher than would apply with an effective system of risk 
management.  More  important,  the  decision  regarding  inspections  is  often  based  on  informal 
payments. The typical clearance times for cargoes with proper documentation are two days for 
imports and one for exports. The procedures for handling transit cargoes have been simplified but the 
time required for issuing transit permits and the procedures regarding inspection of transit cargo are 
neither  transparent  nor  efficient.  Pakistan  Customs  has  a  Risk  Management  Unit  which  has 
developed some risk profiles and is supposed to select the level of inspection applied for individual 
shipments. However, both PaCCS and One Customs perform limited functions137 and neither has a 
risk management module (PaCCS system uses random selection of containers). Still, the random 
selection can be overridden by an officer thereby creating significant opportunities for informal 
payments. 
 
319.     Clearly,  it  would  be  beneficial  from  a  trade  logistics  perspective  if  a  unified  and 
comprehensive system was introduced and operational across the country. Customs are now working 
towards this, by adopting Web Based One Customs (WeBOC). This should enable the private sector 
to develop and invest in appropriate interfaces to the system. Presently this is difficult and inefficient 
as there are duplications. Critical aspects that are still lacking are introducing an effective risk 
management system, a formal Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) regime, and an expedited 
 
136 
PaCCS has been used in the Karachi International Container Terminal (KICT) since 2005 and at two other 
container terminals since December 2006. It is reported after its introduction customs clearance times were reduced 
from seven days to less than one day in KICT. 
137 
Both lack modules for valuation, risk management, transit/transhipment and warehousing, post clearance audit, 
temporary importation and duty drawback. 
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regime for transit shipments. These will allow more cargo to be cleared inland thereby reducing 
bottlenecks at the seaports and land borders and increasing the effectiveness of the clearance 
procedures and allowing for greater cooperation between shippers and customs officials. Presently, 
Pakistan does not have a formal system of AEOs, although informal recognition is given to preferred 
traders who receive expedited clearance. Modern X-ray scanning has been introduced but only at 
QICT and only for exports to the US as part of the C-TPAT program. 
 
11. Measuring Overall Logistics Performance 
 
320.     Due to the institutional fragmentation discussed above, there is presently no agency that is 
systematically collecting performance metrics at either corridor level or at a macro level. Different 
agencies are collecting some data on trade facilitation and logistics performance though these data 
are not put together to inform reform to improve performance. That said, Pakistan has the basic 
ingredients for a well articulated and informative logistics performance monitoring platform, which 
industry can use to assess competitiveness. Over the past decade some steps have been taken to 
overcome the coordination weakness by creating a national trade facilitation committee, with the 
support of UNCTAD and the World Bank. 
 
12. Regional Connectivity 
 
321.     One of the overriding objectives of the GOP is to develop the country as a regional hub for 
logistics. In this regard, the gateway for services via air and sea transport is well established, largely 
through Karachi. What remains largely poorly developed has been the land transport links to 
Pakistan’s neighbors. This will have to be by land transport (road and rail) and also air transport. The 
limited potential, at least in the short term for air transport has already been alluded to. Basing land 
transport connectivity has great  potential, but would require also changing the approach in the 
country, from being a transit country for landlocked Afghanistan to also itself relying on transit rights 
through the same country for access to the Central Asian Republics (CAR) in particular. Exploiting 
this potential requires that Pakistan take certain steps especially with respect to ratifying key 
international conventions and other regional trade facilitation instruments. 
 
13. Transport and Transit Agreements 
 
322.     Pakistan has already been working for some time on negotiating transport agreements with 
several of its neighbors to the north and west. The highest priority of these agreements has been the 
one with Afghanistan, whose revised version entered into force in mid-2011. Others are being 
negotiated with the CAR. These are discussed separately below. 
 
323.     The most significant land transport and transit agreement Pakistan has is with Afghanistan. 
The Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade and Transport Agreement (APTTA) is the most important 
international agreement Pakistan has with its immediate neighbors. APTA replaces a previous 
agreement of 1965 showing that an agreement between the parties has always been important, 
especially for landlocked Afghanistan. The Karachi-Peshawar/Torkham as well as the Karachi- 
Quetta-Chaman/Spin Baldak corridors have traditionally been in use for the movement of goods to 
and from Afghanistan even before Pakistan’s independence in 1947. An alternative route of lesser 
importance, during the British period, was the caravan route from the Gulf through Persia passing 
through Herat and beyond. Since the independence of Pakistan, the transit trade to Afghanistan 
continued to move on the two historical routes, while the first formal agreement was signed in 1958 
between the two governments. 
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324.     Up until 2010 Pakistan offered transit facilities to Afghanistan under the Afghan Transit 
Trade Agreement (ATTA) of 1965. However, ATTA was subject to the vagaries of change in the 
political  and  economic  scenarios  prevailing  within  the  two  countries.  The  original  agreement 
provided for liberalized transit trade facilitation between the two. However, the agreement between 
the two has often been clouded by accusations often made that the transit facilities were often 
misused and a number of items to Afghanistan were smuggled back into Pakistan with negative 
effects on local industry and revenue collection in Pakistan. 
 
325.     Initially, Pakistan tried to curb re-export of transit goods into its territory through various 
measures including the delegation of anti-smuggling powers to the Frontier Corps and Political 
Authorities and the establishment of various combined check posts at Pakistan-Afghanistan border, 
and reducing the rates of duty in order to minimize the margin between costs of smuggling and cost 
of legal imports of these items. The efforts also included Pakistan adopting a negative list of 17 
items, transit of which was prohibited through Pakistan's borders. Over time the negative list was 
first expanded to 24 items in 2001 though later reduced first to six items in 2004 and then by two 
items (cigarettes and auto parts) in 2006. The anti smuggling powers delegated to Frontier Corps, 
Frontier Constabulary and the Police were later on also withdrawn and at present only Customs, 
Customs  Intelligence  and  the  Political  administration  enjoy  anti  smuggling  powers  under  the 
Pakistan Customs Act, 1969. In fact, with the mutual concurrence of both governments the existing 
ATTA, with minor amendments from time to time, governed the movement of Afghan goods through 
Pakistan for 44 years until the new agreement was signed in 2010. 
 
326.     The new agreement, APTTA was signed in July 2010 and entered into force in early 2011 
and replaced ATTA. It is designed to be in force for five years, renewable for another five years after 
which it can be extended based on agreement between the two parties. The agreement is expected to 
halve the amount of time it takes to process transit traffic between Afghanistan and Pakistan. APTTA 
makes several very important changes with operational impact. However, two issues are worth 
highlighting in terms of likely impact on costs. First, APTTA increases the number of routes that can 
be used for transit and trade between the two countries from 5 to 10 in Pakistan and 8 in Afghanistan. 
It  therefore  provides  for  greater  flexibility in  the  routing  of  transit  traffic  passing  through  the 
Pakistani ports of Gwadar, Qasim and Karachi as well as the transportation of bilateral trade traffic 
between  the  two  countries.  Second,  a  breakup  up  of  the  monopoly  of  the  Pakistani  transport 
company, NLC, from being the sole authorized carrier of Afghan transit cargo could bring significant 
benefits. NLC, though large, is expensive and often had no trucks available. 138  Under the new 
agreement, Afghan merchants are allowed to contract any transport company for the transit of goods 
to Afghanistan. This should result in lower transit costs as well as a more stable supply of consumer 
goods to Afghanistan. 
 
327.     One of the issues the agreement has tried to deal with is to provide a framework for systems 
to facilitate customs handling of goods in transit.  The agreement provides for  the countries to 
develop  tracking  systems  and  customs  guarantees  for  such  goods.  Customs  will  also  share 
information between them, to facilitate faster clearance of goods. Generally, under the agreement 
customs will physically check only five percent of Afghan transit cargo passing through the ports. 
There are however concerns in some quarters in Pakistan that some goods may still be diverted to the 
local market. Some of the above provisions are intended to manage such practices. 
 
 
 
 
138 
A USAID study suggests it can take as long as 2 weeks for NLC to make vehicles available. 
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328.     Though the agreement is progressive and a major departure from the previous one, it has one 
major restrictions with respect to India. The agreement allows for Afghanistan transport operations to 
the Indian border where cargo can be offloaded to Indian trucks. However, Afghan trucks may not 
carry Indian goods in the reverse direction but are allowed to pickup Indian cargo. 
 
329.     The designation of transit routes under APTTA provides a base for wider regional trade and 
transport connections. Through the routes defined in Afghanistan it becomes possible for Pakistan to 
link to Azerbaijan, the CAR, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. As 
discussed below, Pakistan is already negotiating bilateral road transport agreements with these 
countries to effect transit and transport operations with them. Already a road caravan has been 
conducted to test the route while Pakistan railways has run experimental trains to Turkey, with 
interchange at Iran border due to different gauges. These services could greatly open up new 
possibilities to trade especially with neighboring countries and beyond. 
 
14. International Transit Regime 
 
330.     The need to have access to the seaports by the CAR along with trade policies and harmonized 
agreements to reduce time and costs is now recognized as a pre-requisite for future regional growth 
and development. Their access to sea ports would be through Afghanistan and then to Iranian or 
Pakistani ports. The shortest route for most destinations is to the ports in Pakistan. The reverse is also 
true that as Pakistan seeks improved access to the CARs then it needs to have an effective customs 
regime that facilitates hassle free transit. Both the public and private sectors in Pakistan see great 
potential to expand intra-regional trade and for Pakistan to serve as a regional logistics hub for CAR. 
A proven transit framework is the Transports internationaux par la route Convention (TIR). 
 
331.     TIR is a system of bonds, operated in nearly 70 countries, that guarantees that any customs 
and other duties will be paid on goods transported in transit trucks. Its objective is both the 
improvement of transport conditions and the simplification and harmonization of administrative 
formalities in international transport, particularly at frontiers. The TIR as three important principles: 
(i) goods carried under the TIR procedures in sealed road vehicles are not as a general rule submitted 
to examination in Customs offices en route (but they may be inspected when an irregularity is 
suspected). Customs authorities do not require vehicles to be escorted at carrier’s expense on the 
territory of their country; (ii) the contracting parties authorize agreed professional associations to 
issue TIR carnets. These associations guarantee that they will pay the import or export duties and 
taxes, including penalty interest in case of irregularities. For the purpose of identification of the 
goods on which duties have to be paid, details of these goods are entered in the TIR carnet. Customs 
authorities discharge TIR carnets after conclusion of the transport operation. Discharge is equivalent 
to clearance and Customs authorities cannot claim taxes and dues after discharge; and (iii) 
irregularities render the offender liable to the penalties of the country where the offence was 
committed. In case of doubt, the offence is deemed to have been committed in the country where it 
was detected. Any person guilty of irregularities may be in future excluded from the operation of the 
Convention. 
 
332.     Pakistan has been working on acceding to the TIR Convention for almost the past eight years. 
ICC Pakistan had been designated as the National Guaranteeing Organization for ATA Carnet and 
TIR Carnet system. However, progress has stalled over Pakistan’s attempt to have reservations on 
some provisions of the TIR convention, for which reservation is not allowed. Initially a reservation 
was sought based on Article 58(i) of the TIR Convention, a request which was turned down by the 
United Nations. Later an attempt was made to seek a reservation, later dropped on Articles 57(1) to 
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57(6) of the convention. Clearly, acceding to the convention seems to be contentious in the country 
and an official decision has been made to suspend the efforts until there is consensus. It remains true 
though that operationalizing the road transport agreements being negotiated with the CARs will 
depend on accession to the TIR Convention as an effective transit transport. In any event, the TIR 
would also greatly benefit transit trade with Afghanistan as it can be an instrument to address 
concerns over likely diversion of goods in transit into the Pakistani domestic market. 
 
333.     More generally, there are a few international instruments that Pakistan is not party to that can 
be beneficial to its intended role as a regional hub while at the same time providing easier access to 
markets in neighboring countries. There remain some gaps in such ratifications that should, if filled, 
facilitate such operations (Table 27). 
 
Table 27. Major International Trade Facilitation Instruments 
Status of Ratification 
 
         
Afghanistan   x x     
Bangladesh        x 
Bhutan         
India  x      x 
Pakistan x x       
Sri Lanka        x 
X = Ratification, accession, definite signature, O = Observer governments 
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CHAPTER V. MARKET ACCESS AND PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
 
 
 
334.    Following global trends, Pakistan is pursuing a strategy of economic integration through 
preferential trade agreements. Until 2006, Pakistan was member of multilateral preferential trade 
agreements only but has since been pursuing a policy of regional and bilateral trade integration, 
including SAFTA and bilateral agreements with China, Iran, Malaysia, Mauritius and Sri Lanka 
(Table 28). This shift reflects awareness in Pakistan that the country under trades with the large and 
fast growing economies from the region, including China and India. 
 
Table 28. List of Pakistan’s Multilateral and Preferential Trade Agreements 
 
Agreement Current Partners Entry into force Type  of 
agreement 
Main provisions Exports, 
2010 (% 
share  tot.) 
Imports, 
2010 (% 
share  tot.) 
Multilateral agreements: 
Protocol on Trade 
Negotiations 
Bangladesh; Brazil; Chile; Egypt; Israel; 
Korea, Republic  of; Mexico;  Pakistan; 
Paraguay;  Peru; Philippines; Serbia; 
Tunisia;  Turkey;  Uruguay 
1973 Partial Scope 
Agreement 
- 11.44 4.54 
WTO 153 WTO Members 1995 Multilateral - 88.30 96.16 
Preferential agreements: 
Economic 
Cooperation 
Organisation 
Afghanistan; Azerbaijan; Iran, Islamic 
Republic  of; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyz Republic; 
Pakistan;  Tajikistan;  Turkey; 
Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan 
1992 Partial Scope 
Agreement 
Coopera ti on on proj ects  a nd 
progra mmes  of mutua l 
i nteres t 
11.95 3.39 
GSTP Algeria;  Argentina; Bangladesh; Benin; 
Bolivarian  Republic  of Venezuela; Bolivia, 
Plurinational State of; Brazil; Cameroon; 
Chile; Colombia;  Cuba; Ecuador;  Egypt; 
Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of Macedonia; 
Ghana;  Guinea;  Guyana;  India; Indonesia; 
Iran, Islamic Republic  of; Iraq; Korea, 
Democratic People's  Republic  of; Korea, 
Republic  of; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; 
Malaysia;  Mexico;  Morocco;  Mozambique; 
Myanmar;  Nicaragua; Nigeria;   Peru; 
Philippines; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Sudan; 
Tanzania;  Thailand;  Trinidad and Tobago; 
Tunisia;  Viet Nam; Zimbabwe 
1989 Partial Scope 
Agreement 
Ta ri ff conces s i ons 16.10 24.02 
Pakistan-Sri Lanka Sri Lanka 2005 PTA Ta ri ff conces s i ons 1.35 0.14 
South Asian Free 
Trade  Agreement 
Bangladesh; Bhutan;  India; Maldives; 
Nepal; Pakistan;  Sri Lanka 
2006 PTA Ta ri ff conces s i ons 5.69 4.50 
Pakistan-Iran I ra n 2006 PTA Ta ri ff conces s i ons 0.86 2.36 
Pakistan-China China 2007 PTA Preferenti a l ma rket a cces s 
through ta ri ff conces s i ons 
a nd muta l recogni ti on 
a rra ngements i n the fi el d of 
s ervi ces 
6.55 13.99 
Pakistan-Mauritius Mauritius 2007 PTA Ta ri ff conces s i ons  l i mi ted to 
texti l es s ector 
0.16 0.00 
Pakistan-Malaysia Malaysia 2008 (and 
2005) 
PTA (and 
Early Harvest 
Programme) 
Ta ri ff conces s i ons  i n goods 
a nd s ervi ces + ma rket a cces s 
provi s i ons . Mutua l 
recogni ti on a rra ngements i n 
the fi el d of educa ti on a nd 
s ervi ces a nd cha pter on 
i nves tment. 
0.67 5.48 
Pakistan- 
Afganistan 
Afganistan 2010 Transit Trade 
Agreement 
Provi s i ons  for the 
fa ci l i ta ti on of mercha ndi s e 
tra ns i t. 
7.95 0.37 
Source: WTO and Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce; WITS. 
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A.        Trade Preferences and Pakistan’s Trade 
 
335.     Pakistan’s trade is not very preferential on the imports side, but much more preferential on 
the exports side. Fewer than 42 percent of Pakistan’s imports receive any preferences but 84 percent 
of Pakistan’s exports go to countries granting preferences to Pakistan, where preferential tariff 
margins are quite low (Table 29). Only 0.3 percent of exports to the top 20 importers receive a 
preference margin of 10 percent or above, mainly in the sectors of garments and commodities, while 
30 percent have a preference margin between 0.1 and 2.5 percent. 
 
 
 
Pakistan Exports (% total) 
Table 29. Partners In Pakistan’s Trade, 2003 - 2010 
 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
United States  23.2 24.0 24.9 25.8 22.3 18.2 18.4 17.3 
China 2.2 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.5 3.6 5.7 6.5 
India 0.7 1.2 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.3 1.3 
Malaysia  0.8 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.7 
SAFTA (exc. India)  2.2 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.2 3.4 4.4 
EU-27  29.6 31.1 27.0 27.0 27.8 26.4 25.6 24.9 
GCC 14.8 12.0 11.1 10.4 13.5 15.6 13.5 12.3 
Trade under FTAs 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7 5.6 7.3 12.9 13.9 
 
Pakistan Imports (% total)  
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
China 7.3 8.3 9.3 9.8 12.8 11.2 12.0 14.0 
Malaysia  4.6 3.5 2.9 2.6 3.6 4.0 5.1 5.5 
United States  6.0 9.6 6.1 6.3 8.0 4.9 5.7 4.3 
India 1.7 2.5 2.3 3.7 3.9 4.0 3.4 4.2 
SAFTA (exc. India)  0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 
EU-27  17.0 14.1 17.6 16.6 14.6 13.6 16.1 11.4 
GCC 29.3 28.6 27.1 30.8 28.3 33.6 29.2 32.8 
Trade under FTAs 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7 5.6 6.1 23.9 26.3 
 
336.     Table 30 provides an overview of the trade regime enjoyed by Pakistan in the largest 20 
export markets while Figure 54 1 gives a graphical description of the share of Pakistan’s exports to 
each  of these  markets enjoying preferential,  non-preferential  or  MFN  zero-tariff regime.  These 
figures reflect more general trends. Only 16.7 percent of world trade is eligible for trade preferences, 
assuming full utilization of trade preferences (Carpenter and Lendle, 2010). In other words, despite 
the flourishing of preferential trade agreements in recent years, 83 percent of world merchandise 
trade still takes place on a non-discriminatory, MFN basis. This is firstly because half of world trade 
is already subject to zero-tariffs, on a most favored nation basis. Secondly, preferential trade 
agreements tend to exempt high MFN-tariff items from preferential treatment and continue to trade 
these products at the MFN rate (WTO, 2011). In addition, large preferences tend to fall on very 
elastic goods, further reducing the efficacy of preferences (Fugazza and Nicita, 2010).  Low MFN 
rates suggest that the scope for exchanging preferential market access is unlikely to be extensive both 
for Pakistan and globally. 
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Table 30. Preferential Trade Regime For 
Exports to Top 20 Markets 
Figure 54. Pakistan’s Preferential Exports 
(percentage shares) 
 
Importer Exporter Regime Reciprocal?  
MFN zero Non-preferential trade Preferential trade 
 
100% 
 
90% 
 
80% 
 
70% 
 
60% 
 
50% 
 
40% 
 
30% 
 
20% 
 
10% 
 
0% 
EUR PAK EU_GSP no 
USA PAK US_GSP no 
ARE PAK MFN MFN 
CHN PAK FTA_CHN yes 
HKG PAK MFN MFN 
KOR PAK PSA_KOR yes 
TUR PAK GSP_TUR no 
JPN PAK GSP_JPN no 
IND PAK FTA_IND yes 
CAN PAK GSP_CAN no 
AUS PAK GSP_AUS no 
TWN PAK MFN MFN 
MEX PAK MFN MFN 
RUS PAK PREF_RUS yes 
THA PAK MFN MFN 
MYS PAK PSA_MYS yes 
BRA PAK MFN MFN 
CHE PAK GSP_special_CHE no 
IDN PAK MFN MFN  
SGP PAK MFN MFN 
 
B.        Welfare Effects of Tariff Liberalization in Pakistan 
 
337.    Trade liberalization enhances aggregate productivity and increases the variety of products 
available in the economy. Despite these benefits, countries are reluctant to open trade on the grounds 
that it is also seen as a source of revenue losses for countries. This section looks at the main 
economic and fiscal impacts of the implementation of Pakistan’s most significant PTAs: China, 
Malaysia, and SAFTA (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka). Simulations are 
based on the World Bank SMART (System of Market Analysis and Restrictions of Trade) - a partial 
equilibrium tool that is part of the World Bank-UNCTAD WITS (World Integrated Trade Solution) 
platform. 
 
338.     Specifically, based on tariff and trade data from 2009, one can simulate a tariff reduction to 
zero for all products between partners of PTA. Each scenarios is first run independently from the 
others and then as a simultaneous implementation of all PTAs. Finally, three additional scenarios are 
added, for benchmarking purposes: a stand-alone PTA with India (not including other SAFTA 
countries), and hypothetical PTAs with the EU-27 and US, respectively. An important caveat of 
SMART-based analysis is however that the simulation tool only allows taking into consideration 
first-round effects. Hence, it only account for currently traded products. 
 
339.     The  increase  in  Pakistan’s  imports  of  currently  trade  products  as  a  result  of  the 
implementation of a zero-tariff regime in the framework of currently signed PTAs is modest and 
ranges from 0.3 to 2.7 percent of total imports (Figure 55). The biggest impact would result from the 
full implementation of a zero-tariff regime under the PTA with China. Imports would increase by 2.7 
percent with respect to the baseline (total imports in 2009). Slashing tariffs in the framework of PTAs 
with India and Malaysia would have a smaller effect, which is similar for the two agreements. In both 
cases, bilateral imports would increase by less than 0.5 percent. The impact of implementing full 
liberalization with all SAFTA countries would increase imports by 0.33 percent. India accounts for 
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94 percent of that increase. It is to be 
expected, however, that tariff reduction 
would also increase the product range of 
imported goods for which now barriers are 
prohibitive. 
 
Figure 55. Change in Pakistan’s Total Imports, 2009-2010 
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340.   Turning to bilateral trade, while 
imports from partners in the PTAs would 
increase according to our simulations, 
imports from  some East Asian countries, 
the EU-27 and the US would be affected 
somewhat negatively by the full tariff 
implementation    in    the    framework    of 
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currently   negotiated   PTAs   (Table   31). 
Imports from all partners in current PTAs 
China India Malaysia SAFTA All 
would increase by double digits if those PTAs were to lead to full tariff liberalization. Meanwhile, 
the largest negative impact would be felt in the case of the PTA with China and Japan with 2.6 
percent of loss in terms of imports value. Similarly, imports from a handful of other East Asian 
countries (Indonesia, Korea and Thailand) as well as those from the EU-27 and the US would be 
affected negatively by the implementation of the FTA with China. Imports from the rest of Pakistan’s 
main trade partners would be marginally impacted (less than 0.5 percent), in particular by full tariff 
liberalization in the framework of the PTAs with India, Malaysia or SAFTA. 
 
Table 31. Changes in Bilateral Imports from Main Partners as a Result of PTAs, 2009-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
     
China 
Saudi Arabia 
UAE Kuwait 
United States 
Japan 
India 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Korea, Rep. 
Thailand 
Australia 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
Canada 
3,777 
3,494 
3,349 
1,804 
1,760 
1,289 
1,080 
955 
627 
600 
535 
506 
496 
492 
403 
28.5 
-0.1 
-0.3 
0.0 
-1.4 
-2.6 
-1.0 
-0.1 
-2.5 
-2.5 
-0.2 
-1.6 
-2.0 
-1.2 
-0.7 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.2 
-0.3 
-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0.0 
-0.3 
-0.7 
0.0 
-0.4 
36.2 
-0.2 
0.0 
-0.3 
-0.1 
-0.1 
0.0 
-0.1 
-0.1 
12.6 
-0.4 
-0.4 
-0.1 
0.0 
-0.2 
-0.1 
-0.1 
0.0 
-0.3 
-0.1 
-0.1 
-0.1 
-0.1 
-0.1 
12.6 
-0.4 
-0.5 
-0.2 
0.0 
-0.4 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0.0 
28.0 
-0.3 
-0.7 
-0.4 
-1.6 
-3.0 
11.6 
-0.5 
-3.4 
-3.5 
-0.3 
-2.4 
34.2 
-1.5 
-0.7 
EU-27 5,087 -1.8 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -2.2 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
Italy 
Finland 
France 
1,270 
780 
677 
418 
396 
-2.1 
-1.7 
-2.1 
-2.6 
-1.6 
-0.2 
-0.1 
-0.2 
0.0 
-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.1 
-0.2 
0.0 
-0.2 
-0.2 
-0.1 
-0.2 
0.0 
-0.2 
-2.5 
-1.9 
-2.5 
-2.7 
-1.9 
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341.     Trade  diversion  resulting  from  a 
zero-tariff PTA with China is significantly 
higher    than    under    other    scenarios, 
potentially leading to as much as US$ 277 
 
Figure 56. Trade Diversion Under Different Scenarios 
(US million) 
 
400 
million of trade diversion. Although the 
trade diversion effect of a PTA with China 
is five times larger compared to the other 
PTAs analyzed, it would still only affect 
0.9 percent of total imports of currently 
trade products (Figure 56). 
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C. Fiscal impact and welfare gains 
 
342. The  fiscal  impact  of  FTAs  with 
India, Malaysia and SAFTA are low, and 
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43 
59 49 
 
 
China India Malaysia SAFTA All 
high with China, according to the simulations using SMART. Results are reported in Table 32. The 
fiscal impact of a zero-tariff PTA with Malaysia would be equal to about US$ 70 million or 2.4 
percent of tariff revenues in 2009. A PTA with India is about US$ 65 million or 2.2 percent of tariff 
revenues in 2009. Signing an FTA with the rest of the SAFTA countries would result in an additional 
loss of revenue of US$9 million or 0.2 percent of total imports, taking the total to US$ 74 and 2.6 
percent of revenues. The reduction of tariffs resulting from the implementation of a PTA with China 
would have by far the biggest impact on revenues and trade. Tariff revenue would go down by US$ 
525 million or 18.2 percent. 
 
Table 32. Changes in Revenue and Welfare From PTA 
 
    
 
 
 
 
China 
Malaysia 
India 
SAFTA 
All current PTAs 
-525 
-70 
-65 
-74 
-663 
-18.2 
-2.4 
-2.2 
-2.6 
-23.0 
90.3 
16.7 
7.3 
8.2 
111.3 
8.3 
13.7 
13.7 
13.6 
7.6 
 
343. Including all the previous scenarios (China, Malaysia and SAFTA) as a free trade partner 
increases the total loss in tariff revenues by US$ 663 million or 23 percent of tariff revenues. Figure 
57 provides the welfare gain estimates net of the tariff revenue loss. While these are small compared 
to the tariff revenue losses, they are underestimated. Indeed they do not consider the associated 
increase in productivity, variety and quality of imported inputs. Hence, full tariff liberalization would 
generate a gain in welfare above the estimated figures, with the only cost of a shift away from tariffs 
in the composition of tax revenues. 
116  
 
 
 
 
3,500 
Figure 57. Revenue Loss and Welfare Gains From Tariff Change 
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D.        Effects of Full Tariff Liberalization on the Intensive Margin of Imports 
 
344.     The potential impact of implementing hypothetical zero-tariff PTAs with two of Pakistan’s 
main trade partners, namely the EU-27 and the US is estimated along with two additional scenarios 
for comparison: (i) all currently signed PTAs (China, Malaysia, and SAFTA) would lead to full tariff 
liberalization, and (ii) simultaneous implementation of all PTAs (currently signed and hypothetical 
ones). 
 
345.     The implementation of a PTA with the EU-27 would have about the same impact on imports 
as the implementation of all previously signed PTAs by Pakistan. A PTA with the EU-27 would 
increase imports by an extra 3.2 percent over the 3.4 percent increase resulting from the 
implementation of the signed PTAs analyzed in the previous section—for a total import increase of 
6.6 percent. The marginal increase of implementing a PTA with the US is lower and would further 
increase imports by 0.8 percent over the increase that result by implementing all signed PTAs (for a 
total increase of 4.2 percent) (Figure 58). 
 
346. Imports from EU-27 and from the 
US would increase significantly with the 
 
Figure 58. Import Change, Percent 2009 Total Imports 
8 
implementation of a zero-tariff PTA while 
imports from Japan, Korea and Thailand 
6 
would be significantly affected by the 
proposed PTAs.139   However, if a PTA were 
4 
to be signed with the US, imports from this 
destination would grow by 19.9 percent 
while imports from the EU-27 would 
2
 
decline by 3.2 percent. Conversely, if a PTA 
were to be signed with EU-27 but not with 
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the US, imports from the former would 
increase by 21.8 percent while imports from 
the latter would decline by 4.9 percent (Table 33). 
All signed Signed  + US  Signed  + EU-27Signed  + EU-27 
+ US 
 
139 
If both hypothetical scenarios were implemented, imports from Japan (-6.8%), Korea (-7.0%) and Thailand (- 
5.9%) would be significantly affected while imports from the US (17.1%) and the EU-27 (20.8%) would grow by 
double digits. 
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Table 33. Changes in Bilateral Imports from Main Partners as a Result of PTAs 
 
 Proposed PTAs 
Partner All signed PTAs All current + US All current + EU-27 All current + US + EU-27 
China 
Saudi Arabia 
UAE 
Kuwait 
United States 
Japan 
India 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Korea, Rep. 
Thailand 
Australia 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Singapore 
Canada 
28.0 
-0.3 
-0.7 
-0.4 
-1.6 
-3.0 
11.6 
-0.5 
-3.4 
-3.5 
-0.3 
-2.4 
34.2 
-1.5 
-0.7 
27.5 
-0.3 
-0.8 
-0.4 
19.9 
-3.9 
11.5 
-0.6 
-3.8 
-3.9 
-0.5 
-2.6 
33.8 
-2.2 
-1.1 
25.7 
-0.4 
-1.2 
-0.5 
-4.9 
-5.8 
10.9 
-0.8 
-6.4 
-5.4 
-1.4 
-3.5 
32.8 
-3.7 
-2.1 
25.1 
-0.5 
-1.5 
-0.5 
17.1 
-6.8 
10.8 
-0.9 
-7.0 
-5.9 
-1.7 
-3.8 
32.3 
-4.5 
-2.6 
EU-27 -2.2 -3.2 21.8 20.8 
Germany 
United Kingdom 
Italy 
Finland 
France 
-2.5 
-1.9 
-2.5 
-2.7 
-1.9 
-3.6 
-3.1 
-4.2 
-3.3 
-3.1 
24.1 
19.1 
28.7 
22.7 
20.0 
23.1 
18.8 
27.0 
22.1 
18.8 
 
 
E.        Fiscal Impact and Welfare Gains 
 
347.     The fiscal impact of signing a zero-tariff PTA with the EU-27 would be significant and added 
to the impact of already signed PTAs would result in a 41.7 percent loss of tariff revenue. The 
additional impact of implementing a PTA with the EU-27 is US$ 541 million or 18.7 percent of tariff 
revenues in 2009. Adding the costs of already signed PTA would bring the total revenue impact to 
US$ 1,204 million or 41.7 percent of revenues. The additional fiscal cost of adding a PTA with the 
US is significantly lower at US$ 159 million or 5.5 percent of 2009 tariff revenues and a total impact 
(including signed PTAs) of US$ 822 or 28.5 percent of tariff revenues. Figures 59 and 60 and Table 
34 provide the welfare gain estimates net of the tariff revenue loss. 
 
Figure 59. Tariff revenue losses (US$ million) Figure 60. Welfare gains (US$ million) 
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Table 34. Changes in Tariff Revenue and Welfare as a Result of Proposed FTAs 
 
    
 
 
 
 
1. China 
2. India 
3. Malaysia 
4. SAFTA 
-525 
-65 
-70 
-74 
-18.2 
-2.2 
-2.4 
-2.6 
90.3 
7.3 
16.7 
8.2 
8.3 
13.7 
13.7 
13.6 
All signed (1+3+4) -663 -23.0 111.3 7.6 
All signed + US 
All signed + EU-27 
All signed + US + EU-27 
-822 
-1,204 
-1,347 
-28.5 
-41.7 
-46.7 
134.7 
191.2 
207.7 
6.5 
4.6 
3.7 
 
F. Beyond Tariffs and Market Access 
 
348.     PTAs are not only about lowering tariffs and gaining better market access abroad. Focusing 
on tariffs and market access only is missing a lot of the action that takes place in preferential 
agreements (Chaffour and Maur, 2011). There are wider-ranging motivations for countries to engage 
in  PTAs.  These  include  the  need  to  gain  credibility,  political  motives  and,  increasingly,  the 
willingness to signal openness to investors and to achieve deeper commitments in response to the 
emergence of supply-chain production as a prominent mode of twenty-first century economic 
integration. Global value chains have grown dramatically over the past two decades and are now 
responsible for a large share of global trade and an even larger share of trade within Asia. Traditional 
trade  policy  tools  and  trade  agreements  are  based  on  a  conceptual  framework  of  producer  to 
consumer trade where countries efforts were aimed at enhancing market access. By contrast, the 
demand from industry is increasingly more complex. 
 
349.     Indeed, ample evidence shows that the commitments in PTAs cover a large number of non- 
tariff policy areas and have become deeper over time. The WTO has recently compiled a dataset 
reviewing in detail the coverage and legal enforceability of all PTAs having been notified to the 
WTO (WTO, 2011). The identification of the policy areas and the definition of enforceability are 
based on Horn et al. (2010). The WTO analysis shows that commitments in services, investment, 
intellectual property protection, technical barriers to trade and competition policy loom large in PTAs 
(Table 35). 
Table 35. Policy Areas Covered by PTAs 
 
Shallower PTAs policy areas Deeper PTAs policy areas 
 Competition Policy SME 
FTA Industrial TRIPs Economic Policy Dialogue 
FTA Agriculture IPR Statistics 
Customs Movement of Capital Human Rights 
AD Investment Political Dialogue 
CVM Environmental  Laws Illicit Drugs 
Export Taxes Research and Technology Anti-Corruption 
TBT Agriculture Data Protection 
GATS Regional Cooperation Audio Visual 
State Aid Education and Training Illegal Immi gration 
STE Labour Market Regulation Money Laundering 
Public Procurement Visa and Asylum Health 
SPS Energy Mining 
TRIMs Industrial Cooperation Taxation 
 Cultural Cooperation Public Administration 
 Social Matters Terrorism 
 Consumer Protection Nuclear Safety 
 Approximation of Legislation Innovation Policies 
 Financial Assistance Civil Protection 
 Information Society  
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350.     Reflecting changes in underlying realities, also the content of the more recent bilateral trade 
agreements undersigned by Pakistan with China and Malaysia, respectively, goes beyond market 
access. Table 36 compares the different structure of provisions regulating Pakistan’s PTA with 
SAFTA (a shallow agreement) and the agreement recently signed with China (the deepest of all of 
Pakistan’s PTAs). While the bilateral agreement with SAFTA only deals with tariffs for agricultural 
and industrial goods, the agreement between Pakistan and China covers non-tariff measures, services 
and regulatory matters, including—among others—provisions regulating the mutual recognition of 
services suppliers and other technical barriers to trade, international property rights and the 
establishment of Chinese investment zones in Pakistan. The preferential trade agreement between 
Pakistan and Malaysia is also deep in nature, and includes investment provisions in the fields of 
computer and IT related services, Islamic Banking, Islamic Insurance and mutual recognition 
arrangements for accreditation of education institution and academic programs. All remaining PTAs 
listed in Table 36 are shallow in nature, i.e. they primarily cover issues of market access. 
 
Table 36. Provisions in Pakistan’s PTAs with SAFTA Partners and China 
 
PTA SAFTA PAK-CHN 
 Provision Legally 
enforceable? 
Provision Legally 
enforceable? 
FTA Industrial 1 yes 1 yes 
FTA Agriculture 1 yes 1 yes 
Customs 1  1 yes 
Export Taxes 0  1 yes 
SPS 0  1 yes 
TBT 1  1 yes 
AD 0  1  
CVM 0  1  
State Aid 0  1  
IPR 0  1 yes 
Investment 0  1 yes 
Total 4 2 11 8 
Source: WTO (2011) 
 
 
351.     Other tools have been increasingly used, globally and in Pakistan, which are complementary 
in coverage to PTAs in their role of creating a framework of trade and investment rules able to 
address the emergence of supply-chain production as a prominent mode of twenty-first century 
economic integration. These include bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and double taxation treaties 
(DTTs). Generally speaking, investment and trade are regulated by distinct treaties because they 
focus on different but complementary objectives (Di Mascio and Pawelyn, 2008). Trade agreements 
seek to increase trading opportunities and investment agreements seek to protect and promote foreign 
investment. BITs have been an important vehicle that capital abundant countries have used to 
guarantee investment protection (Adlung and Molinuevo, 2008) and that labor-abundant counterparts 
have used to attract off-shored manufacturing jobs and factories (Baldwin, 2010). 
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352.     As of 2011, Pakistan had signed 47 such agreements (Table 37).140 These are agreements that 
establish disciplines that govern interactions between private foreign investors and host governments. 
In the case of Pakistan, most of the bilateral investment agreements are aimed at avoiding double 
taxation and at facilitating trade and investment. While Pakistan’s older bilateral investment 
agreements were with developed countries, the more recent agreements are increasingly South-South 
in nature. This parallels developments in trade in parts, which from North-North developed into 
North-South and now increasingly extent to South-South deals. 
 
353.     According to Bergstrand and Egger (2011), the likelihood that a country-pairs establishes 
BITs and PTAs is higher: the larger and the more similar in income level the two countries are and 
the closer geographically the two countries are. Nevertheless, while the likelihood of signing PTAs is 
higher if the country shares a border and a language, for BITs the opposite is true. Countries that do 
not share a border or a language are more likely to sign investment agreements. Finally BITs tend to 
be more frequent between skilled labor abundant countries. 
 
Table 37. Pakistan Bilateral Investment Agreements 
 
       
Pakistan BITs Signature Entry into force  Pakistan BITs Signature Entry into force 
       
Germany 1959 1962  Denmark 1996  
Romania 1978 1978  Indonesia 1996  
Sweden 1981 1981  Syria 1996  
France 1983 1984  Tunisia 1996  
Kuwait 1983   Belarus 1997  
Korea, 1988 1990  Italy 1997 2001 
Netherlands 1988 1989  Mauritius 1997  
China 1989 1990  Oman 1997  
Uzbekistan 1992   Sri  Lanka 1997  
Spain 1994 1996  Australia 1998 1998 
Turkmenistan 1994   Belgium-Luxembo 1998  
United Kingdom 1994 1994  Japan 1998 2002 
Azerbaijan 1995   Czech Republic 1999  
Bangladesh 1995 1997  Philippines 1999  
Iran 1995 1998  Qatar 1999  
Kyrgyz Republic 1995   Egypt 2000  
Malaysia 1995   Bosnia and  Herzeg 2001  
Portugal 1995 1996  Lebanon 2001 2003 
Romania 1995 1996  Morocco 2001  
Singapore 1995   Kazakhstan 2003  
Switzerland 1995 1996  Cambodia 2004  
Turkey 1995 1997  Lao 2004  
United Arab emirat 1995   Tajikistan 2004  
source: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet   
 
 
 
 
 
 
140  
An alternative source of information on BITs is  UNCTAD: http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp 
?intItemID=3150&lang=1. 
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G.        Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of Pakistan’s PTAs 
 
354.     Several studies have examined the impact of PTAs and tested the traditional theories of trade 
creation and trade diversion. While theoretical models identify a number of channels for trade 
creation, empirically, the effect may be different from agreement to agreement. As concerns trade 
diversion, theoretical models also identify a number of channels through which non-preferential trade 
partners can be harmed by PTAs. Empirically, the effect of trade diversion of existing PTAs 
worldwide has been estimated to be of second order importance (Freund and Ornelas, 2010). 
Notwithstanding the general results, it may be more relevant in some specific cases. Hence, in this 
section the effect of agreements undersigned by Pakistan to date is tested in terms of trade creation 
and diversion and their value is compared to the effect for PTAs worldwide. This is a more complete 
assessment of the effects of PTAs on trade than the one carried out earlier in the report by simulation 
analysis, in several respects: both trade creation and trade diversion are measured; effects on overall 
trade and separately for the intensive margin of trade are estimated; the evolution of trade and trade 
policy linkages among third countries is accounted; and finally, different types of agreements are 
distinguished. 
 
355.     To test for trade creation and diversion a standard tool of analysis is used: the gravity model. 
This methodology has been extensively used by economists to test empirically the determinants of 
trade flows, and in particular to evaluate trade policy effects. It is particularly well suited for 
estimating the effect of preferential trade opening on trade flows as this was the purpose in its 
original formulation by Tinbergen (1962). The state of the art of gravity equation has become very 
sophisticated. The specification reflects indications from the numerous empirical and theoretical 
contributions that have allowed over the years to generate consensus around the key features that a 
well specified gravity model should have. In particular, the chosen specification controls for all 
unobservable exporter and importer characteristics and for any idiosyncratic factor related to the 
year, the bilateral relationship, and the individual nation. It also corrects for non-linearity, potential 
selection bias, heterogeneity and zeroes in the data. 
 
356.     One finds that in the period 2005-2010 and for a sample of 181 countries worldwide, PTAs 
had overall positive trade creation effects. These effects however stemmed completely from deeper 
PTAs, with shallower PTAs having a statistically not significant or weakly significant effects overall. 
Turning to the effect of PTAs on Pakistan’s exports, it appears that signing PTAs has not boosted 
Pakistan’s exports. By contrast, they did not have trade diversion effects on Pakistan’s imports from 
third country. On the contrary, they made Pakistan more attractive as an export destination also for 
the rest of the world. 
 
357.     Having quantified the trade creation and trade diversion effects of Pakistan’s PTAs, whether 
Pakistan’s  exports  suffered  from  trade  agreements  between  third  countries  is  tested.  More 
specifically whether Pakistan’s exports have suffered from trade diversion generated by any of 
existing PTAs notified to the WTO is quantified. While PTAs in aggregate do not seem to have 
noticeable trade diversion effects, they do for exports of Pakistan. Pursell et al. (2011) notes that the 
complex system of regulatory duties set in place to protect domestic producers of import competing 
goods may indeed be a source of trade diversion costs. Since countries having signed PTAs with 
Pakistan are exempt from the regulatory duties foreseen in Pakistan’s tariff system, this may 
ultimately lead to protect its own high cost producers and high cost producers in the preferential 
supplying country, leading to trade diversion costs for Pakistan itself. 
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358.     Interestingly Pakistan also appears disadvantaged in terms of its geographical position and 
the strained trade relations with its geographical neighbors. More specifically, while the elasticity of 
Pakistan’s exports to tariff changes is in line with the world average, Pakistan’s trade seems to be 
more elastic to trade frictions than the world average. The elasticity of Pakistan’s trade to distance— 
a common proxy for trade costs—is about 30 percent higher than the world average. Sharing a border 
(contiguity) usually facilitates trade. In the case of Pakistan sharing a border appears to represent an 
additional substantial burden to trade. Not only sharing a border appears to be a trade cost for 
Pakistan’s exports, but the overall effect is so important that it doubles the cost of distance. In other 
words, exporting to two equidistant locations, one in a neighboring country and one in a non- 
contiguous market, implies twice the cost if exports go to the neighboring country. These insights are 
confirmed if actual vs. predicted flows are compared. Trade with India is 40 percent below its 
predicted potential (Figure 61). Similarly, Pakistan is the key missing market for India (Figure 62), 
once more confirming that both countries would gain by a normalization of their trade relations. 
 
Figure 61. Pakistan’s Predicted vs. Actual Exports 
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Figure 62. India’s Predicted vs. Actual Exports 
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H.        PTAs Impact on Export Growth 
 
359.     While the previous section has followed a mainstream approach to evaluating preferential 
trade policy in Pakistan, this section goes beyond aggregate values and average effects. It looks at the 
impact on individual exporters’ decisions. There are several advantages in quantifying the impact of 
trade policy directly on individual firms’ export flows. Most importantly, it allows looking at the 
impact of trade policy on different types of decisions the firm makes: whether to start exporting vs. 
entering in a new market or increasing the product range of exports. Discriminating is important for 
policymakers as modifying the impact of trade policy on these decisions requires different policy 
actions. Moreover, it allows one to address a common criticism of aggregate analysis: the 
identification of heterogeneity in the treatment effects. 
 
360.     Given the above, one first investigates how the growth of exports along the various margins 
of trade evolves over time. Looking at the time evolution of the margins of trade is useful on account 
of the gradual shift of trade policy in the past decade, from a relatively simple framework based on 
multilateralism and unilateralism to a more complex framework of preferential trade agreements and 
exceptions. Second further tests will be carried out by means of econometric analysis, with 
preferential trade agreement variables. For both exercises, export growth performance along the firm, 
market and product margins are quantified, as well as at the intensive margin. Outcomes at the 
extensive margin as a measure of diversification are interpreted. The extensive margin is defined as a 
new flow, where one further distinguishes between new firms starting an export activity (firm 
diversification), an incumbent exporter entering new destinations (market diversification), and an 
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incumbent exporter exporting new products in destinations where it is already present (product 
diversification).141 
 
361.     Starting with the decomposition  of export  growth,  one can  quantify the  contribution  to 
overall annual export growth in the period 2002-2010 of each of the margins of trade, and within 
each margin one can further decompose the contribution of entries separated from exits. Export 
growth is computed using the so called “mid-point growth rate” (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992 as 
applied to firm-level exports Bricongne et al. 2011). An interesting fact emerges from the export 
growth decomposition. Namely, entries and exits at the firm, sector and product level have declined 
over  time,  possibly  indicating  a  decrease  in  the  dynamism  of  exports  in  Pakistan,  a  stronger 
positional advantage of incumbent exporters and a lack of incentives for the latter to innovate. Many 
important changes took place in Pakistan over the past decade, which may explain these trends in 
firms' export growth. 
 
362.    Accordingly, the econometric assessment quantifies the effect of preferential trade policy, 
estimating separately shallow and deep PTAs. It does so by controlling for the impact of tariffs, 
exchange rates, fixed costs to export and foreign demand on the ability of firms to increase their 
exports at the intensive margin and at the extensive margin. 
 
363.     Once one controls for traditional determinants of exports, including developments in foreign 
demand, exchange rate, and a proxy for the fixed costs to export—that are approximated with the 
change in total number of days for handling customs procedures (summing costs at the importer and 
exporter side)142—one find that the key results on the effects of preferential trade policy that emerged 
from the gravity equation on aggregate flows are confirmed by the micro-data. Shallow PTAs do not 
seem to have a statistically significant impact on firms’ exports, while deep PTAs have a positive and 
significant impact. Engaging into a deep PTA may increase firm exports by up to 21 percent. 
Meanwhile, one finds that changes in the average tariff level have no significant impact on export 
growth but the complexity of the tariff regime does. One standard deviation increase in tariff 
complexity implies a reduction in firms’ exports by 13 percent. 
 
364.     The econometric framework allows determining the effect on each margin of firm export 
growth of the trade policy stance. Accordingly, the overall non-significance of shallow PTAs for 
trade appears to be the result of contrasting effects on the various margins of trade. Indeed, shallow 
PTAs have a positive effect on the intensive margin of trade. They also seem useful in bringing more 
firms to export and to expand the number of markets served. However these effects are fully offset 
by a dampening in terms of product variety. In other words, shallow preferential agreements are 
likely to create market distortions that dampen firms drive to innovate and diversify. By contrast, 
deep PTAs seem to have positive trade creation effects along all margins. Tariff complexity on the 
other hand seems to be a burden for firms’ ability to start exporting, for their ability to increase the 
volume of exports at the intensive margin and for their propensity to diversify. Finally, the fixed 
costs to export appears to be by far the most important impediment to export diversification, having a 
sizeable and statistically negative effect on all the extensive margins of trade. Not surprisingly, the 
negative  effects  at  the  extensive  margin  are  partially offset  at  the  intensive  margin.  Arguably, 
 
141 
Note that this definition involves a hierarchy along the different dimensions of the extensive margin. That is to 
say, product diversification is contingent to a firm being already an exporter serving the same market. We keep this 
pecking order along the text. 
142 
While this is only a partial measure of fixed costs to export, we assume that it is representative of more general 
issues. We assume that a reduction in the number of days for customs handling is likely to be correlated with a more 
general public effort to reduce a range of costs affecting firms. 
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burdens to export are likely to create a competitive advantage for incumbents (Figure 63 provides a 
graphical representation, where their effect is benchmarked against the effect of the other trade costs 
variables in the specification). 
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Figure 63. Determinants of Export Growth and Diversification 
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CHAPTER VI. TRADE POLICY RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS 
 
A.        Introduction 
 
365.     Following a renewed focus on the importance of global competitiveness and integration for 
growth and poverty reduction, the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) launched an initiative in 2007 to 
develop an institute capable of providing policy advice backed by high quality research and analysis. 
New leadership was set in place in July 2007 at the Foreign Trade Institute of Pakistan (FTIP) to 
transform what had essentially been the training institute for officers of the Commerce and Trade 
(C&T) Group occupation category of the federal civil service, into such an institute. A government 
change in March 2008 saw continued support for the FTIP restructuring, and a revamped institute, 
renamed the Pakistan Institute of Trade and Development (PITAD), was launched in January 2009. 
 
366.     The Bank’s involvement with the FTIP began in 2008 when in a show of support by the 
Commerce Ministry, the institute was designated to receive the MOC’s allocation of funds from the 
World Bank’s Pakistan Public Sector Capacity Building Project (PSCB). In this context, the World 
Bank Institute (WBI) was invited by the FTIP to assess its capacity building needs and prepare a 
Capacity Building Strategy and Implementation Plan to achieve the dual goals of improving its 
training capabilities and developing its research capacity. A report was prepared in June 2008 which 
outlined proposals for implementation in the short and medium term with respect to institutional 
design, scaling up training programs, research capacity building, and outreach and policy 
dissemination. 
 
367.     In a short period, the FTIP/PITAD made significant strides in its transformation, exhibited 
dynamic growth and attempted to fill a void in a lackluster national research environment on 
competitiveness and integration. In the meantime, the Bank moved beyond a retail model of research 
support to developing countries (where Bank staff provide research outputs) to one that included a 
wholesale model (where the Bank provides data and analytical tools so that researchers in developing 
countries are able to produce research themselves and develop home-grown solutions to policy 
problems).  In this context, and consistent with the South Asia Regional strategy and the country 
partnership strategy, Non- Lending Technical Lending Assistance (NLTA) was extended to Pakistan 
to support evidence-based policy making. The aims of the NLTA were to provide activities and 
advisory services to PITAD that aimed to (i) build its research capacity, (ii) upgrade its training 
function, and (iii) coalesce and stimulate a disjointed trade research community under PITAD’s 
leadership,  thus  boosting  the  research  output  of  the  wider  community  and  promoting  policy 
discussion and debate. 
 
368.     This section covers the activities of the NLTA in support of PITAD, outlines its results and 
outcomes in terms of PITAD activities and developments in trade policymaking in Pakistan. It makes 
the case for continued support to PITAD and identifies strategies to consolidate and accelerate the 
significant progress already made by PITAD. The section is organized in the following manner. 
Trade policy context and the institutional context in which PITAD operates is discussed and 
recommendations provided. Then a brief profile of PITAD is provided, followed by the context for 
the NLTA in terms of the Bank strategy of research capacity wholesaling, as well as its role with the 
strategy for the region and the country with a description of the activities carried out to strengthen 
research  capacity,  support  training  and  coalesce  the  wider  trade  community.  The  results  and 
outcomes of these activities are discussed and the case for continued support to PITAD based on 
these results and outcomes is provided. The way forward in terms of design and implementation 
strategies for capacity building in the short and medium term to upgrade its training capacity, 
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strengthen its research capacity and catalyze the wider trade community is discussed, as well as the 
potential scope for Bank support within this framework. 
 
B.        Institutional Context of Trade Policy Analysis 
 
369.     The  Commerce  Ministry  has  nine  wings:  Import,  Export,  and  Foreign  Trade-I,  Foreign 
Trade-II, Foreign Trade-III, Administration, International Trade Organization, World Trade 
Organization, and Trade Organization Wings. It has over 50 Trade Offices in 40 countries. The 
Ministry also has eight statutory/autonomous/semi-autonomous bodies under its administrative 
control: Trade Development Authority of Pakistan, National Tariff Commission, Pakistan Institute of 
Trade and Development, Pakistan Tobacco Board, Trading Corporation of Pakistan, State Life 
Insurance Corporation, National Insurance Company Limited, and Pakistan Re-Insurance Company 
Limited. 
 
370.     Institutional reform to support the Commerce Ministry in achieving the national goals of the 
rapid export growth has been focused on three agencies (i) The Trade Development Authority 
(TDAP), (ii) The National Tariff Commission (NTC), and (iii) the Pakistan Institute of Trade and 
Development (PITAD) formerly known as the Foreign Trade Institute of Pakistan (FTIP). 
 
371.     The  Trade  Development  Authority  of  Pakistan  (TDAP)  was  created  in  November  2006 
through an Ordinance to replace the Export Promotion Board (EPB), which since 1963 tried to 
expand exports, on the demand side by exporter participation in exhibitions abroad and sending 
delegations to export markets, and on the supply side by establishing 32 sector training institutes. The 
TDAP  has  been  given  a  wider  mandate  than  the  EPB  that  includes  export  marketing  (market 
research, fairs and exhibitions, trade delegations abroad), communication (publication of trade 
inquiries/opportunities, export intelligence bulletin, statistics), human resource development (training 
institutes,  training  on  TQM,  social,  regulatory  and  environmental  compliance  concerns)  and 
regulation (developing and implementing trade policy, issuance of GSP certificates). The TDAP is 
not an attached department like its predecessor, and has financial and administrative autonomy, 
reporting directly to a Board chaired by the Minister of Commerce, and consisting of public and 
private sector stakeholders. This is expected to boost the effectiveness of the institution, by making 
its activities more relevant, allowing it greater freedom for quick response actions and reducing 
bureaucratic hurdles. TDAP’s successes have been centered around the participation in trade fairs 
and trade delegations. Since the inception of the new institution, there has been a significant increase 
in these marketing activities with substantial subsidization of costs for exporters financed through a 
tax on exports. However, the TDAP is weak on research. 
 
C.        A Transformative Paradigm—From FTIP to TDAP 
 
372.     The Foreign Trade Institute of Pakistan (FTIP) was created in 1989 within the Ministry of 
Commerce with the goals of providing training, research and information dissemination. By the 
FTIP’s  self-assessment  (Yatawara,  2008),  the  Institute’s  performance  was  “largely  focused  on 
training with very little work on research and dissemination” and characterized by a “weak outreach 
program” and “poor linkages & networking.” The need for the PITAD to acquire technical research 
expertise was first highlighted in the Trade Policy Speech of 2004/5 by the Government to the 
Parliament, which called for FTIP upgrading. 
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“The Foreign Trade Institute of Pakistan (FTIP) will be strengthened by enhancing the 
capacity of the Institute faculty. The physical resources of the Institute will be improved and 
it will also be shifted to a new building with adequate space and facilities. The upgraded 
Institute will be tasked to carry out research and conduct periodic refresher courses.” 
 
373.     This led to the reconstitution of the FTIP Board of Governors to include more representatives 
of the private sector and the hiring of a consultancy firm to analyze the strategies of restructuring the 
FTIP to achieve its original goals. A new Director- General (DG) was hired in December 2006, and 
took office at the FTIP headquarters in July 2007. In the Trade Policy Speech 2007/08 (July 2007) 
the Minister of Commerce addressed the need for institutional reform, stating that the ministry’s 
effectiveness was restricted by the lack of an effective research arm, and committed resources to 
revamping the FTIP. 
 
374.    A major constraint in the past has been the lack of effective research and information on 
multipronged trade and globalization issues. The FTIP was created in 1989 with the objective of 
providing this research base but in fact was reduced to an average institute providing some training to 
new officers of the Commerce and Trade Group. 
 
375.     In order to plug the original research gap, the Government has decided to replace the FTIP 
with the Trade Competitiveness Institute of Pakistan. 143 In addition to conducting policy research on 
all key aspects of trade competitiveness, this institute will be the premier body for capacity building 
and human capital development on commerce. This Institute will also provide an important forum for 
the discussion and dissemination of information on issues of commerce. For enhancing the capacity 
of this institute to carry out its changed role effectively; a PC-I Rs.130 million144 has already been 
approved by Planning Commission. 
 
376.     Since July 2007, the Institute has been in an active restructuring process with a new mission 
aimed at producing “quality research inputs, trained human resources and policy advice to all 
stakeholders to make them competitive in their respective domains/ sectors, nationally and 
internationally.” 145 
 
D.        PITAD Structure and Management 
 
377.     The PITAD is under the administrative control of the Commerce Ministry and was declared a 
semi-autonomous body through a Resolution. All financial requirements are met by the Federal 
Government. Management structure. PITAD’s management structure was revamped to suit its new 
research function.  It is headed by a Director-General, and has 3 Directors for training, policy and 
research, and administration/finance. The research wing has an additional “Joint Director” of 
Research.  The Institute has been graced by strong, effective results-oriented leadership—first with 
Dr. Safdar Sohail as Director General through June 2010 and then with Mr. Asaf Ghafoor at the 
helm. Both hail from the civil service cadre of the Commerce Ministry with expansive trade 
experience. Under the new leadership, there has been a greater emphasis in providing analytical 
inputs for evidence-based policy making at the Commerce Ministry. 
 
 
 
 
 
143 
The name finally settled at Pakistan Institute of Trade and Development. 
144 
Approximately US$2 million at the time, at the June 30, 2007 exchange rate of Pakistani Rs. 60.95 per US dollar. 
145 
Yatawara (2008). 
129  
378.     There  are  currently 12  staff  actively  pursuing  research,  including  the  Director  General. 
PITAD has not reached its full staff strength, and actively seeks well-trained staff. The Director 
Research has a PhD in Economics from Australian National University, Canberra. There are 4 senior 
research associates and 4 research associates. The senior research associates typically have a Masters 
in Economics, and at least 2 years of research experience. The young staff are of high quality, 
hardworking, energetic and eager to learn. Fifty percent of the senior research associates and the 
research  associates  are  women.  Employees  receive  wages  substantially  higher  than  typical 
government employees, but these salaries are still lower than those in the private sector for similarly 
qualified individuals. New employees are hired on a contract basis, while some commerce ministry 
are seconded to PITAD. 
 
379.    Currently the office is located at State Life Building No.7, Jinnah Avenue, Blue Area, 
Islamabad. Although located in an old building, the PITAD office space was overhauled into a nice 
modern open space office area, with new furniture and new computers. Land has been procured and 
financial resources allocated by the Ministry of Commerce to construct a building for the PITAD in 
Sector H-9, Islamabad, but currently there is no mobilization of resources for construction. 
 
E.        Research Activities 
 
380.     The principle areas of research and policy work listed are: 
 
 Trade liberalization and its impact on the economy 
 
 Market access strategies and trade integration 
 
 Trade competitiveness 
 
 Trade promotion and trade facilitation 
 
 Barriers to trade 
 
 Comparative analysis of competitors’ trade policies 
 
 Domestic commerce 
 
 Trade and the environment 
 
 Technology and innovation 
 
381.     Since the restructuring, much research has been conducted and presented in Pakistan and in 
the South Asian region. PITAD conducts research in-house as well as through partnerships with 
outside researchers/institutions and also manages research studies outsourced by the MOC. Much of 
the work has focused on analyzing preferential trade agreements and sector competitiveness.  PITAD 
is also actively pursuing an innovation policy study, devising strategies to spur innovation through 
public-private partnerships (government-academia-industry) that would in turn increase the quality 
and competitiveness of Pakistani products. 
 
382.     Training activities: The main training programs offered are listed below: 
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 The Specialized Training Program (STP) is the core training program offered annually by the 
PITAD. It is a 9 month comprehensive course, offered to entry level candidates of the 
Commerce and Trade (C&T) Group of the Ministry of Commerce. The annual entry class 
size ranges from 10 to 20 candidates, depending on the retirement of the C&T cadre which 
amounts to about 345 officers. The course covered basic theory of microeconomics and trade, 
Pakistan’s current trade patterns and issues, trade laws, WTO issues, export promotion and 
business management. There is also a research component which involves a sector-wise 
analysis. 
 
 Capacity Building Program is a 12 day program with two modules, designed for mid-level 
C&T officers at the BS17-19 levels. The training was mandatory for promotion until May 
2007. 
 
 Orientation Course for Commercial Attaches selected for posting abroad. This training has a 
one week duration covering current trade issues, trade diplomacy, marketing Pakistan’s 
exports, and WTO issues, among other topics. 
 
 Foreign Service Academy Training  is a one week training designed for newly inducted 
Pakistani diplomats being posted abroad to promote Pakistani exports more effectively. This 
is a one week course for training diplomats prior to departure on foreign postings, on areas 
such as export promotion, investment policies and tourism promotion. 
 
383.     Recent introductions to the portfolio of courses include: 
 
 Executive Post Graduate Diploma Course was delivered “Applied Quantitative Research 
Techniques” catering to both the public and private sectors. Twenty–four participants 
completed the course. 
 
 Capacity Building program for Economic Journalists was conducted in collaboration with 
Journalists for Democracy and Human Rights.  The course was designed to increase the 
understanding of the complexities of globalization and improve the quality of economic 
reporting. 
 
384.     Outreach and Policy Dissemination: The PITAD has played an information dissemination 
role by organizing seminars and conferences on relevant topics, exposing stakeholders to new 
information and research on current issues and those directly related to their research program above. 
 
F.         The New Strategy for Research 
 
385.    As outlined in President Zoellick’s speech at Georgetown University on “Democratizing 
Development Economics” (September 2010) and the subsequent elaboration in World Bank 
publications, the Bank is embarking on a new approach to developing new solutions to the most 
pressing problems facing developing policymakers. The field of development economics has 
sometimes focused on questions that new data and new analytical tools can address, rather than 
priority issues and key knowledge gaps in development policy. Further, a greater focus is needed on 
the results of development policies and projects, to assess their effectiveness. It is important to adopt 
a practical approach to research, with its policy relevance being the fundamental objective of the 
work, as opposed to a by-product of academic pursuits. 
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G.        Activities Under the NLTA 
 
386.     The activities carried out under the NLTA were carried in accordance with client priorities, 
and the Bank budgetary and time constraints. The goals of PITAD are to provide quick response, 
high quality policy analyses to support evidence-based policy making at the MOC, longer analyses to 
support effective monitoring and evaluation of trade-related policies and outcomes, and longer term 
research on trade and competitiveness that would catalyze proactive policymaking, and offer 
opportunities for high-quality trade research economists to contribute intellectually to the global 
trade research community. 
 
1. Research Capacity Building 
 
387.     Activities carried out under the NLTA in support of PITAD included 
 
 identification and prioritization of capacity needs 
 
 delivery of capacity building activities 
 
 design of strategies for implementation of capacity requirements. 
 
388.     Research advisory services. Research advisory services were broad ranging and focused on 
reinforcing a strong foundation of fundamental skills as well as introducing frontier research topics 
and methodology. A common goal was established, and services provided included reviewing studies 
already drafted, assessing ongoing research work and designing approaches for new research on 
various trade topics ranging from preferential liberalization, non–tariff measures (NTMs) that affect 
trade, war on terror impacts on trade, and competitiveness of the textile industry, gender and trade, 
among other topics. Inputs varied from offering analytical content review to research design ideas, 
alternative methodological approaches, encouraging use of more disaggregated data, discussion of 
econometric results as well as quality control and confirmation. 
 
389.     Leapfrogging to the research frontier. Trade topics and methodologies (including new data 
sources) that were gaining momentum in the global trade research community were discussed. 
Presentations were provided to various government officials on the additional value of using customs 
transactions data to analyze export dynamics such as exporter firm survival. 
 
390.     Initiated  joint-  research.  A  research  proposal  was  developed  to  work  jointly  with  the 
Director Trade Policy and junior researchers to analyze the likely impact of EU’s trade concessions 
awarded to Pakistan to accelerate recovery after the devastation of the great flood of 2010. In the 
context of this work, introductory training on the statistical package STATA was provided to two 
young researchers. 
 
391.     Building a database of local data. A comprehensive proposal was produced to develop a 
trade database and portal to support research analysis, policy monitoring and evaluation (there is 
currently no national historical trade database in Pakistan). The key is to have access to the most 
recent data along with historical data, at the appropriate level of disaggregation through an easily 
accessible portal. Researchers tend to use international data sources from the World Bank, IMF, 
UNCTAD or ITC (e.g. TRAINS, COMTRADE). While these data provide a consistent dataset for 
cross-country comparison, they also have limitations that a PITAD database could address. First, 
there is a significant lag in reporting internationally comparable data, but national policymakers and 
the private sector are always interested in the latest data. Second, international data of trade flows are 
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consistent only at the HS 6 digit level of product disaggregation, when in fact much of trade policy in 
Pakistan is carried out at the more disaggregated HS 8 digit level, thus a database of trade flows at 
the 8 digit level is needed. Further, since local sources only provide data on the internet for a couple 
of years, or not in a format that facilitates analysis (e.g. 8 digit level tariffs in PDF document format), 
it will be worthwhile to create a national historical database that is updated as soon as data is released 
locally.  The  PITAD  should  maintain  a  monthly  trade  flows  data  set,  which  would  also  allow 
quarterly, and annual (both calendar year and July-June financial year) comparisons in trade flows. 
The trade flows data should be merged with the data on tariffs and other policy indicators to facilitate 
analysis. 
 
2. Training Activities 
 
392.     Trade  Indicator  Training.  A  structured  training  was  provided  on  trade  indicators, 
highlighting the breadth of indicators to assess a country’s trade and competitiveness profile, and 
pointing to the newest indicators that are publicly available. In particular, attention was drawn to the 
World Bank’s Open Data Initiative, with particular reference to WITS-World Integrated Trade 
Solution   and    http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/   and   the   World   Trade   Indicators   (WTI)   2010 
www.worldbank.org/wti. The WTI is an innovative benchmarking and ranking tool that provides a 
nation the ability to compare its trade and competitiveness profile vis-à-vis other countries. Various 
indicators were surveyed to develop a country’s trade profile under (i) trade policy, (ii) market access 
and external trade environment, (iii) business environment, (iv) trade facilitation and (v) trade 
outcomes. A training was provided on the Trade Indicators to the staff from the research department 
of the State Bank of Pakistan (8 people in Karachi). 
 
393.     Structured  Learning  -  lectures  on  the  Global  Recession.  Two  topics  were  presented: 
“Recent Trade Developments and the Global Recession”, and “Policy Responses During the 
Recession” for 34 civil service cadre that had joined the commerce ministry in addition to the 9 
research staff of PITAD. Topics included the expansion of trade from 2002, the food, fuel and 
financial crises, the trade collapse, analyzing the causes of the trade collapse, and the reasons for the 
differential impacts of the recession on goods versus services trade. The second lecture looked at the 
policy instruments available to a country in responding to the global recession, documented the use 
of stimulus packages, prevalence of trade remedy actions and growth of non-tariff measures and 
relatively mild use of tariff increases. Discussion followed on why the protection seen was not as 
dramatic as during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The usage of newly available data was 
highlighted. 
 
394.     Working  with  PITAD  foreign  donor  partners.  The  International  Food  Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) and the US Commerce Department were engaged to assure that PITAD training was 
consistent, and training initiatives were identified that could be funded by other donors that were 
beyond the scope of the current NLTA. In collaboration with the US Commerce Department’s 
Commercial Law Development Program, a training was provided on non–tariff measures to a 
delegation of Pakistani trade officials. 
 
395.     Advisory services on re-engineering the STP. Discussions were held on the content covered 
in the revamping of the STP course carried out by PITAD in collaboration with the World Trade 
Institute. 
 
396.     Preferential Trade Agreements Course proposal. Since regional trade integration is a key 
component of MOC trade strategies, a course on the latest issues in preferential trade agreements 
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(PTAs)   is  appropriate.   The   key  components  of  such   a   course   would   include   theoretical 
considerations, empirical methods used to analyze PTAs, relevant topics to be negotiated as well as 
implementation issues and the political economy of regional integration. 
 
H.        Coalescing the Trade Community, Building partnerships, and Outreach 
 
397.     Assessment of the Trade Research Landscape in Pakistan. As part of the piloting exercise 
of the  Trade  Department’s Export Competitiveness Toolkit,  discussions were  held with  several 
private sector firms, chambers of commerce, business associations, academic institutions, research 
institutes  and  governments  institutions.  The  visits  provided  an  opportunity  to  survey  the  trade 
research landscape in Pakistan. The key features of the trade research landscape are listed below. 
 
 Small, diffused and disconnected trade community. The community of trade researchers is 
small, and spread mainly over Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore. There was little evidence of 
collaboration outside the relevant institution. 
 
 Lack of trade specialization in institutions and individuals. Apart from PITAD, there was no 
institution that researchers would readily identify as a trade research institute or an institute 
or university that had a strong trade department. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Pakistan 
Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) was known for its strong trade focus, but that is 
not so currently. Similarly, there did not appear to be much of a trade specialization among 
economists. Pakistani economists have produced some good quality trade work but not in a 
consistent fashion. There was no prominent economist that could be labeled an eminent trade 
economist. 
 
398.     The contributing factors to include: 
 
 Insufficient research incentives in academia. Until recently, career advancement of entry 
level university lecturers/assistant professors was not significantly tied to academic research 
output. Lecturers contributed to consultancy work taken on by the Economics department, 
but academic publications were not a priority. 
 
 Previous neglect of trade policy in the public policy agendas. The relegation of trade policy 
in government priorities reduced the demand for trade-related analytical work. 
 
 Donor-driven  research  agenda.  The  research  agenda  of  development  economists  have 
become donor–driven in many instances. Universities and research institutes seeking funding 
opportunities cater to the demands of the donor community. As trade was not a priority 
agenda item among donors, the trade work has been limited in the lead up to Pakistan 
reserves crisis in 2008 and the global recession. 
 
399.     Emerging developments in the economics research community are: 
 
 Recent growth of policy research institutes. There has been a significant growth in research 
institutes and consultancy firms, often started by high profile former government officials or 
Pakistani nationals who have returned from working in international organizations. While 
these are high quality economists with well-deserved reputations, none would be readily 
identified as trade economists. Similarly, these research institutes are also broad in the scope 
of the work they undertake. 
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 Scarce mid-level human capital.  There is a scarcity of well—trained trade economists and in 
particular those with doctorates that are at the peak of their productivity. Instead, there are 
successful older economists and a very talented group of young economists. 
 
400.     Organization  of  meetings  with  trade  data  producers.  Meetings  of  PITAD  with  data 
producers at the State Bank of Pakistan and the Bureau of Statistics were organized. Previously such 
meetings were not typical. 
 
401.     Quarterly  International  Trade  Monitoring  Report  proposal.  This would be a  quarterly 
update on Pakistan trade situation which would be about 8 pages long. The objective would be to 
provide a brief analysis (two pages) of the most recent quarterly trade outturn and significant trade 
policy developments at home as well as international developments that would have an impact on 
Pakistan. The rest of the publication would be a series of figures and tables, highlighting aspects of 
the quarterly developments in the context of historical quarterly data.   This would be an exercise 
where the costs would involve initial high fixed costs of choosing the appropriate indicators and 
setting up a template. Once the template is setup, the goal is to have this publication be a low variable 
cost exercise. A trade profile using annual aggregate indicators could be placed under 4 categories 
such as (i) trade policy, (ii) market access, (iii) trade facilitation and (iv) trade outcomes. 
 
402.     The publication would also involve capturing trends in the levels of quarterly data, as well as 
growth rates. More disaggregated indicators at the product and market level that would highlight the 
largest increases and declines of exports and imports at the product or industry level would 
additionally  be  included.  A  similar  analysis  for  export  markets  and  import  sources  would  be 
displayed. No written analysis would be required beyond chart titles that highlight the main 
developments. At least 4 pages of the publication should be standardized tables that would be easily 
updated. The last page may be a continuation of the analysis, provide deeper product level or sector 
level analysis, contain a list of upcoming trade-related events, or have brief analyses of ongoing work 
at PITAD that would serve as publicity for an upcoming working paper. Besides writing the two page 
analysis of the quarterly trade outturn, senior staff need would not be burdened by this report. A 
natural partner for this endeavor would be the Bureau of Statistics, and this could be a joint 
publication of the two institutions, and made available on both websites. 
 
403.    Pakistan State of International Trade Annual Report proposal. As PITAD matures, the 
Institute should be positioned to launch its annual flagship publication, “State of International Trade 
in Pakistan” by 2014. This report should be of high quality, so that it will become a well-recognized 
and appreciated publication and PITAD’s largest outreach vehicle. 
 
404.     The first part of such a publication could be on trade policy developments and outlook, which 
would cover domestic policy developments in trade and related policies, as well as international 
policy developments affecting Pakistan. The Institute’s policy outlook and advice would also be 
included. Further it would provide a trade outturn analysis—showing trends with aggregated and 
disaggregated data. It is critical that this section is analytical, and for the first publication an analysis 
looking back three to five years of trade outcomes is warranted. The second part of the publication 
would be comprehensive analysis of a particular theme (which would change annually), with the 
content coming directly from PITAD’s ongoing research program. Given the current work program, 
a theme such as “Regional Integration” appears appropriate. This section may contain other research 
work condensed from working papers. Part 3 would be called Policy Briefs and these would be 3-5 
page analyses on highly relevant current topics. They could provide brief data analysis, or clarify 
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issues that are currently in hot debate where it has become hard for the public to decipher fact from 
rhetoric. The last section would contain a statistical appendix. 
 
405.     Pakistan   Trade   and   Development   Conference   (PAKTAD)   proposal.   An   excellent 
opportunity to coalesce the trade community and exhibit leadership would be to organize an annual 
trade conference to foster debate and dissemination of research work, as well as to ignite further 
analysis and collaboration. A call for papers should encourage policy related work from government, 
academia, research institutes and private organizations. Graduate students should be encouraged to 
apply with a small financial prize for the best graduate student paper and funding to provide 
accommodation and travel to Islamabad during the conference. The call for papers would typically be 
6 months before the conference with paper deadlines three months before the conference. 
 
I.         Results and Outcomes: PITAD Progress and Trade Policymaking in Pakistan 
 
406.     The items listed below reflect results of the technical assistance- some effects are more 
directly observable than others. While it is difficult to attach a specific degree of contribution, similar 
to estimating the size of the coefficient of a regression, the technical assistance contributed to these 
outputs in a statistically significant manner with the anticipated positive sign. The key results are 
increased awareness of new data, methods and topical directions that trade research was heading, as 
well as the acquisition and application of such information and skills to produce higher quality, more 
useful analytical outputs. Clearly, the efforts of PITAD staff are the dominant factor in the successful 
execution of research efforts. 
 
407.     The outcomes have been a vibrant and active trade policy agenda carried out by the MOC, 
with trade integration once again widely recognized as key to competitiveness, inclusive growth, job 
creation and poverty reduction. Trade policy initiatives taken in consultation with multiple 
stakeholders, include the historic progress towards normalization of trade relations with India. Such 
bold policy moves are unlikely to have proceeded without the analytical inputs of PITAD with 
respect to liberalization benefits with existing free trade agreements, as well as specific work related 
to the implications of liberalization with India and the identification of the constraints to current trade 
with India. 
 
 Launch of PITAD Working Paper Series. In 2010, PITAD launched a working series and 
posted the working papers on their website. This reflects a confidence in the quality of the 
work, greater transparency in its function and an interest in dissemination of analytical work 
to a broader audience. These papers reflect acquisition and application of new knowledge and 
skills, and incorporation of advisory services. 
 
 High quality analytical inputs from PITAD to the Commerce Ministry. PITAD has become 
the key source of analytical inputs to the MOC on a wide range of topics prior to trade 
negotiations, for policy formulation as well as for trade monitoring and evaluation. Examples 
of these inputs include analyzing China-Pakistan bilateral trade, exploring the impact of the 
Pakistan-Sri Lanka free trade agreement on exports to Sri Lanka, and assessing the barriers to 
trade with India through surveys conducted on the private sector. 
 
 Towards Open Data - Release of customs trade transactions actions data. Following careful 
explanations of the benefits of releasing customs transactions to facilitate analysis of trade at 
the firm level, the Customs Department released Pakistan’s data to the World Bank. 
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 Enhanced  networks.  PITAD  has  developed  improved  processes  for  collaboration  with 
external partners to bolster their research capacity and outreach. Working with the US 
Commerce Department (Commercial Law Development Program) has facilitated some 
training in innovation policy, commercial law and regional integration. Technical trade 
assistance for the MOC supplied by the EU is also channeled through PITAD. PITAD joined 
the UN ESCAP’s ARTNeT—a network of national-level research and academic institutions 
involved in trade research and located in ESCAP member countries. The network provides 
opportunities to (i) participate in technical training workshops and other capacity building 
activities,   (ii) participate in ARTNeT research projects and projects from international 
institutions, (iii) enhance networking with regional trade researchers and institutions, and (iv) 
expand dissemination of research to policymakers and researchers through the ARTNet 
website. PTAD is also using MOC’s commercial attaches as sources of market information 
in the countries they are based, in addition to their export promotion role. 
 
 PITAD building relationships with local data producers. The PITAD leadership has also 
begun to develop cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Statistics. 
 
 Enhanced  networks  for  upgrading  training  program.  PITAD  has  developed  improved 
processes for collaboration with external partners to re-engineer their training program. With 
regard to training, they have established a twinning agreement with the World Trade Institute 
(WTI) in Germany to support the restructuring of their hallmark STP course.  Faculty from 
the WTI work with faculty from PITAD on developing new modules for the course. 
 
 MOC Coalition Building for policy making.  PITAD’s policy work which has included 
surveys of the private sector, has increased the MOC’s ability to generate coalitions for 
reform. First, analytical work that also incorporates stakeholders feel their voice has been 
heard. Second, the awareness that policy initiatives are backed by analytic work, and policy 
monitoring will follow to capture unanticipated effects, gives stakeholders greater confidence 
to support reform and reduces their fears of departures from the status quo. 
 
 Vibrant  and  active  trade  policy  agenda  including  the  bold  move  to  normalize  trade 
relations  with  India.  These  initiatives have  the  potential  to  not  only stimulate  exports, 
growth and job creation in Pakistan, but also unleash regional integration and shared 
prosperity in the South Asian region. Policy initiatives include: 
 
o Normalization of trade relations with India: The plan to liberalize trade with 
India was announced in April 2011, with the announced intention to convert the 
positive list of allowable Indian imports to a “negative list”.  The two sides also 
agreed to improve trade infrastructure and expand trade through the Attari-Wagah 
land route.  Following the February 2012 first visit to Islamabad for substantive 
meetings by an Indian Minister of Commerce, the implementation of the negative 
list took effect on March 20, 2012 with the SRO 280( I) /2012- Amendment to 
Import Policy Order 2009. Pakistan is also expected to extend India its long 
withheld MFN (most-favored nation) status in January 2013. 
 
o The  year  2012  was  declared  the  “Year  of  Regional  Trade  and  Economic 
Connectivity” by the Prime Minister. 
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o Liberalization obligations were met under the SAFTA with a reduction of 233 
tariffs lines (20 percent of the 1,169 items) under the sensitivity list the SAFTA 
agreement. 
 
o The Afghanistan –Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement was signed in June 2011. 
 
o Pakistan joined the CAREC (Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation) as a 
full member in 2011, to promote cooperation in implementation of regional 
projects   in   energy,   transport,   and   trade   facilitation   among   Afghanistan, 
Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
 
o Connectivity was increased with the Middle East and Central Asia through the 
ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization) e.g. Islamabad –Tehran-Istanbul 
container train -2010. 
 
o Aggressive and fruitful trade diplomacy took place to obtain tariff concessions 
under the EU GSP+ scheme. 
 
408.     Importance of trade liberalization entrenched into development strategy. After a period, 
where trade and trade policy was neglected, a consensus has built up on the importance of trade 
integration for prosperity and job creation, and this culminated in the substantial role given to trade 
liberalization in the new growth strategy of the Planning Commission. 
 
J.         The Case For Accelerated World Bank Collaboration with PITAD 
 
409.     Demand-driven, client-owned initiative. The goal of enabling evidence-based policy making 
was an initiative of the MOC. PITAD has a strong mandate from the MOC, and in the last year there 
has been greater clarity in the relationship between PITAD and the MOC. The PITAD plays an 
important role in supplying inputs to support trade negotiations, policy formulation, and policy 
monitoring to assess needs for policy recalibration.  Strengthening research capacity at this time 
would be an essential, appropriate and compatible component of the MOC’s overall institutional 
reform package which includes an active Trade Development Authority of Pakistan doing export 
promotion, the National Tariff Commission handling contingent protection and unfair trade practices, 
and the PITAD providing training and research in trade issues. 
 
410.     Bold trade strategies require effective monitoring for sustainability. Given that the MOC 
has launched into bold strategies that would not only be beneficial for Pakistan, but also for the entire 
SAR region and Central Asia, it is important to support initiatives that would support sustainability 
of the reforms. Quick, accurate and effective monitoring would be needed to identify losers of reform 
and any unanticipated developments so that the MOC could take any remedial measures to foster 
inclusive growth. It is only with a well–equipped team that effectively analyzes developments are 
reforms likely to be sustained. In particular, given the size of India, the magnitude of effects may be 
large, and thus quick, effective analyses are crucial. 
 
411.     Immature local trade research environment. The erosion of the trade and competitiveness 
research environment in Pakistan needs support to incorporate new issues and methodologies that 
have engulfed the field such as the trade in tasks, heterogeneous firms, services trade and off-shoring, 
and trade facilitation. These new lenses of analyses are important for discussing traditional issues like 
regional integration. 
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412.     PITAD First Mover Advantage and Specialization. PITAD has clearly developed a first 
mover advantage and created a concentration of researchers around trade and competitiveness issues. 
Thus it is the clear choice for which to supply capacity development assistance. Given the immature 
state of the trade research community, PITAD support could also be channeled to coalesce the trade 
community and catalyze analytical endeavors to support policy formulation and results monitoring. 
Support from the World Bank in a larger fashion than previously and for a longer period (e.g., 3 
years) would also provide additional credibility to this young organization, in an incubation phase. It 
would  provide  an  attraction  to  prospective  employees  who  would  recognize  opportunities  for 
research capacity development and joint work with World Bank staff. 
 
413.     Result-oriented leadership at PITAD. The excellent development track record of PITAD 
may be attributed to its effective leadership, first with Director-General Dr. Safdar A. Sohail, and 
currently with Director- General Mr. Mohammed Gafoor. Under the current leadership, PITAD has 
consolidated its functions and shows clarity of mission. In the absence of substantial Bank assistance, 
it has developed alternative networks to support development of its training program, but still needs 
sustained effective support on the research capacity development. 
 
414.     Needs match strengths and imperatives of the Bank. Given the commitment from the MOC 
and the resulting availability of financial resources for the expansion of PITAD, the main constraint 
to growth is in the technical aspects of building research capacity. Given the lack of surplus trade 
researchers and a strong trade research community in Pakistan, the Bank has an important role to 
play to provide training in analysis of trade and competitiveness. Assistance to PITAD would be 
consistent with the Bank’s strategy to incorporate a “wholesale” strategy to analytical work, so that 
local researchers are empowered with technical skills to design insightful national strategies for 
inclusive growth and poverty reduction. Using technical expertise within and outside the World 
Bank, the Bank would be able to effectively advise PITAD on building research capacity, and 
actively  help  nurture  such  research  capacity  through  learning-by-doing,  by  partnering  with  the 
PITAD on some projects. 
 
415.     PITAD ready for absorbing greater assistance. The infrastructure has been set up at PITAD 
and the young researchers have a firm foundation from which to execute competent analyses. It is 
now an appropriate time to provide increased capacity development assistance as the researchers at 
PITAD are  at a  stage  that they would  be able to  absorb and exploit  more  sophisticated  Bank 
assistance effectively. The more senior researchers would also likely to find the Bank assistance 
catalytic. Thus the Bank would have high returns to this assistance. 
 
416.     Forum for trade policy formulation and analysis. Given the fragmentation of the trade 
policy formation process and jurisdiction over different policy instruments, the PITAD could also 
play an important role of not just bringing government and non-government stakeholders together, 
but also in convening the various different ministries and government departments that influence 
trade policy. This would promote greater harmonization of policies, as well as a clearer mandate and 
more efficient scope of work for different departments and ministries. 
 
K.        The Way Forward 
 
417.     The following outlines recommendations in terms of design and implementation strategies 
for PITAD to achieve goals of strengthening research capabilities, scaling up its training programs 
and coalescing the trade community and expanding its outreach. Potential World Bank initiatives that 
would contribute to the successful achievement of PITAD’s goals are also identified. 
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1. Strengthening PITAD Research Capacity 
 
418.     The recommendations here are based on (i) increasing the quality and scope of analytical 
work by introducing new methodologies, topics and data; (ii) increasing research productivity by 
developing systems to reduce fixed costs of analysis; and (iii) attracting and keeping high quality 
research staff. The short term and medium strategies for developing research capacity are discussed 
below. 
 
 Develop a database of national trade statistics. A database of disaggregated (HS 8 digit) trade 
statistics would be useful to readily match tariff policy changes (instituted at the HS 8 digit) with 
changes in the trade flows. A monthly dataset of trade flows and a quarterly dataset of trade 
flows and markets would support PITAD’s trade monitoring function, providing the latest trade 
trends to decision makers in the private and public sector. An interface to access data at various 
levels of aggregation with low fixed costs of entry would be essential. Partner: Federal Bureau of 
Statistics. 
 
 Establish Internal Database Repository. It would also be important to create a data depository, 
where the data collected from different projects- those outsourced and done in-house- by various 
researchers are stored in a central location in the Institute so that they may be easily accessed by 
all researchers. Researchers would be responsible to provide supporting documentation to 
accompany the datasets. 
 
 Use a Statistical Package beyond EXCEL (e.g. STATA). At the Institutional level, researchers 
should be encouraged to learn to work with a statistical package like STATA. As trade research 
now tends to be performed at very disaggregated product or firm level, research productivity 
would be highly advanced if researchers adopted a common statistical package such as STATA. 
STATA is recommended as it has excellent applications, is widely used internationally and 
PITAD computers already have STATA installed. Since STATA usage is primarily a learning by 
doing exercise, it would be good to have all researchers working on it so that there would be 
cooperation among researchers to address any issues. A basic introduction could be provided, but 
no further structured training is encouraged. While there will be an initial fixed cost in adoption, 
the stream of benefits that follow would far outweigh these costs. This would then facilitate the 
increased use of econometrics in the analytic work. 
 
 Develop a “core” research program. It is important to balance support to the MOC with a 
longer-term research agenda. It would be useful to identify a “core” research program, covering a 
few broad topics based on policy relevance and the strengths of the PITAD team. While the 
requirements of the MOC would point to important trade issues relevant to Pakistan, outputs may 
be required in a time sensitive manner that would not accommodate an extensive analysis. If such 
work was in the research ‘core’ then researchers should be encouraged to revisit the topic, and 
expand the analysis towards generation of a PITAD working paper. The identification of a ‘core’ 
would also then readily reveal which projects should be outsourced (those outside the core). 
Having a core program, would also give researchers the opportunity to pursue a research topic 
which could become important in the future but as yet has not been identified as important by the 
MOC. 
 
 Prioritize Econometric and Analytic work over CGE Modeling. Computer General Equilibrium 
(CGE) models are valuable as a tool to gauge the trade and income effects of different 
liberalization scenarios, and are attractive in that their output is a precise number reflecting 
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welfare effects of a proposed policy change.  However these simulation results are based on 
complex models, with several assumptions and data requirements, where results could be highly 
sensitive to parameter variation. Further, Pakistan estimates are based on an outdated input- 
output table that is only being currently updated. There is a high fixed cost of embarking on 
rigorous CGE modeling, and it is recommended that acquiring these skills are not a priority, and 
any needed studies could be outsourced. Instead the focus should be on moving on to more 
econometric  work  and  more  sophisticated  analytical  work.  These  would  involve  advanced 
gravity modeling, and analytics involving disaggregated data relating to export diversification, 
intensive and extensive margins of trade, product quality, exporter firm survival, regional 
integration, services export competitiveness, and NTMs. 
 
 Form a Research Advisory Board. It is important to have a high profile research advisory board 
that could advise PITAD on its long-term research agenda. While the requirements of the MOC 
would point to important trade issues relevant to Pakistan, it would be useful to have a broader 
advisory board that may be more forward thinking and brings perspectives from outside the 
country. Besides the Senior PITAD researchers, the membership of the proposed Board could 
include: 
 
o MOC (1 member) 
 
o Pakistani academics (1 member) 
 
o Pakistan private sector (1 member) 
 
o High profile non–resident Pakistani economist (1 member) 
 
o High profile international academic/ economist familiar with Pakistan (1 member) 
 
The members of the Board would be charged with reviewing the publications of PITAD and 
advising on the future directions for research. The external advisors could prove particularly 
useful in terms of funding sources, opportunities for training for PITAD staff, opportunities for 
collaboration and having an external advocate for the Institute. The Board would meet once a 
year. International members may cost effectively contribute to meetings by video conference or 
Skype, and make written submissions.  Currently PITAD does not have is an internationally 
recognized high profile trade expert associated with it. It would be useful to have a prominent 
economist in the Advisory Board. 
 
 Resident Research Fellows. In order to increase the technical capacity of its research staff, the 
PITAD should seek to secure Resident Research Fellows from abroad or within Pakistan for 
short periods, whose active research skills or areas of study would provide invaluable intellectual 
stimulation to senior as well as junior research staff. These academics should be focused on 
relevant research and should collaborate with senior staff or be allocated junior staff to provide 
research assistance; so that there is skills transfer. 
 
 External  Research  Fellows.  These  research  fellows  that  are  not  based  at  PITAD  could 
economists/academics  in Pakistan or abroad, but collaborate with PITAD staff. These titles 
should be carefully given so they remain a prestigious position. 
 
 Incentives to Attract and Retain High Quality Staff. In order to provide high quality research and 
policy  analysis,  PITAD  has  to  acquire  and  retain  high  quality  human  capital  with  strong 
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analytical, statistical and writing skills. Given the growth of research institutes and consultancy 
work in Pakistan, there is likely to be much competition for and poaching of well-trained 
researchers. Since PITAD staff do not have the job security of civil servants, they have to be 
compensated by higher wages and other non-monetary benefits. In order to retain staff, it may 
also be worth considering an incentive mechanism that gives them some additional payment for 
consultancies taken on by PITAD or consultancies that they bring in. 
 
Apart from competitive salaries, PITAD’s attraction must continue to be an active research 
conducive work environment encouraging active debate and discussion, with opportunities for 
training. While a “training of trainers” strategy may be cost effective, it would be also important 
to additionally expose young researchers to training abroad. It is great to see that contributions of 
junior staff are acknowledged by name for research assistance or given co-authorship when the 
contribution is substantial. In addition, PITAD would have to adjust to the regular turnover of 
young staff that will go on for further full time study. As the reputation of PITAD grows, it may 
become an attractive place for civil servants on the cusp of retirement. PITAD management 
needs to be vigilant that only active staff that could contribute effectively to the team are 
recruited. 
 
 Foreign Staff Exchange/placement. Networks could be developed with a more mature research 
institute in the region to create opportunities for staff development through temporary leaves of 
absence. Compensation strategies may be negotiated with the partner institutes. 
 
2. Scaling Up Training Program 
 
419.     The  Institute’s  training  goals  have  expanded  beyond  provision  of  its  core  Specialized 
Training Program (STF) to new entrants of the Commerce and Trade (C&T) officer cadre at the 
MOC. It is envisioned that the PITAD will identify continuous training needs of middle management 
at the MOC that would be met by PITAD in-house training, partnerships with outside academic 
institutions, or complete outsourcing of training to local or international institutions. This would 
include technical training as well as leadership and management training. 
 
 Completing Core STP Course Re-engineering. A key training-related priority is to complete the 
revamping of PITAD flagship STP course in collaboration with the World Trade Institute (WTI), 
Switzerland. It is important that the new curriculum includes new topics such as heterogeneous 
firms and trade in tasks. 
 
 Consolidation vs. Expansion. Beyond the STP, PITAD has other shorter courses for foreign 
service officials, trade officers to be posted abroad, mid-level commerce officers and journalists. 
This is a strong portfolio and it is important to focus on upgrading all these shorter courses 
instead of expanding to cover new areas. The growth of PITAD’s research wing will contribute 
to the medium-term development of the training program. 
 
 Opening up Internal Trainings. Given the lack of a vibrant trade research community, it would be 
good if PITAD opened up some of its trainings to other officers in the Commerce ministry, 
relevant industry ministries, and researchers of the State Bank of Pakistan and the Federal Bureau 
of Statistics. Reciprocity would be expected under such an arrangement. 
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3. Coalescing the Trade Community and Expanding Outreach 
 
420.     The Institute can play an important role in coalescing the trade research community by 
bringing together the various stakeholders of trade policy making, in a convener and connecter role. 
Convening conferences and  workshops would  be  an  excellent  forum  for  policy discussion  and 
debate. Policy dissemination through the publication of research papers and policy reports would also 
provide important information to relevant stakeholders. 
 
 Continue Working Paper Series. Now that the Working Paper Series has been launched, it is 
imperative that it continues with the publication of more papers. A reasonable target focused of 
quality and quantity would be about 5 papers per year. There are many works in the pipeline and 
it is important to add them to the working paper list. In addition, it would be worthwhile to 
expand on quick policy outputs that revealed interesting results but were produced under short 
time constraints on request by the MOC.   There is no need to spend money on printing these 
papers as long as they are freely available on the website. The publication of a clear, deep 
analysis on a pressing issue in trade policy would be invaluable to generating confidence in the 
analytical capacity and policy advice of the PITAD. 
 
 Updating the PITAD website. The homepage of the PITAD website contains more information 
than is optimal. A streamlining of the website is needed and systems for regular updates at low 
cost need to be set in place. Currently, the website does not seem recently updated. 
 
 Organize Pakistan Trade and Development (PAKTAD) Conference. This would be the launch of 
an annual trade conference in Pakistan. 
 
 Develop a Market Access Database Portal. The nature of barriers to trade in the global economy 
has changed. Market access issues now focus increasingly on non-tariff and other “behind the 
border” measures in the markets of trading partners, compared to border tariffs. While some 
regulation of trade (human, animal and plant health, security-related) is important, the 
implementation of legitimate policies is sometimes manipulated for protective purposes. A user – 
friendly web portal that allows Pakistani exporters to register market access barriers especially 
NTMs would be useful for MOC policy negotiations and actions, and exporting success. The 
portal could be developed as a more modest hybrid of the European Commission’s Export 
Market Access Database madb.europa.eu/ 
 
 Intra-regional  and  Extra-regional  Networking.  Networking  with  intra-regional  and  extra- 
regional policy institutes should be accelerated as the Institute builds its research capacity. 
 
4. Potential Channels for World Bank Support 
 
421.     Consistent with the World Bank’s strategy of moving to a “wholesale” model of research 
capacity building, the Bank could provide technical assistance in a variety of ways that introduces 
new techniques, data, and topics to Pakistani researchers. Provide technical assistance through Bank 
staff doing joint work with PITAD researchers, so they could impart new methodologies through 
learning-by-doing. Bank staff may spend extended time at PITAD, or a PITAD researcher could 
spend the summer months working on a joint research project. Advisory services include continuing 
research collaborations, mentoring young researchers and assisting with monitoring quality control. 
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 Conferences, Workshops and Specific trainings. Financing conferences on highly topical 
subjects and periodic workshops on research methodology. 
 
o Pakistan Trade and Development (PAKTAD) Conference 
 
o Empirical Methods in International Trade Workshop 
 
o Preferential Trade Agreements Training 
 
 Trade Database and Portal. Support for the development of the trade database and portal—in 
line with supporting statistical capacity development and open data initiatives in developing 
countries. 
 
 Quarterly Trade Monitoring Report and the Annual Pakistan State of International Trade 
Report - advisory services for development of these publications. 
 
 Export  Competitiveness  Toolkit.  Training  on  calculating  and  interpreting  all  the  key 
indicators in the Trade Department’s Export Competitiveness Toolkit. 
 
 Non-tariffs Measures Project. Include Pakistan in NTMs stocktaking project of the Trade 
Department. 
 
 Innovation Policy. Incorporate Pakistan in World Bank’s efforts to build regional and global 
networks on innovation policy practitioners to facilitate locally-driven initiatives by 
mobilizing international “know-how” and facilitating practitioner exchange (including 
“south—south”). 
 ANNEX 1. TOWARD ENHANCED COMPETITIVENESS AND EXPORT GROWTH 
PAKISTAN’S TOP 45 EXPORTS AS SHARE OF TOTAL 
(at 4 digit SITC level) 
Code Product Name 1990-99 2000-2006 
Share in Total Exports (%) 
 Code Product Name 1990-99 2000-2006 
Share in Total Exports (%) 
6513 Cotton yarn 16.11 9.22  0423 Rice, milled 5.74 5.90 
6522 Woven unb cotton fab nes 5.50 4.40  0342 Fish,frozen exc.fillets 0.43 0.51 
6523 Woven cotton finish<200g 4.77 1.70  0361 Crustaceans, frozen 1.02 0.34 
6525 Woven cotton blend <200g 1.33 3.68  0542 Dried legumes 0.01 0.22 
6529 Woven cotton fabrics nes 1.00 2.02  0571 Citrus fruit fresh/dried 0.08 0.21 
6531 Woven syn fil yarn fabrc 6.15 2.90  0579 Fruit fresh/dried nes 0.54 0.54 
6552 Knit/croch fabric nes 0.94 0.63  0612 Cane/beet sugar nes 0.64 0.10 
6582 Tarpaulins/tents/blinds 0.62 0.48  0615 Molasses ex sugar refine 0.73 0.41 
6584 Bed/table/toilet linen 7.77 14.44   Food Products 9.20 8.26 
6585 Curtains etc nes 0.34 1.05      
6589 Made-up textile arts nes 1.48 1.78  6114 Bovine/equine leathr nes 0.86 0.92 
6592 Carpets etc. knotted 2.66 2.06  6116 Goat/kid leather,no hair 1.31 0.85 
 Textiles 48.68 44.36  8511 Footwear metal toe-cap 0.28 0.11 
     8514 Footwear leather upr nes 0.03 0.49 
8414 Men/boy trouser/etc wovn 1.88 3.11   Leather and Footware 2.49 2.37 
8415 Mens/boys shirts, woven 1.58 0.77      
8416 M/b under/night wear wvn 0.61 0.48  8947 Sports goods 2.99 2.53 
8426 Women/g trousers woven 0.33 1.00  8722 Medical.surg/vet instrum 1.41 1.15 
8432 Men/b suits/etc knit/cr 0.35 0.77   Misc Manufactures 4.40 3.69 
8437 Men/boy knit/croch shirt 3.14 4.47      
8447 Women/g blouses knit/cro 0.38 0.64  3330 Petrol./bitum. oil,crude 0.66 0.31 
8454 T-shirts/singlets knit/c 0.63 1.14  3344 Fuel oils,nes 0.24 2.72 
8459 Apparel nes knit/crochet 1.36 1.47  5743 Polycarbonates/alk resin 0.01 0.52 
8461 Clothing acc not knit/cr 0.58 0.93   Petrol & Chemical Products 0.90 3.54 
8462 Panty hose/hosiery kn/cr 0.67 0.88      
8481 Leather clothing/access 4.42 3.59  6612 Portland etc cements 0.03 0.32 
 Garments 15.91 19.23  6633 Min material manuf nes 0.12 0.11 
      Cement 0.15 0.43 
2631 Raw cotton,excl linters 3.43 0.61      
2633 Cotton waste 0.63 0.33   Total  Top 42 85.80 82.83 
 Raw Cotton 4.06 0.94   Total Top 10 58.46 54.86 
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 ANNEX 2. EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS AND GROWTH ISSUES: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1.          Studies on competitiveness have made it clear that the determinants of competitiveness are many 
and complex.  The arguments for investment in physical capital and infrastructure have been long present. 
Neoclassical  economists,  then,  emphasized  getting  the  macro  fundamentals  right  so  that  resources 
naturally flow into the right sectors, and within those sectors, the right firms.  Further, economists looked 
for other issues: human and social capital, hard and soft infrastructure, technological progress and 
innovation,  business  enabling  environment,  firm sophistication  and  demand  conditions,  product  and 
market diversification, etc.   There is now a general consensus among academics and practitioners that 
many of these arguments are not mutually exclusive but jointly supportive. 
 
2.          Competitiveness is a proxy of the productivity of an economy and depends on the value of a 
nation’s products and services, measured by the prices they can command in international markets as well 
as the efficiency with which they can be produced.   Productivity is subject to the basic minimum 
conditionality  or  the  macro  fundamentals  of  stability,  sound  markets  and  property  rights  regimes, 
effective and constructive regulation, good human resources, etc.   But productivity and operational 
efficiency can often be increased through inter-firm and inter-industry linkages, spillovers, and synergies 
which require efficient access to public goods, better coordination and diffusion of best practices. 
 
3.          A good practice export competitiveness initiative underscores several of the above issues and 
draws on the myriad of policy tools and approaches employed around the world on trade, macroeconomic 
policy, customs and logistics, and direct enterprise support.  It emphasizes the importance of global 
integration in achieving competitiveness – be it through new technologies, market-integrating economic 
policies. The policy agenda that typically emerges from a competitiveness analysis relates to three or four 
core areas.  [Education and health is often considered a fourth distinct core area, but may be included in 
Supply Side Measures also.] 
 
Macro  fundamentals  (e.g.,  removal  of  economic  biases  having  to  do  with  tariff  and  non-tariff 
barriers, real exchange rate misalignment, distortive tax regime, overall fiscal health of the economy, 
product and factor market conditions, property right protection, effective regulation, case of firm 
entry and exit). 
 
Services and costs (e.g., infrastructure, customs and trade logistics, the costs of doing business 
including compliance cost of regulation). 
 
Proactive measures that try to correct market failures and develop public goods (e.g., technology 
creation and adaptation, product standards and certifications, export promotion, environmental and 
social standards, social safety nets). 
 
Education and health (e.g., primary and higher education, vocational and on-the-job training, basic 
health care). 
 
4.          Macro fundamentals are as necessary now as before. No country ever achieved sustainable 
growth without have macroeconomic stability, removing protectionist measures, avoiding exchange rate 
biases and opening up markets.   Although it is sometimes argued that the first generation reforms are 
complete in several countries, it remains a key challenge for policy makers to ensure that anti-trade biases 
are eradicated so that domestic resources can be channeled to their most productive activities. 
 
5.         Anti-trade biases can take various forms.   High tariff rates and quantitative restrictions are 
conventional   trade   distorting   policies   but   presence   of   import-export   monopolies   and   various 
administrative restraints often make the situation especially prone to rent-seeking.  Trading systems are 
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further distorted and segmented by the existence of preferential tariff rates and market access that are 
reciprocal to a subset of partner countries. 
 
6.          Real exchange rate misalignment can be detrimental to export growth, and the current devaluation 
of dollars as well as the inflationary pressures are likely to affect several countries.   For example, the 
exceptional export growth of East Asian countries in the early 1990s was closely related to the ability of 
these countries to avoid real exchange rate overvaluation while minimizing exchange rate volatility. 
 
7.         Business taxes on investment also affect export orientation through its impact on investment 
decisions.  Marginal effective tax rate (METR) on capital is a summary measure of the effective rate of 
tax imposed on the rate of return generated.  The tax regime can impose biases against exporters, labor- 
intensive investments and against the small and medium enterprises (SMEs). It is important that countries 
continue to investigate ways to bring down the tax-related biases which may stand in their way to export 
competitiveness. 
 
8.          Deregulation of market is a must for the forces of competition to play.  Any barriers in entry and 
exit of industries are likely to result in compromise in reaching the potentials of economic efficiency. 
 
9.          Factor markets are instrumental in achieving competitiveness:   Constraints on factor markets 
often bar economies from achieving full competitive potentials.  For example, poor access to credit, lack 
of skilled labor, biased land policies and lack of transparency in land management are things that come up 
as constraints on the way industries can attain highest degree of efficiency.   These in turn lead to 
excessive informality, less than minimum efficient scale and cumbersome enforcement of business 
regulations. 
 
10.        Reduced trade costs of infrastructure and related services contribute to competitiveness. In 
order to effectively compete in the global markets, firms should have access to efficiently-produced 
critical backbone services and inputs.  Countries where firms have to pay more than their competitors for 
energy, telecommunications, transport and logistics, business registration and operations, and business 
services will find it hard to compete in the global markets.  If bureaucratic hurdles, lack of transparency 
and corruption are rampant, enterprises will find hard to compete even if they have high productivity 
within factory floors.  As environmental agenda is gaining momentum and firms’ track records on carbon 
footprints often add to not only their corporate social responsibility but also overall effectiveness of their 
brands and products. 
 
11.        Supply  side  measures  for  enhancing  competitiveness.    It  is  possible that industries  need 
support to cover one-time expense of discovery of new products and gathering information on foreign 
markets, upgrading product quality and standards requirements, changing packaging, and establishing 
market channels.   All these tasks require the coordination between public institutions and private 
stakeholders to work at multiple levels.  This, in turn, will require each side to be aware of the strengths 
and limitations of the other, and be ready to step in when necessary and feasible.  Such complementarities 
become especially important as local markets integrate with global, and export competitiveness becomes 
more and more the function of broader technological and organizational efficiency than individual firm- 
specific characteristics. 
 
12.        The importance of basic health and education remains clear. The past experiences on global 
integration, especially in more sophisticated industries, have put the agenda of specialized education and 
vocational training back at the forefront of the competitiveness agenda. 
 
13.         Despite the codification and structure described above, a competitiveness strategy should 
not be static but dynamic. Although the macroeconomic fundamentals and human resources remain key 
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to competitiveness, the new paradigm of competitiveness is very much about getting the microeconomic 
business environment right.   Although business environment is equated with the ease of business 
regulations, it may be useful to think of this term more broadly, consisting public or semi-public 
institutions covering innovation and R&D, standards and certification, skills enhancement, export 
promotion, etc. Such cannot be responsibilities of the private sectors alone nor that of the public sectors 
alone.  In essence, several of these are not industry-specific issues either, but issues that affect the 
functioning of various industrial clusters and the way each is connected with the other.  The challenge of 
each  competitiveness  program  will  be  in  applying  the  broad  pro  forma  framework  on  trade 
competitiveness into a meaningful policy dialogue and strategic initiative that works towards removing 
specific binding constraints in Pakistan. 
 
14.        To maximize the effectiveness of interventions, the authorities need to be able to quickly spot 
deficiencies or changing conditions and make course corrections.  The pre-requisites for this dynamic 
approach include: 
 
A realistic plan that is observant of the diverse factors and stakeholders involved, is anticipatory of 
any global or local changes rising to the surface. 
 
An institutionalized and inclusive process of consultation with the private sector in the design, 
monitoring and evaluation of interventions 
 
Transparency in implicit or explicit subsidies involved in the interventions 
Clear, measurable and transparent indicators of success of each intervention 
Arms-length relations between the government and the private sector 
A public governance set-up that ensures that the government is bound by sufficient accountability to 
be able to prevent capture and to interrupt failing interventions. 
 ANNEX 3. TOWARD ENHANCED COMPETITIVENESS AND EXPORT GROWTH 
 
A Cluster Based Approach 
 
1.          Improving competitiveness mostly depends on the pace at which firms within an economy shift 
from competing on basic and inherited endowments to competing on advantages arising from efficient 
and distinctive processes and products that contain as much added value as possible. Within firms, such a 
shift will require innovation of products, processes, and markets, adaptation of new technologies, and new 
partnerships among productive forces, such as workers, suppliers, service providers, and buyers. 
 
2.          Beyond firms, the shift will require parallel changes in the surrounding microeconomic business 
environment, which will depend on the mobilization of private and public sector actors and institutions. 
While microeconomic business environment is fundamental but development of public institutions that 
proactively support value addition by firms at a collective level are also important, such as those covering 
innovation and R&D, standards and certification, skills enhancement and export promotion. 
 
3.          A  cluster-based  approach  combines  economy-wide  and  industry-wide  analyses  such  that 
consultations with the public and private sector bodies are managed such that they form the platforms on 
which public-private partnerships are sought and achieved at an incremental pace.  A typical cluster 
initiative model will begin with cluster mapping which will outline cluster-economy embeddedness on the 
one hand, and on the other, it will show cluster composition typically involving producers and suppliers, 
service providers, regulators and standard setters, and policymakers from the key public institutions. 
Lifespan of a cluster analysis involves three broad components: 
 
First, facilitators will apply tools that emphasize on interaction among cluster members from both 
public and private domains (e.g., product/market segmentation, SWOT, GAP and Porter’s Five- 
Forces analyses); 
 
Second, industry experts are brought in to undertake more rigorous analyses that are done jointly 
with the private sector actors (e.g., value chain analysis, market trend analysis, competitiveness 
positioning); 
 
4.          The above two are deeply intertwined with clusters’ strategy formulations on behavior change 
within firms where the private sector actors have to invest in kind or in cash.  This is matched by reforms 
in public supporting institutions to bring changes in microeconomic business environment covering 
innovation, and R&D, standards and certification, skills enhancement and export promotion. 
 
5.          Facilitating Public—Private and Private—Private Dialogue (PPD).  Interface and partnerships 
between and within the public and private sectors are crucial to address key constraints to existing 
activities.  This is due to the fact that the ultimate success of a competitiveness strategy is influenced by 
the fact that (i) governments can rarely pick winners, (ii) the private sector has difficulty creating public 
goods or taking collective action, (iii) competitiveness often is boosted from collaboration of industry 
with  academic  and  applied  research  institutions,  and  (iv)  the  body  of  policy  reforms  and  specific 
initiatives affecting competiveness involves a cross section of government institutions.  However, though 
the private sector can have a positive role—such as helping the public sector coordinate and monitor pro- 
active measures to unleash firm level competitiveness – public and private sector bodies often find it 
challenging to achieve aligned objectives and work productively together. 
 
 
6.          In Pakistan, the private sector is highly active in policy making through a number of formal and 
informal avenue.  Leading business voices are present in high level committees sponsored by the Ministry 
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of Finance (The Economic Advisory Committee) and the Planning Commission (The PSD Task Force). 
Some of these same leading businesses have also formed the Pakistan Business Council a private sector 
run and funded think-tank which carries out policy analysis of key issues facing Pakistan’s business 
sector.  The strong PPD tradition in Pakistan is a good foundation to identify new ways for the public and 
private sectors to work together for common objectives. 
 
7.          The project will first assess various PPD and initiatives in Pakistan, with a particular attention to 
those  which  focus  on  policy  advocacy  to  influence  levels  of  leadership,  build  consensus  with 
stakeholders, effectively coordinate inputs, mobilize resources and push forward an implementation 
agenda.  Based on the lessons learned in Policy Notes 4 and 5, and a stocktaking of current PPD activities 
in Pakistan, the component will specify (i) an agreed upon set of targeted outcomes shared by the public 
and private sector, (ii) an appropriate mode of engagement between government, private sector, donors, 
and any other key stakeholders, (iii) identification of issue-specific, sector-specific and/or cluster-based 
approaches to engage, and (iv) checks and balances, for an effective PPD institution, including a 
monitoring and evaluation framework for targeted outcomes.   The Bank team will liaise closely with 
other donors in the field including ADB, USAID and DFID as well as related project such as the 
Competitiveness Support Fund (CSF) which has been in existence since 2005-06.
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8.          Issues identification, engagement methodology and success indicators for the PPD stock taking 
and pilot PPD approach to cluster development will be determined within the context of Policy Notes 4 
and 5.  While the Ministry of Commerce will oversee and sponsor the effort, the precise institutional 
counterparts on the public and private side will also be determined at that time.  The case study will be 
written up and published as a pilot, but will also include a plan (i.e. methods, institutions, costs, etc) for 
scaling up the pilot to other cases. 
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USAID is exploring the setting up a panel of “competitiveness councils” of private sector, government, academia 
and civil society representation in 20 districts. 
 
 
149 
